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ABSTRACT 
T h i s  r e p o r t  h i g h l i 8 h t s  some o f  t h e  m a j o r  i s s u e s  o f  r e c r u i t i n g ,  r e t e n t i o n ,  
and q u a l i t y  r a i s e d  bv t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a n  A l l - V o l u n t e e r  F o r c e  (AVF) and  
e f f o r t s  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t  i n  t h e  1970s  and 1 9 8 0 s .  The s t r a t e g i c  and  p o l i t i c a l  
b a s i s  of c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f ramework f o r  a  
discussion of  q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  q u a l i t a t i v e ,  and a n a l y t i c a l  and administrative 
i s s u e s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  A'TF. 
The r e p o r t  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t :  ( 1 )  m e e t i n g  q u a n t i ~ a t i v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  more d i f f i c u l t  t h a n  m a i n t a i n i n g  a d e q u a t e  manpower q u a l i t y ;  
and ( 2 )  t h e  i n s ~ i t u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  o f  mann ing  t h e  Armed F o r c e s  e n t i r e l y  w i t h  
v o l u n t e e r s  may r e m a i n  l o n g  a f t e r  c h a l l e n g e s  o f  q u a n t i t y  and  q , u a l i t y  h a v e  b e e n  
me t .  
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SUMMARY 
Background, Purpose,  and Scope 
This  CRS r e p o r t  h i g h l i g h t s  some of t h e  major  i s s u e s  of r e c r u i t i n g ,  
r e t e n t i o n ,  q u a l i t y ,  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  r a i s e d  by t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  t o  an All-Volunteer  Force  (AVF) and e f f o r t s  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t  
i n  t h e  1970s and 1980s. The s t r a t e g i c  and p o l i t i c a l  ba se s  of c u r r e n t  
U.S. m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y  provide  t h e  framework f o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  of 
q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  q u a l i t a t i v e ,  a n a l y t i c a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  i s s u e s  
r ega rd ing  t h e  AVF. A l l  t h r e e  components of t h e  m i l i t a r y  manpower s t r u c -  
t u r e  -- t h e  a c t i v e  Armed Fo rces ,  S e l e c t e d  Reserve u n i t s ,  and p r e t r a i n e d  
i n d i v i d u a l  r e s e r v i s t s  -- a r e  i nc luded .  Only e n l i s t e d  pe r sonne l  i s s u e s  
a r e  d i s c u s s e d ;  o f f i c e r  personnel  m a t t e r s  a r e  n o t  t r e a t e d .  
The S t r a t e g i c  and P o l i t i c a l  Framework 
The United S t a t e s  e n t e r e d  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force  e r a  i n  1973 w i t h  
c e r t a i n  s t r a t e g i c  and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  unde r ly ing  t h e  concep tua l  and 
i d e o l o g i c a l  ba se s  f o r  i t s  m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c i e s .  Based on a  NATO/ 
Warsaw Pac t  war a s  t h e  most demanding, manpower-intensive m i l i t a r y  emergency 
U.S. Armed Forces  were l i k e l y  t o  f a c e ,  i t  was assumed t h a t  adequate  
U.S. m i l i t a r y  manpower t o  meet a n t i c i p a t e d  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  could  be 
main ta ined  by manning bo th  t h e  a c t i v e  and Reserve f o r c e s  w i th  v o l u n t e e r s  
i n  peacet ime,  wi th  a  s tandby S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  System t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
capable  of qu ick  r e a c t i v a t i o n  t o  provide  d r a f t e e s  i n  an emergency. 
S ince  t h e  AVF began i n  1973, s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s t r a t e g i c  s i t u a t i o n  unde r ly ing  t h e s e  assumptions have changed. Sov ie t  
m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  have i n c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  whi le  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
manpower s t r e n g t h  h a s  dropped,  and t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  acqu i r ed  m i l i t a r y  
and s t r a t e g i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  P e r s i a n  Gul f - Ind ian  Ocean-Southwest 
As ia  r e g i o n s  which i t  d i d  n o t  have i n  t h e  1970s. 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Requirements  
The Al l -Volunteer  Force  a s  i t  now s t a n d s  i s  meet ing  e x p l i c i t l y  
s t a t e d  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r e c r u i t i n g  g o a l s  and bo th  a c t i v e  and S e l e c t e d  
Reserve c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i z e d  manpower s t r e n g t h s .  On c l o s e r  
examina t i on ,  however, t h i s  a p p a r e n t l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s i t u a t i o n  may 
d i s g u i s e  unde r ly ing  manpower problems. Peacet ime a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  have been s t e a d i l y  reduced s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  
of t h e  AVF i n  FY 1973, f o r  no c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  reasons .  Th i s  r a i s e s  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  r equ i r emen t s  ove r  t h e  p a s t  e i g h t  y e a r s  have been 
a d j u s t e d  downward i n  r e sponse  t o  a  d e c l i n i n g  c a p a c i t y  t o  r e c r u i t .  
The i n c r e a s e d  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r equ i r emen t s  of t h e  Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  
beg t h e  q u e s t i o n  even f u r t h e r .  Se l ec t ed  Reserve wartime r equ i r emen t s  
a r e  s t i l l  l a r g e r  t h a n  S e l e c t e d  Reserve s t r e n g t h s ,  d e s p i t e  some improvement 
s i n c e  t h e  end of FY 1978. Overarch ing  a l l  of t h e s e  f i g u r e s  i s  t h e  
l a r g e  gap between t h e  a c t u a l  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  Army I n d i v i d u a l  Ready Reserve 
(IRR) and m o b i l i z a t i o n  r equ i r emen t s  f o r  a NATO/Warsaw Pac t  war. 
Because t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  a r e  a t  cong re s s iona l l y - au tho r i zed  s t r e n g t h ,  
and t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve i s  no t  d r a s t i c a l l y  below DoD-stated m o b i l i z a t i o n  
r equ i r emen t s ,  i t  seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  assume t h a t  they  could  be main ta ined  
a t  t h e s e  l e v e l s  o r  s l i g h t l y  i n c r e a s e d  w i thou t  a  wholesa le  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  
of r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  and p o l i c i e s .  The gap between 
Army I n d i v i d u a l  Ready Reserve s t r e n g t h  and DOD-stated requi rements ,  
however, would appear  t o  be so  g r e a t  t h a t  i t  could  t a k e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
more t han  " t i n k e r i n g  a t  t h e  edges" t o  b r idge  i t .  The a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  All-Volunteer  Force t o  meet i n c r e a s e d  manpower r equ i r emen t s  
would, on t h e  b a s i s  of p a s t  expe r i ence  a lone ,  appear  t o  be much 
more p rob lema t i ca l .  
Thus, U.S. f o r c e  p l anne r s  now f a c e  a  s e t  of major p o l i c y  i s s u e s  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  manpower requi rements  of t h e  Armed Forces .  
I n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and e a r l y  1970s,  t h e  view of most concerned a n a l y s t s  
and m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  was t h a t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  manpower l e v e l s  
were adequate o r  even exces s ive .  I n  t h e  1980s,  i f  t h e  assumptions noted  
above a r e  accep ted ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s e n s e  t h a t  c u r r e n t  manpower s t r e n g t h s  a r e  
e i t h e r  adequate  o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  The Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  i n  f a c t  p l a n s  
t o  expand manpower requi rements .  There i s  t h u s  f i r s t  a q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  
whether c u r r e n t  DOD-stated requi rements  u n d e r s t a t e  a c t u a l  m i l i t a r y  
requi rements ,  Second i s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  of whether ,  i f  requi rements  should  
be i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  manpower system can supply  i n c r e a s e d  
numbers of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  of r e q u i s i t e  q u a l i t y  wi thout  r a d i c a l  change. 
Qua l i t y  
The d i s c u s s i o n  of personnel  q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force  
has  been marked by e x t r a o r d i n a r y  con t rove r sy .  Not j u s t  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  
bu t  methodology and s t anda rds  a s  w e l l ,  have been t h e  s u b j e c t s  of i n t e n s e  
debate .  C e r t a i n  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  however, can be drawn a f t e r  e i g h t  y e a r s  
of expe r i ence  w i th  t h e  AVF: 
-- The pe rcen t age  of above ave rage  and ave rage  i n d i v i d u a l s  
i n  t h e  e n l i s t e d  r a n k s  -- measured by e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t  o r  mental  
t e s t  s c o r e  -- h a s  d e c l i n e d  s i n c e  t h e  AVF began. Th i s  c o r r o b o r a t e s  
near-unanimous, i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  r e p o r t s  by o f f i c e r s  and N C O s  t h a t  
such pe r sons  a r e  found much l e s s  o f t e n  i n  t h e  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  r anks  -- 
e s p e c i a l l y  above average  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
-- The p r o p o r t i o n  of below ave rage  pe r sonne l  h a s  r i s e n  sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  s i n c e  t h e  mid-1970s. Though many c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  
had b e l i e v e d  t h i s  t o  be t h e  c a s e ,  t h e i r  view was q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  r e i n -  
f o r ced  o n l y  r e c e n t l y  by r e v e l a t i o n s  of menta l  t e s t  i n a c c u r a c i e s  
d u r i n g  FY 1976-1980. 
-- The b r i e f  h i s t o r y  of manpower q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n  i n  t h e  A l l -  
Vo lun t ee r  Force  s u g g e s t s  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of r e l y i n g  t oo  h e a v i l y  on 
s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  informed judgment, i n  de t e rmin ing  o v e r a l l  
p o l i c y .  I t  would appear  t o  be more u s e f u l  f o r  some purposes t o  u se  
g e n e r a l  i n d i c a t o r s  and impres s ions  of & r e a d i n e s s  and p r o f i c i e n c y ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  of i n d i v i d u a l  s k i l l  competence. A f t e r  a l l ,  i t  i s  
t h e  u n i t s  t h a t  dep loy  t o  f i g h t ,  no t  a  mass of unorganized i n d i v i d u a l s .  
-- The AVF j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  r anks  c o n t a i n  a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  
h i g h  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of b l acks .  The complex n a t u r e  of t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
between b l a c k  and wh i t e  Americans, and t h e  cause s  and consequences 
of r ac i sm  i n  American l i f e ,  make e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  
o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  on m i l i t a r y  performance very  d i f f i c u l t ,  
-- It is not clear that career retention problems result primarily 
from the advent of the All-Volunteer Force. The evidence suggests that 
career retention problems preceded the AVF by many years. It may be 
that intangible or secondary effects of the transition to an AVF exacer- 
bate career retention problems, but if past laments of retention study 
groups in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s are any indication, the major reason 
for career retention problems was and remains career force compensation 
leve 1s. 
Analytical and Administrative Issues 
One of the central features of manpower policy management in the 
All-Volunteer Force is the dominance of economic criteria, market-place 
analogies, and quantitative analyses. This has come about because an 
AVF must compete in the labor market for personnel. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that some of the strategies the Armed Forces adopt to 
induce individuals to enter and remain in military service will 
bear a close resemblance to those used by civilian business and 
commercial enterprises. 
The transition to an All-Volunteer Force, however, merely reinforced 
a broader trend toward approaching military manpower policy from a 
civilian-oriented managerial, industrial, and utilitarian perspective, 
rather than a more specifically military, geopolitical, and strategic 
one. This has resulted from a combination of traditional political, 
strategic, and social circumstances and a variety of post-World War I1 
developments that reinforced these circumstances. The characteristics 
of this style of policymaking have included: 
-- Heavy r e l i a n c e  on long-range p r o j e c t i o n s  t o  provide  a  b a s i s  
f o r  comparing e x i s t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and programs wi th  t h o s e  be ing  proposed.  
These p r e d i c t i o n s  and t h e  a n a l y s e s  based on them a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  
o v e r t a k e n  by e v e n t s  o r  changes i n  fundament a1  assumptions.  
-- The r e d e f i n i t i o n  ( t o  what deg ree  i s  n o t  c l e a r )  of m i l i t a r y  
s e r v i c e  from an  " i n s t i t u t i o n "  o r  " c a l l i n g , "  w i t h  s p e c i a l  r equ i r emen t s  
of d i s c i p l i n e ,  s e r v i c e ,  l o y a l t y ,  and commitment, toward an occupa t ion  
o r  job ,  no d i f f e r e n t  from c i v i l i a n  employment. 
-- Emphasis on t h e  economica l ly  and b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y  e f f i c i e n t  
management of a  peacet ime armed f o r c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  combat 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h a t  peacet ime f o r c e  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n  f o r  war. 
-- I n c r e a s e d  p e r s o n a l  autonomy of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  i n  t h e i r  
l i f e s t y l e s  and h a b i t s ,  and a  concomitant  dec rea se  i n  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  
of i n d i v i d u a l  d e s i r e s  and wishes  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
g o a l s  and needs  of t h e  Armed Forces .  
-- Attempts  t o  " t a i l o r "  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  
shor t - te rm p o l i c y  g o a l s  f o r  t h e  s ake  of economic and budgetary  e f f i -  
c i ency .  These a t t e m p t s  have made t h e  compensat ion system q u i t e  
complex and u n p r e d i c t a b l e  from t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  servicemember 's  p o i n t  
of view. 
Concluding Remarks 
Q u a l i t y  problems i n  t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force  a t  i t s  c u r r e n t  s t r e n g t h  
seem s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  s o l u t i o n  th rough t h e  t a r g e t i n g  of i n c r e a s e d  r e s o u r c e s  
on p r e c i s e  problem a r e a s  o r  through t h e  p r e c i s e  ad jus tment  of e n l i s t m e n t  
s t a n d a r d s .  It appears  l i k e l y ,  however, t h a t  major problems i n  r e c r u i t i n g  
an adequate  q u a n t i t y  of pe r sonne l  w i l l  r e s u l t  i f  manpower r equ i r emen t s  
grow i n  t h e  1980s. Such i n c r e a s e d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r equ i r emen t s  would 
a p p a r e n t l y  r e q u i r e  d r a s t i c  i n c r e a s e s  i n  budgetary  r e s o u r c e s  -- f o r  
r e c r u i t i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  f a r  beyond c u r r e n t  pay s c a l e s ,  i f  c u r r e n t  
r e c r u i t i n g  problems a r e  any gu ide ,  o r  h i g h e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s  r e s u l t i n g  
from a  r e t u r n  t o  c o n s c r i p t i o n .  
Problems of q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y ,  however, may no t  be t h e  most 
c r u c i a l  i s s u e s  f a c i n g  t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force.  The AVF h a s  i n t e n s i f i e d  
o l d  and gene ra t ed  new a n a l y t i c a l ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ,  and p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
problems t h a t  do n o t  seem t o  have much t o  do wi th  s p e c i f i c  r e c r u i t i n g  
and r e t e n t i o n  p o l i c i e s  o r  q u a l i t y  l e v e l s .  Ra the r ,  they  r e s u l t  from 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Armed Fo rces ,  t o  o b t a i n  r e c r u i t s ,  must assume 
many of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of a  c i v i l i a n  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  
o r d e r  t o  compete i n  t h e  l abo r  market e f f e c t i v e l y ,  There h a s  been 
i n c r e a s e d  a d a p t a t i o n  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e s i r e s  of m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l ,  
r a t h e r  t han  emphasizing more t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  m i l i t a r y  
d i s c i p l i n e .  Major r e l i a n c e  h a s  been p l aced  on q u a n t i t a t i v e  
i n d i c a t o r s  of personnel  q u a l i t y ,  wi thout  s u f f i c i e n t  account  be ing  
t aken  of t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  judgment of exper ienced  o f f i c e r s  and N C O s ,  
o r  enough a t t e n t i o n  be ing  g iven  t o  t h e  p r e c i s i o n  and p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i -  
c a b i l i t y  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  t e chn iques .  F i n a l l y ,  budget c o n s t r a i n t s  and 
t h e  s c a r c i t y  of manpower a s  a  r e s o u r c e  have fo r ced  t h e  s e r v i c e s  t o  
a t t emp t  t o  c a r e f u l l y  s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  meet p a r t i c u l a r  
g o a l s ,  even when goa l s  may be shor t - te rm and s u b j e c t  t o  c o n s t a n t  change. 
This  "p reven t s  f l e x i b i l i t y  by e l i m i n a t i n g  what does n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  ach i ev ing  t h e  c u r r e n t  o b j e c t i v e  so  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  means a r e  
n o t  a v a i l a b l e  i f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  changed." - 1/ The cumula t ive  
e f f e c t  of many of t h e s e  changes i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y ' s  way of "doing 
bus ines s "  and d e c i d i n g  what i t s  b u s i n e s s  i s  may, i n  t h e  long run ,  
be c r e a t i n g  a s  many problems f o r  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force  a s  t h e  
more obvious and t a n g i b l e  ones  of r e c r u i t i n g ,  r e t e n t i o n ,  and q u a l i t y ,  
and may l i n g e r  long  a f t e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  t h e  l a t t e r  seem t o  have 
been so lved .  
1/ Palmer,  Gregory. The McNamara S t r a t e g y  and t h e  
program Budget ing i n  t h e  Pentagon,  1960-1968. Wes tpor t ,  
Greenwood P r e s s ,  1978: 5. 
Vietnam War: 
Connec t i cu t ,  
I. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND SCOPE - 1/ 
Background 
P u b l i c  disenchantment  w i th  t h e  Sou theas t  Asia c o n f l i c t  d u r i n g  t h e  1960s 
coupled  w i t h  t r a d i t i o n a l  American a n t i p a t h y  t o  c o n s c r i p t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  
i n c r e a s i n g  p r e s s u r e  throughout  t h e  decade t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  d r a f t  and e s t a b l i s h  
an  All-Volunteer  Force  (AVF). I n  February 1969, soon a f t e r  assuming o f f i c e ,  
P r e s i d e n t  Nixon appoin ted  a commission c h a i r e d  by former  S e c r e t a r y  of  
Defense Thomas Gates t o  "develop a comprehensive p l a n  f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  
c o n s c r i p t i o n  and moving toward an  a l l - v o l u n t e e r  armed f o r c e . "  2/ I n  February 
1970 t h e  Gates  commission recommended t h a t  t h e  coun t ry  complete  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
t o  a n  AVF by J u l y  1, 1971. Though P r e s i d e n t  Nixon and t h e  Department of 
Defense (DoD) accep ted  t h e  g o a l  of an  All-Volunteer  Force  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  
t h e  p r e s s u r e s  of t h e  Vietnam War and t h e  need f o r  a more o r d e r l y  t r a n s i t i o n  
t o  an  AVF n e c e s s i t a t e d  d e f e r r a l  of t h e  t a r g e t  d a t e  from J u l y  1, 1971, 
t o  Ju ly  1, 1973. 
ended on December 
Ac tua l  i n d u c t i o n s  of d r a f t e e s  i n t o  t h e  Armed Forces  
29,  1972, - 3 /  and on J u l y  1, 1973, w i th  c e r t a i n  minor 
1/ T h i s  r e p o r t  was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared  f o r  Sena to r  Roger W.  J epsen  i n  
h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  ranking  minor i t y  member and subsequen t ly  chairman of t h e  
Manpower and Pe r sonne l  Subcommittee, Senate  Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee. The 
e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n ,  d a t e d  December 2, 1980, has been s t a t i s t i c a l l y  updated 
and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v i s e d  f o r  p u b l i c a t i o n  a s  a CRS Report .  
21 Report of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on All-Volunteer  Armed Force.  
~ a s h i z ~ t o n ,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1969: v i i .  
3 /  A few i n d i v i d u a l s  who had a c t u a l l y  been c a l l e d  f o r  i n d u c t i o n  d u r i n g  
o r  beyore December 1972 b u t  whose o b l i g a t i o n s  had been d e f e r r e d  con t inued  t o  
e n t e r  a c t i v e  duty  through FY 1977. Although t h e  las t  i n d u c t i o n  took  p l a c e  on 
December 29,  1972, t h e  a c t u a l  announcement t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  no more persons  
would be d r a f t e d  was made on Janua ry  27, 1973, a f t e r  s i g n i n g  of t h e  Vietnam 
peace agreements .  All-Volunteer  Force: A Report .  Commanders D iges t  (Depart- 
ment of Defense) ,  A p r i l  19 ,  1973: 1, 3;  The Volunteer  Army -- One Year L a t e r ,  
Report of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  Army Howard H .  Callaway t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  
February 14 ,  1974; D i r e c t o r a t e  f o r  In fo rma t ion  Opera t ions  and Repor t s ,  Washington 
Headquar te rs  S e r v i c e s ,  Department of Defense. S e l e c t e d  Manpower S t a t i s t i c s ,  
FY 1979: 131,  Tab le  P27.3, Department of  Defense Summary of E n l i s t e d  Personnel  
Procurement, FY 1973-1979. 
excep t ions ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  i nduc t  men i n t o  t h e  Armed Forces  
exp i r ed .  - 41 Standby d r a f t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  c o n t i r u e d ,  however, u n t i l  A p r i l  1975, 
when i t  w a s  suspended by e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r  of  P r e s i d e n t  Ford.  5/ 
Purpose 
This  paper  h i g h l i g h t s  some of t h e  major i s s u e s  of r e c r u i t i n g ,  r e t e n t i o n ,  
and q u a l i t y  r a i s e d  by t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a n  All-Volunteer  Force  and subsequent  
e f f o r t s  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  AVF i n  t h e  1970s and 1980s. Q u a n t i t a t i v e  manpower 
requi rements  a r e  an  ove ra rch ing  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  cont inued  v i a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  AVF. Some a n a l y s t s  f e e l  t h a t  a n  AVF of s u f f i c i e n t  q u a l i t y  can  be maintained 
w i t h i n  c u r r e n t  ( o r  reduced)  f o r c e  l e v e l s  w i th  compara t ive ly  minor ad jus tmen t s  
i n  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  p o l i c y  and procedure.  The s t r a t e g i c  and geo- 
p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  of t h e  1980s,  however, p rovides  some grounds f o r  b e l i e v i n g  
t h a t  f o r c e  l e v e l s  may have t o  be r a i s e d ,  and t h e  Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  
has  s t a t e d  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  do s o .  61 I f  t h i s  s t e p  i s  taken ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  
f o r  major changes i n  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  p o l i c y  w i l l  probably be 
g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d .  T h i s  r e p o r t  w i l l  survey t h e  c u r r e n t  e n l i s t e d  r e c r u i t i n g  
41 S u b s e c t i o n  ( c )  of 50 USC App. 467 [Subsec. a  (35) ,  sec .  101, T i t l e  I ,  
P.L. 92-129, approved September 28, 1971; 85 S t a t .  3531 provided t h a t  no 
persons  could be i nduc ted  i n t o  t h e  Armed Forces  a f t e r  J u l y  1, 1973, except  
f o r  persons  d e f e r r e d  from i n d u c t i o n ,  who remained e l i g i b l e  f o r  i n d u c t i o n  a s  
provided  by l a w  a f t e r  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e i r  deferment  ceased t o  e x i s t .  
51 P r e s i d e n t i a l  P roc l ama t ion  No. 4360, A p r i l  1, 1975,  40 F .R. i4567,  sus- 
pended r e g i s t r a t i o n  pendi  ng "new procedures " which were i n  f a c t  never  announced. 
61  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense Caspar  W. Weinberger appear ing  on  ABC News, 
issues and Answers, March 29,  1981, s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  a c t i v e  Navy and A i r  Force  
a l o n e  would have t o  be i n c r e a s e d  by 130,000-160,000 persons  t o  man i n c r e a s e d  
f o r c e  l e v e l s ,  a long  w i t h  a s  y e t  undetermined b u t  d e f i n i t e  Army s t r e n g t h  i n c r e a s e s .  
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and retention situation, discuss some conceptual and methodological issues 
on managing and making AVF recruiting and retention policy, and make some 
tentative suggestions about how all of those problems might be dealt with. 
L 
Scope 
This study is divided into four major sections: quantitative issues; 
qualitative issues; analytical and administrative issues; and concluding 
remarks. A11 three components of the military manpower structure -- the 
active Armed Forces, Selected Reserve units, and pretrained individual 
reservists -- are included. Only enlisted personnel issues are discussed; 
officer recruitment and retention is a different matter best considered 
separately. 
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11. QUANTITATIVE ISSUES 
The Strategic and Political Basis of Current Manpower Policy 
The United States entered the All-Volunteer Force era in 1973 with 
certain strategic and political factors underlying the conceptual and 
ideological bases for its military manpower policies. For the most part these 
fundamental assumptions are still intact, but some have been modified and 
others, more subjective in nature, are questioned by many interested analysts. 
One particular manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S. 
forces has constituted the planning base for manpower requirements since 
the transition to an AVF began. This is a major war with the Soviet Union 
and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North 
Atlantic, with ancillary action worldwide. DoD believes that such a NATO/ 
Warsaw Pact conflict would begin with a period of exceptionally intense 
combat resulting in a continuing high level of casualties, and the concomitant 
mobilization of U.S. civilian industry and manpower to continue the war 
as long as necessary. Such a war would require massive manpower mobilization, 
particularly to meet ground force requirements for replacements and force 
expansion. I/  
Using this scenario as a starting point, a series of assumptions shaped 
current military manpower policies beginning in the early 1970s: 
1. The United States needed enough conventional forces to permit responses 
to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war (both U.S. and Soviet 
conventional forces have tactical nuclear capabilities). Most American 
-------------- 
71 For discussions of this scenario, see Office of the Secretary of 
~efense. An Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability Based 
on Exercises Nifty Nugget-78 and Rex-78. June 30, 1980; and FY 1982 Annual 
Report of the Department of Defense. January 19, 1981: 103-06. 
a n a l y s t s  c o n s i d e r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  power t o  be a  more c r e d i b l e  d e t e r r e n t  
and z more c o n t r o l l a b l e  m i l i t a r y  i n s t r u m e n t  t h a n  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s .  P o s s e s s i o n  of 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  p r o v i d e s  a  range  of o p t i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  r e s o r t i n g  
t o  n u c l e a r  weapons a n d / o r  s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  w a r f a r e .  
2 .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f a c e d  a  long-term c h a l l e n g e  from t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  
l a r g e  S o v i e t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  i n  Europe and t h e  USSR t h a t  were  c o n f i g u r e d  
t o  pose  a  d i r e c t  t h r e a t  t o  NATO f o r c e s  i n  Europe, t h e  M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,  and t h e  
Ncrth A t l a n t i c ,  and t o  U.S. n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  Middle E a s t  and E a s t  
Asia. 
3 .  Active duty m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  needed t o  be m a i n t a i n e d  a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
2 . 2 - 2 . 3  m i l l i o n ,  a long  w i t h  combat-ready and r e s p o n s i v e  Reserve  components ,  
t o  ensure  a  prudent  minimum l e v e l  w i t h  which t o  meet i n i t i a l  U.S. n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y  commitments worldwide.  5/ 
4 .  Xajor  m i l i t a r y  manpower a s s e t s  would be f u r n i s h e d  by our  NATO a l l i e s  
i n  t h e  even t  of a  c o n f l i c t  i n  Europe. 
5.  The manpower requ i rements  f o r  any c o n t i n g e n c i e s  m r e  l i m i t e d  t h a n  a  
f u l l - s c a l e  U.S. /Soviet  c o n f l i c t  would be l e s s  t h a n  t h o s e  f o r  t h e  b r o a d e r  
cont ingency . 
6. Any m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  anywhere i n  t h e  world  o t h e r  t h a n  a c o m p a r a t i v e l y  
minor show of f o r c e  would p robab ly  r e q u i r e  t h e  augmenta t ion  of a c t i v e  d u t y  
f o r c e s  w i t h  Reserves  and possib1.y d r a f t e e s ;  a NATO/Warsaw P a c t  w a r  would r e q u i r e  
immediate r e i n s t i t u t i o n  of c o n s c r i p t i o n .  
------------_- 
g/  These  a r e  t h e  f o r c e  levels  which a  v a r i e t y  of o f f i c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
i m p l i e d  were r e q u i r e d  i n  a  post-Vietnam War environment  d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  
1970s.  See below, pp. 10-13. They were p r e d i c a t e d  on i n c r e a s e d  r e l i a n c e  
on t h e  Reserve components compared w i t h  p r e v i o u s  y e a r s  -- t h e  " T o t a l  F o r c e  
P o l i c y "  e x p l i c i t l y  adop ted  by t h e  Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  S e e  S t a t e m e n t  
of S e c r e t a r y  of Defense  Melvin  R .  L a i r d  on t h e  F i s c a l  Year  1972-76 Defense 
Program and t h e  1 9 7 2  Defense  Budget,  ?larch 9 ,  1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Of f .  , 1971: 21,  130. 
7. Adequate U.S. military manpower to meet anticipated contingencies 
could be maintained by manning both the active and Reserve forces with 
volunteers in peacetime, with a standby Selective Service System theoreti- 
cally capable of quick reactivation to provide draftees in an emergency. 9/ - 
Several of the underlying assumptions on which those manpower policies 
are based, however, have changed since the AVF began in 1973. Soviet 
military capabilities have increased substantially, in terms of quantity 
and quality of manpower; quantity and sophistication of materiel; command, 
control, communications, and intelligence capability; and meshing of doc- 
trine with the forces required to carry it out. In light of these increased 
Soviet capabilities, as well as other doctrinal and technical reevaluations 
of NATO/ Warsaw Pact war scenarios, the projected tempo, intensity, and 
duration of such a war have all increased. 101 At the same time, U.S. 
active duty military strength has dropped from the levels envisioned when 
the transition to an All-Volunteer Force began. Reserve force strengths 
91 The Military Selective Service Act Amendments of 1971 [50 USC App. 
460 6); P.L. 92-129, subsection 101 (a) (291, approved September 28, 1971; 
85 Stat. 3521 required that after induction authority ended on July 1, 1973 
the Selective Service System be maintained as "an active standby organization, 
with (1) a complete registration and classification structure capable of 
immediate operations in the event of a national emergency, and (2) personnel 
adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operations of the System ..." 
The Presidentl's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (the "Gates Com- 
mission," named after its chairman, former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates) 
also recommended that a similar standby draft mechanism be maintained after 
the All-Volunteer Force went into effect. Report of the President's Commision 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 
1970: 119-24 (hereafter cited as Gates Commission Report). 
101 For broad overviews of these trends, see United States Military 
posture for FY 1982 and Supplement. General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman 
of the Joints of Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and 
John M. Collins. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 
1960-1980. [Washington], McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980. 
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have a l s o  d e c l i n e d  -- i n  t h e  ca se  of t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  Ready Reserve ,  t h e  
drop has  been d r a s t i c .  
Moreover, t h e  United S t a t e s  has  acqu i r ed  m i l i t a r y  and s t r a t e g i c  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  P e r s i a n  Gul f - Ind ian  Ocean-Southwest As ia  r e g i o n s  
which it d i d  no t  have i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970s. The l i k e l i h o o d  of m i l i t a r y  
a c t i o n  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s ,  which a r e  i n  g e n e r a l  t h o s e  l e a s t  a c c e s s i b l e  from 
North America, has  g r e a t l y  expanded t h e  scope of c o n t i n g e n c i e s  which U.S. 
p l anne r s  must t a k e  i n t o  account  i n  e v a l u a t i n g  manpower r equ i r emen t s .  
S p e c i f i c  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  I s s u e s  
To examine s p e c i f i c  q u a n t i t a t i v e  manpower r equ i r emen t s  and AVF 
r e c r u i t i n g  r e s u l t s ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  f o u r - t i e r e d  
manpower s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Armed Fo rces :  
The a c t i v e  Armed Forces  -- f u l l - t i m e  m i l i t a r y  personnel  -- form t h e  
most ready  and a v a i l a b l e  ca t ego ry  of p e r s o n n e l .  
The S e l e c t e d  Reserve components of t h e  Armed Forces  (which i nc lude  
t h e  Na t iona l  ~ u a r d )  provide  t r a i n e d  u n i t s  f o r  augmentat ion of t h e  a c t i v e  
Armed Forces  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n .  The S e l e c t e d  Reserve c o n s i s t s  l a r g e l y  
of R e s e r v i s t s  i n  paid s t a t u s  who a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  perform approximate ly  
two weeks of a c t i v e  du ty  t r a i n i n g  a n n u a l l y  and u s u a l l y  one weekend of 
i n a c t i v e  du ty  t r a i n i n g  ( " d r i l l " )  per month. 
The ~ n d i v i d u a l  Ready Reserve (IRR) p rov ides  a  pool  of p r e v i o u s l y - t r a i n e d  
i n d i v i d u a l s  who a r e  promptly a v a i l a b l e  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n .  These i n d i v i d u a l  
r e s e r v i s t s  a r e  needed t o  b r i n g  undermanned and unmanned u n i t s  i n  t h e  a c t i v e  
and S e l e c t e d  Reserve f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  t o  f u l l  war s t r e n g t h  and p rov ide  
rep lacements  f o r  c a s u a l t i e s  u n t i l  such t ime a s  d r a f t e e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  
The I R R  c o n s i s t s  l a r g e l y  of pe r sonne l  who have s e rved  on a c t i v e  d u t y ,  a r e  
n o t  members of t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve,  and who have n o t  completed t h e i r  
t o t a l  s i x -yea r  m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n .  - 111 They a r e  no t  c u r r e n t l y  r e q u i r e d  
by DoD t o  t r a i n  p e r i o d i c a l l y ,  a l t hough  they  a r e  l e g a l l y  o b l i g a t e d  t o  do 
s o  i f  o rde red .  
D r a f t e e s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n  t o  provide  f o r  wartime 
expans ion  of t h e  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  and rep lacement  of c a s u a l t i e s .  
While t h e s e  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  of m i l i t a r y  manpower a r e  l i s t e d  i n  a  
broad  descending  o r d e r  of r e a d i n e s s  and a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  i t  i s  i n a c c u r a t e  
t o  assume t h a t  o n l y  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  and /o r  t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve "count" 
i n  e v a l u a t i n g  whether  o r  n o t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  manpower requi rements  a r e  be ing  
met.  This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  I R R .  Even i f  t h e  
u n i t s  of t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  and S e l e c t e d  Reserve a r e  a t  f u l l  s t r e n g t h  a t  
t h e  beginning  of  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  adequate  numbers of i n d i v i d u a l  r e s e r v i s t s  
must be a v a i l a b l e  t o  r e p l a c e  c a s u a l t i e s  u n t i l  t r a i n e d  d r a f t e e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  
This  i n t e rdependence  means t h a t  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  
do no t  r e s u l t  i n  adequate  numbers of personnel  i n  c a t e g o r i e s  of manpower 
cannot  be cons ide red  s u c c e s s f u l .  Adequate manning of t h e  Reserve Components 
a s  we l l  a s  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  i s  no l e s s  impor tan t  t o  s u s t a i n i n g  t h e  Armed 
Forces  i n  b a t t l e  t h a n  adequa t e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h .  
Ac t ive  Force Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Requirements 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  succes s  of t h e  a l l - v o l u n t e e r  a c t i v e  
f o r c e s  i n  meet ing  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r equ i r emen t s .  Manpower s t r e n g t h  l e v e l s  of 
111 By law (10  USC 651) any person  who becomes a  member of any armed 
f o r c e s h a l l  s e r v e  i n  t h e  Armed Forces  f o r  a  t o t a l  pe r iod  of s i x  yea r s .  Any 
p o r t i o n  of such s e r v i c e  t h a t  i s  no t  a c t i v e  du ty  s h a l l  be se rved  i n  a  r e s e r v e  
component. 
the active forces under the AVF, like all peacetime manpower strengths of 
any nation's armed forces, are below potential wartime requirements. To 
compare actual peacetime active force strengths with wartime requirements, 
therefore, is unrealistic. Furthermore, DoD does not provide unclassified 
estimates as to what the wartime manpower requirements for a total 
mobilization - 121 for a major war with the Soviet Union would be. 
DoD - does provide wartime requirements estimates which specify what 
the wartime manning levels are for the currently maintained active 
and Reserve peacetime force structure. These estimates, however, do 
not include manpower figures for the major expansion of the force 
structure which would take place in time of war. They are consequently 
less than adequate as a benchmark for judging the sufficiency of current 
active duty military manpower strengths. 
Ideally, rather than measuring peacetime active force strengths 
and recruiting attainments against wartime requirements, there should 
be a series of peacetime strength objectives which represent different 
degrees of budgetary constraints and/or military risk. At one extreme 
would be a low manpower level representing either rigid fiscal discipline 
or acceptance of a high degree of military risk, or a combination of both. 
At the other would be a much higher level requiring much greater budgetary 
121 There are three broad levels of mobilization. A partial mobiliza- 
tion would require only selected portions of the peacetime active and Reserve 
force structure to be activated and brought to wartime manning levels. A 
full mobilization would bring the entire active and Reserve peacetime force -
structure to war strength. A total mobilization would exceed the require- 
ments of a full mobilization by activating new units not maintained in the 
peacetime force structure and bringing these new units to war strength as 
well. U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The Selective Service System: 
Mobilization Capabilities and Options for Improvement. Budget Issue Paper 
for Fiscal Year 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., November 1978: 4. 
r e s o u r c e s  and/or  p rov id ing  a  much g r e a t e r  degree  of p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
r i s k .  Var ious  a c t i v e  f o r c e  manpower s t r e n g t h s  i n  between would r e p r e s e n t  
l e s s  extreme s i t u a t i o n s .  A l l ,  however, would be recognized  a s  peacet ime 
l e v e l s ,  below t h a t  needed i n  time of war, and r e q u i r i n g  augmentat ion 
wi th  Reserves and/or  d r a f t e e s  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n .  
DoD does no t  provide  such a  s e r i e s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  peacetime s t r e n g t h  
l e v e l s  f o r  p u b l i c  a n a l y s i s .  I t  is  t h e r e f o r e  neces sa ry  t o  t u r n  t o  
i m p l i c i t  i n d i c a t i o n s  of peacet ime a c t i v e  f o r c e  requi rements  l e s s  c o n s t r a i n e d  
by immediate budgetary  concerns  t han  annual  congres s iona l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s .  
H i s t o r i c a l  examples a r e  t h e  most u s e f u l  type of such i n d i c a t i o n s .  
A t  t h e  beginning  of t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  an All-Volunteer  Force ,  i n  
February 1970, t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on an All-Volunteer  Force ( t h e  
"Gates  omm mission") d i d  no t  recommend post-Vietnam f o r c e  l e v e l s .  It 
based i t s  a n a l y s e s  on how b e s t  t o  ach i eve  an All-Volunteer  Force ( n o t ,  
it should  be no ted ,  whether  o r  no t  an AVF was f e a s i b l e  o r  d e s i r a b l e )  
on t h e  assumption t h a t  f u t u r e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  l e v e l s  would range between 
2.0 and 3.0 m i l l i o n .  However, most of i t s  d e t a i l e d  ana lyses  cen t e red  
around 2.25 and 2.5 m i l l i o n  person s t r e n g t h s .  - 13/  Department o f  Defense 
r e p o r t s  on t h e  AVF i n  i t s  e a r l y  s t a g e s  (1972-1973) r e p e a t e d l y  s t a t e d  
t h a t  maintenance of  then-cur ren t  f o r c e  l e v e l s  of approximate ly  2.3 
m i l l i o n  were impera t ive .  - 14/  A c t u a l l y ,  a f t e r  t h e  AVF began i n  FY 1973, 
13/ Report  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on an All-Volunteer  
~ r m e d y o r c e .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  February 1970: 35-40 
and passim ( h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  Gates  Commission Repor t ) .  The Commission 
f e l t  t h a t  up t o  a  2.5 million-man f o r c e  would be s u s t a i n a b l e  i f  t h e  pay 
r a i s e s  and personnel  p o l i c y  changes i t  recommended were implemented. 
14 /  Report of S e c r e t a r y  o f  Defense Melvin R. La i rd  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
and the Chairmen of  Armed S e r v i c e  Committees of t h e  Senate  and of t h e  House 
of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  P rog re s s  i n  Ending t h e  Dra f t  and Achieving t h e  A l l -  
Volunteer  Force .  August 1972: 30-31; All-Volunteer  Force -- A Report .  
Commandrs D iges t ,  A p r i l  19 ,  1973: 3 ,  12,  and passim. 
a c t i v e  duty  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  dec l ined  t o  approximate ly  2  .O5 m i l l i o n  
by FY 1978, where i t  has  s i n c e  more o r  l e s s  s t a b i l i z e d .  - 15/ Cur ren t  
(March 31, 1981) a c t i v e  duty  s t r e n g t h  i s  about t h e  same a s  FY 1979 and 
FY 1980 congres s iona l ly -au tho r i zed  l e v e l s ,  9  pe rcen t  below a c t u a l  FY 1973 
s t r e n g t h ;  9 o r  18  percent  below t h e  two most commonly-used Gates Commission 
p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  post-Vietnam f o r c e  l e v e l s ;  and 23 pe rcen t  below FY 1964 
( t h e  l a s t  f u l l  pre-Vietnam War f i s c a l  y e a r ) :  
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH TRENDS, FY 1964-PRESENT ( IN THOUSANDS) 
COMPARED WITH CONGRESSIONALLY-AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS (IN PARENTHESES) 
End FY S t r e n g t h s  Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Force DoD To ta l  
FY 64 973 (NA) 668 (NA) 190 (NA) 
FY 73 810 (829) 565 (602) 196 (198) 
FY 74 783 (804) 546 (566) 189 (196) 
FY 75 784 (785) 535 (540) 196 (196) 
FY 76 779 (785) 525 (529) 192 (196) 
FY TQ 783 (783) 528 (536) 190 (196) 
FY 77 782 (789) 530 (541) 192 (192) 
FY 78 772 (787) 530 (536) 191 (192) 
FY 79 759 (776) 524 (524) 185 (190) 
FY 80 777 (777) 527 (528) 188 (189) 
FY 81 (31  Mar 81) 774 (775) 536 (537) 188 (188) 
FY 82 ( r e q u e s t e d )  (786) (555) ( 1  9  2) 
15/ A l l  m i l i t a r y  manpower s t r e n g t h  l e v e l s  c i t e d  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  were 
ob t a ined  from t h e  Department of Defense from a  v a r i e t y  of sou rces .  Wherever 
p o s s i b l e  we have used s i n g l e  sou rces ;  i n  some c a s e s ,  t h e  u sua l  problem 
of mutua l ly  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  d a t a  i n  making s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s e s  could  no t  
be avoided.  P r i n c i p a l  sou rces  f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  were t h e  annual  volumes 
on Se l ec t ed  Manpower S t a t i s t i c s  publ i shed  by t h e  Off i c e  of t h e  A s s i s t a n t  
S e c r e t a r y  of Defense (Compt ro l l e r ) ,  a s  updated by monthly c h a r t s  i s sued  
by t h e  same o f f i c e .  Congress iona l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  were obta ined  from t h e  
a c t u a l  p u b l i c  laws. 
N e i t h e r  DoD n o r  t h e  Congress  have s t a t e d  t h a t  a u t h o r i z e d  s t r e n g t h s  
r e f l e c t  a n t i c i p a t e d  r e c r u i t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o r  a r e  i nadequa t e  t o  meet 
m i l i t a r y  r equ i r emen t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  t h e y  have never  r e p u d i a t e d  
t h e i r  e a r l i e r  r e q u e s t s  f o r  o r  app rova l s  of g r e a t e r  a c t i v e  du ty  m i l i t a r y  
s t r e n g t h s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  and mid-1970s, begging t h e  q u e s t i o n  of why a u t h o r i z e d  
s t r e n g t h s  have been reduced .  161 S ince  FY 1976, c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i z e d  -
a c t i v e  du ty  s t r e n g t h s  have v a r i e d  between 2.05 and 2.10 m i l l i o n  and DoD 
reques t ed  s t r e n g t h s  have f l u c t u a t e d  between 2.05 and 2.12 m i l l i o n .  It 
seems r e a s o n a b l e  t o  assume, t h e r e f o r e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of d e c l i n e s  i n  bo th  
a u t h o r i z e d  and a c t u a l  s t r e n g t h s  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  t h a t  a  t a c i t  f l o o r  of 2.05- 
2.10 m i l l i o n  h a s  been reached .  Force l e v e l s  lower t han  t h e s e  a r e  a p p a r e n t l y  
r ega rded  by t h e  e x e c u t i v e  and l e g i s l a t i v e  branches  a s  i ncapab l e  of s u s t a i n i n g  
c u r r e n t  n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y  a s  d i s cus sed  above (pp .  4-6). 
The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h  
i s  r e q u i r e d .  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense Caspar  Weinberger ha s  s t a t e d  t h a t  planned 
expans ion  of  t h e  Navy and A i r  Force  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  r e q u i r e  i nc r ea sed  
a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h  of 130,000-160,000 i n  t h o s e  two s e r v i c e s  a l o n e ,  and 
t h a t  t h e  a c t i v e  Army w i l l  be i n c r e a s e d  by a s  y e t  undetermined numbers 
161 There  have been major  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  h e a d q u a r t e r s ,  t r a i n i n g ,  and 
s u p p o ~  manpower d u r i n g  t h e  1970s,  f o r  s t a t e d  r ea sons  of p runing  unnecessary  
spaces  and improving e f f i c i e n c y  and p r o d u c t i v i t y .  There i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
c o n t r o v e r s y ,  however, about  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e s e  c u t s  have i n  f a c t  
a f f e c t e d  combat r e a d i n e s s  and s u s t a i n a b i l i t y .  There i s  no one sou rce  which 
summarizes t h e s e  c u t s  i n  suppor t  manpower; they  can be t r a c e d  i n  t h e  annual  
Manpower Requirements  Repor t s  o f  DoD from FY 1973 through FY 1982;  and i n  
t h e  annual  s t a t e m e n t s  of t h e  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense (Manpower, 
Reserve  A f f a i r s ,  and L o g i s t i c s )  and t h e  s e r v i c e  a s s i s t a n t  s e c r e t a r i e s  f o r  
manpower, r e s e r v e  a f f a i r s ,  and l o g i s t i c s  b e f o r e  t h e  House and Sena t e  Armed 
S e r v i c e s  Committees and Defense Approp r i a t i ons  Subcommittees th roughout  
t h e  1970s. 
of persons .  171 These i n c r e a s e s  would boos t  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h  t o  
approximate ly  2.3 m i l l i o n  -- o r  t h e  l e v e l  a p p a r e n t l y  deemed neces sa ry  
when t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  an AVF began i n  FY 1973. Various groups i d e n t i -  
f i e d  o r  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  gene ra l  t r e n d  of de fense  p o l i c i e s  proposed 
by t h e  Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  a l s o  suppor t  a c t i v e  f o r c e  i n c r e a s e s  t o  t h e  
2.3 m i l l i o n  person l e v e l .  181 - 
The e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  a c t i v e  Armed Forces  have m e t  r e c r u i t i n g  
o b j e c t i v e s  sheds l i t t l e  l i g h t  on whether  o r  no t  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  a c t i v e  
du ty  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  r e f l e c t s  r e c r u i t i n g  problems: 
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED RECRUITING OBJECTIVE MET, FY 73-PRESENT 
Army Navy Marine Corps A i r  Force  DoD T o t a l  
FY 73 98 
FY 74 94 
FY 75 102 
FY 76 100 
FY TQ (Jul-Sep 1976) 96 
FY 77 9  9  
FY 78 9  8  
FY 79 9  0  
FY 80  100 
FY 81 ( 1 s t  h a l f )  9 9  
The above t a b l e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i n  most y e a r s ,  f o r  most s e r v i c e s ,  
approximate ly  100 percent  of a c t i v e  f o r c e  r e c r u i t i n g  requi rements  have 
been achieved .  This  r e s u l t ,  however, i s  no r e a l  i n d i c a t o r  of t h e  
l ' ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ "  o r  L . ' fa i lure ' l  of All-Volunteer  Force r e c r u i t i n g .  I f  t h e  
171 S e c r e t a r y  of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger i n t e rv i ewed  on ABC News, 
~ s s u e s a n d  Answers, March 29, 1981. See a l s o  Richard  Ha l lo ran .  Reagan 
~ i l i t a r y  P lan  Envis ions  up t o  250,000 Add i t i ona l  R e c r u i t s .  New York Times, 
A p r i l  26, 1981: 1. 
18/  For  example, s e e  A Program f o r  M i l i t a r y  Independence. Washington, 
~ a ~ i t o l ~ i l l  S t a f f  Group, 1980: 70-71; Committee on t h e  P r e s e n t  Danger. 
Countering t h e  S o v i e t  T h r e a t :  U.S. Defense S t r a t e g y  i n  t h e  1980s. May 9 ,  
1980: 12.  
r e c r u i t i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  on which t h e s e  pe rcen tages  a r e  based were d r i v e n  
by t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  Armed Forces  t o  o b t a i n  r e c r u i t s ,  t hen  t h e  approxi -  
mation of 100 p e r c e n t  of t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g ,  and would not  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  a b i l i t y  of AVF r e c r u i t i n g  t o  meet requi rements .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand,  i f  t h e  r e c r u i t i n g  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  i n  f a c t  based on meeting 
s t r e n g t h  o b j e c t i v e s  which a r e  not c o n s t r a i n e d  due t o  r e c r u i t i n g  problems,  
t h e n  t h e  approximat ion  of  100 pe rcen t  of requi rements  would be a  t r u e  
i n d i c a t i o n  of s u c c e s s f u l  r e c r u i t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and p r a c t i c e s .  The absence  
of any open s o u r c e  s t a t e m e n t s  by DoD of requi rements  o t h e r  t han  t h e  
annua l  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a c t i v e  f o r c e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  r e q u e s t  makes a  d i s -  
c u s s i o n  of  t h e  adequacy of  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r e c r u i t i n g  very  d i f f i c u l t .  
It would appea r ,  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  a  p r i o r i t y  f o r  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  dec i s ion -  
makers concerned w i t h  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  of t h e  AVF would be t o  s e c u r e  
from DoD a  range  of peacet ime manpower requi rements  d a t a  no t  a s  c l o s e l y  
t i e d  t o  c u r r e n t  budgetary  c o n s t r a i n t s .  Such d a t a  would be based on 
U.S. s t r a t e g i c  and g e o p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s  and wartime requi rements ,  
and would s p e c i f y  what manpower was needed t o  ach i eve  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  
and r equ i r emen t s  a t  r e l a t i v e  l e v e l s  of r i s k ,  independent  of any one 
y e a r ' s  budget  c y c l e .  
S e l e c t e d  Reserve Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Requirements 
The war t ime manpower r equ i r emen t s  DoD p rov ides  f o r  t h e  S e l e c t e d  
Reserve,  a s  w i t h  t h o s e  s t a t e d  f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s ,  do no t  t a k e  i n t o  
account  t h e  major  expans ion  of t h e  peacet ime f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  which would 
t a k e  p l a c e  upon t o t a l  t o t a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n .  Using t h e s e  requi rements  a s  
a n  i n d i c a t i o n  of a b i l i t y  o f  DoD t o  man t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve s o l e l y  w i t h  
v o l u n t e e r s  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same problems a s  s o  u s i n g  s t a t e d  a c t i v e  
f o r c e  requi rements .  However, t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  
i s  based l a r g e l y  on what Reserve f o r c e s  a r e  needed t o  suppor t  and 
" f l e s h  out"  a  peacet ime a c t i v e  fo rce  of s p e c i f i e d  s t r e n g t h  i n  t ime 
of war. 191 Measuring a c t u a l  Se l ec t ed  Reserve manpower s t r e n g t h s  - 
s t a t e d  wartime requi rements  t h u s  enab le s  one t o  de te rmine  how c l o s e  
t h e  Reserve i s  t o  meeting t h e  requi rements  based on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c t i v e  
f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  and s t r e n g t h .  A s  no ted  above, whether t h e  a c t i v e  
f o r c e s  a r e  adequate  i s  ano the r  i s s u e  a l t o g e t h e r .  
Once aga in ,  h i s t o r i c a l  examples a r e  u s e f u l .  The Gates Commission 
d i d  not  recommend post-Vietnam Se lec t ed  Reserve f o r c e  l e v e l s  any more 
t han  i t  d id  a c t i v e  fo rce  l e v e l s ;  however, i t  d id  d i s c u s s  Reserve f o r c e  
s t r e n g t h s  r equ i r ed  t o  suppor t  a c t i v e  duty  f o r c e s  of between 2  and 3 
m i l l i o n  persons .  The Commission s t a t e d  t h a t  i n  i t s  opin ion  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
number of spaces  i n  t h e  then-cur ren t  Reserve f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  were unnecessary ,  
and made i t s  e s t i m a t e s  acco rd ing ly .  For  an a c t i v e  f o r c e  o f  2.25 m i l l i o n ,  
t h e  Gates Commission f i g u r e s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  r e s u l t  i n  S e l e c t e d  
Reserve requi rements  of 709,000 t o  799,000 ( i . e . ,  c u r r e n t  S e l e c t e d  Reserve 
s t r e n g t h s  a r e  approximate ly  60,000 persons  above t h e  i n f e r r e d  Gates ca lcu-  
l a t i o n s ) ;  a  2.5 m i l l i o n  person a c t i v e  f o r c e  would have r e q u i r e d  781,000 t o  
882,000 Se l ec t ed  Reserve pe r sonne l .  20/ -
19/ See,  f o r  example, t h e  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  of Army manpower 
requi rements  f o r  m o b i l i z a t i o n  i n  U.S. Congress. Senate .  Committee on 
Armed S e r v i c e s .  Department of Defense A u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  Appropr i a t i ons  
f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1981. P a r t  2. Hear ings ,  96 th  Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n .  
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1980: 660-61. This  c l e a r l y  shows 
t h a t  Army Reserve Component r equ i r emen t s  a r e  based on what i s  r e q u i r e d  
t o  " f l e s h  out"  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r  i n  t ime of war. 
201 F igu re s  based on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of d a t a  i n  Gates Commission 
~ e ~ o r F  97-117. 
The Department o f  Defense ,  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  of t h e  AVF e r a ,  appeared 
t o  r e g a r d  main tenance  o f  t h e n  c u r r e n t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i z e d  S e l e c t e d  
Reserve minimum s t r e n g t h s  a s  i m p e r a t i v e ,  and urged d u r i n g  1972-1973 t h a t  
v a r i o u s  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  be adopted t o  r a i s e  a c t u a l  
S e l e c t e d  Reserve s t r e n g t h  (which was t h e n  approx imate ly  925,000) t o  t h e  
mandated l e v e l  o f  o v e r  970,000. - 211 Presumably,  i f  DoD d i d  no t  r e g a r d  
t h e s e  s t r e n g t h s  a s  t r u e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  i t  would n o t  have  endorsed incen-  
t i v e s  t o  a t t a i n  and m a i n t a i n  them. 
A c t u a l  S e l e c t e d  Reserve s t r e n g t h s ,  l i k e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h s ,  
d e c l i n e d  s t e a d i l y  a f t e r  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  of t h e  AVF i n  FY 1973, r e a c h i n g  a  low 
i n  FY 1978 and r e c o v e r i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  s i n c e  t h e n .  Cur ren t   a arch 31, 
1981)  S e l e c t e d  Reserve f o r c e  l e v e l s  a r e  5 p e r c e n t  below FY 1973, approx i -  
m a t e l y  17 p e r c e n t  below DoD's FY 1982 s t a t e d  m o b i l i z a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  
and 8  p e r c e n t  below FY 1964 l e v e l s .  
I f  one a c c e p t s  DoD's s t a t e d  war t ime m o b i l i z a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  
S e l e c t e d  Rese rve ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  i n  Reserve s t r e n g t h  under t h e  
Al l -Volun tee r  Force  i s  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e .  221 While S e l e c t e d  Reserve f o r c e  -
l e v e l s  have r e c o v e r e d  g r e a t l y  from lows reached  i n  FY 1978, s t r e n g t h  
i s  s t i l l  below r e q u i r e m e n t s .  I f  one a c c e p t s  t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e s e  
211 L a i r d  R e p o r t :  39-43; Al l -Volunteer  Force  -- A Repor t .  Commanders 
~ i ~ e s c  A p r i l  19 ,  1973: 10-11. 
221 It shou ld  be no ted  t h a t  DoD does  n o t  p l a n ,  i n  peace t ime ,  t o  man 
t h e  ~ x e c t e d  Reserve a t  f u l l  war t ime r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  on t h e  as sumpt ion  
t h a t  I n d i v i d u a l  Ready Reserve p e r s o n n e l  cou ld  be used t o  f i l l  t h e  S e l e c t e d  
Reserve t o  war s t r e n g t h  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n .  The IRR, of c o u r s e ,  i s  i t s e l f  
f a r  u n d e r s t r e n g t h  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t ime .  Peacet ime manning o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  
t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve i n  FY 1981 a r e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  9 3  p e r c e n t  of war t ime 
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  See U.S. Congress.  House. Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s .  
Department o f  Defense  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  Act ,  1981;  r e p o r t  t o  accompany H.R. 6974. 
A p r i l  30, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1980 ( 9 6 t h  Congress ,  
2nd s e s s i o n .  House. Repor t  no .  96-916): 128. 
stated wartime requirements are based on the Selected Reserve force struc- 
ture needed to support an active force of given strength, - 231 if active 
force strengths were judged to be inadequate then Selected Reserve force 
levels would fall even further short of requirements, 
SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY STRENGTHS, FY 197 3-PRESENT ( IN THOUSANDS) 
COMPARED WITH WARTIME MANNING REQUIREMENTS WHERE AVAILABLE ( IN PARENTHESES) 
Marine Air 
Army Nat 1 Army Naval Corps Air Natl Force DoD 
Guard Reserve Reserve Reserve Guard Reserve Total 
FY 64 382 (NA) 
FY 73 386 (NA) 
FY 74 403 (435) 
FY 75 395 (431) 
FY 76 362 (431) 
FY TQ 367 (431) 
FY 77 355 (431) 
FY 78 341 (431) 
FY 79 346 (431) 
FY 80 367 (436) 
FY 81 379 (438) 
(31 Mar 1981) 













123 (NA) 46 (NA) 73 (NA) 61 (NA) 953 (NA) 
126 (NA) 38 (NA) 90 (NA) 44 (NA) 919 (NA) 
115 (115) 31 (42) 94 (103) 46 (50) 925 (1021) 
98 (113) 32 (41) 95 (102) 51 (53) 896 (1015) 
97 (92) 30 (41) 91 (100) 48 (54) 823 (994) 
98 (92) 29 (41) 91 (101) 49 (55) 826 (996) 
90 (52)* 31 (37) 92 (100) 50 (56) 808 (952)* 
83 (57)* 33 (37) 92 (101) 54 (57) 788 (950)* 
88 (51)*33 (44) 93 (101) 57 (65) 807 (968)* 
87 (49)*35 (44) 96 (101) 59 (69) 851 (960)* 
88 (96) 35(42) 98 (97) 59(66) 874 (1017) 
*Naval Reserve mobilization requirements for FY 1977-1980 reflect attempts 
by DoD to reduce the size of the Naval Reserve for budgetary reasons. All actual 
evaluations of Naval Reserve requirements based on wartime needs resulted in 
force levels of approximately 100,000. Acceptance of these figures for purposes 
of judging true wartime requirements are therefore highly misleading. See U.S. 
Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authori- 
zation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981. Part 3, Manpower and Personnel. 
Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980: 
1582, for an enumeration of five studies completed during the 1973-1980 period 
which arrive at a figure of about 100,000. 
Individual Ready Reserve Quantitative Requirements 
Comparing Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) strengths with requirements 
during the AVF era is difficult. IRR requirements are based on the number 
of individual reservists required to support and fill out units in 
231 See above, pp. 7-10. -
t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  and S e l e c t e d  Reserve when mobi l ized  f o r  war. E v a l u a t i o n  
of I R R  r equ i r emen t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  based on compounded u n c e r t a i n t y .  A s  
w i t h  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  and S e l e c t e d  Reserve,  I R R  wartime requi rements  
a r e  based on how many pe r sonne l  a r e  needed t o  b r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  peacet ime 
f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  t o  war s t r e n g t h  and s u s t a i n  i t  i n  b a t t l e .  Expansion of 
t h e  peacet ime s t r u c t u r e  i s  n o t  involved .  The l a c k  of r e g u l a r  t r a i n i n g  
s t a t u s  f o r  I R R  p e r s o n n e l ,  and t h e i r  be ing  a  pool  of unorganized i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
makes t h e i r  a c t u a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  i n  t ime of war much more d i f f i c u l t  t o  
a s c e r t a i n ,  moni tor ,  and c o n t r o l  t han  t h a t  of  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e  o r  S e l e c t e d  
Reserve. F i n a l l y ,  t h e  u s e  of I R R  pe r sonne l  as c a s u a l t y  rep lacements  makes 
IRR requ i r emen t s  dependent  on both  b a t t l e  and n o n b a t t l e  c a s u a l t y  e s t i m a t e s  
f o r  f u t u r e  wars  -- a f u r t h e r  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  u n c e r t a i n  f i e l d  
of s c e n a r i o s  and p r o j e c t i o n s .  
Cont roversy  ove r  I R R  r equ i r emen t s  and s h o r t f a l l s  has  revolved  a lmost  
e n t i r e l y  around t h e  Army IRR.  It i s  t h e  Army t h a t  r e q u i r e s  by f a r  t h e  
l a r g e s t  number of IRR pe r sonne l  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n ,  p r i m a r i l y  t o  f l e s h  ou t  
a c t i v e  and S e l e c t e d  Reserve u n i t s  and r e p l a c e  l o s s e s ;  t h e  overwhelming 
m a j o r i t y  of b a t t l e  c a s u a l t i e s  a r e  s u s t a i n e d  by t h e  ground f o r c e s  i n  any war. 
The Marine Corps, w h i l e  i t  would presumably s u s t a i n  c a s u a l t i e s  a t  t h e  same 
r a t e  a s  t h e  Army, a p p a r e n t l y  has  an  I R R  of s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e .  The Navy and 
A i r  Force  r e l y  a lmost  e x c l u s i v e l y  on t h e i r  S e l e c t e d  Reserve t o  b r i n g  them 
t o  war s t r e n g t h .  
E s t i m a t e s  of  Army I R R  requi rements  and s h o r t f a l l s  have f l u c t u a t e d  
d r a s t i c a l l y  s i n c e  DoD documents f i r s t  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  i s s u e  openly i n  l a t e  
1975. Based on r equ i r emen t s  f o r  a  ~ ~ ~ O / ~ a r s a w  Pac t  ar, e s t i m a t e s  of 
r e q u i r e d  Army IRR s t r e n g t h  have f l u c t u a t e d  between 400,000-750,000; e s t i m a t e s  
of t h e  IRR s h o r t f a l l  have f l u c t u a t e d  between z e r o  and 350,000. These 
v a r i a t i o n s  r e f l e c t  disagreement  over  a v a i l a b i l i t y  r a t e s  and t h e i r  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ;  
a  methodologica l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ( 1 )  t h e  number of u n f i l l e d  spaces  i n  t h e  
wartime f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  and ( 2 )  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  IRR pool t h a t  had t o  be main- 
t a i n e d  t o  gua ran t ee  t h a t  t h o s e  u n f i l l e d  spaces  a r e  f i l l e d  ( i . e . ,  account ing  
f o r  IRR members who w i l l  n o t  a c t u a l l y  be m o b i l i z a b l e ) ;  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
g r o s s  numer ica l  s h o r t a g e s  and sho r t ages  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s k i l l s ;  and t h e  
r e spons ivenes s  of t h e  s tandby S e l e c t i v e  S e r v i c e  System (of  which t h e  u t i l i t y  
and presence  of peacetime d r a f t  r e g i s t r a t i o n  was a  p a r t ) .  A t  t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  
a l though t h e  Of f i ce  of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense (OSD) and t h e  Army have 
a p p a r e n t l y  reso lved  t h e  i s s u e  of t h e  number of u n f i l l e d  spaces  -- i t  i s  
now s t a t e d  t o  be 270,000 -- t h e r e  s t i l l  does no t  appear  t o  be  any consensus  
a s  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  number of I R R  personnel  r equ i r ed  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  s h o r t f a l l .  
The l a t t e r  f i g u r e  i s  he ld  t o  be approximate ly  400,000 personnel  by OSD 
and appear  t o  be c l o s e r  t o  600,000 i f  Amy e s t i m a t e s  a r e  used.  241 -
241 OSD e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  400,000 Amy I R R  personnel  ( a s  opposed t o  t h e  
curre= s t r e n g t h  of approximate ly  200,000) w i l l  be on t h e  r o l l s  by t h e  end 
of FY 1985, and t h a t  t h i s  number -- p l u s  improved a v a i l a b i l i t y  r a t e s  due 
t o  " b e t t e r  management" of t h e  IRR pool -- w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  meet r e q u i r e -  
ments .  See O f f i c e  of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense. An Eva lua t ion  Report of Mobili- 
z a t i o n  and Deployment C a p a b i l i t y  Based on E x e r c i s e s  N i f t y  Nugget-78 and Rex-78. 
June 30, 1980: 15;  and U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s .  
Department o f  Defense Au tho r i za t ion  f o r  Appropr ia t ions  f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1981. 
P a r t  5  of  6  P a r t s ,  M i l i t a r y  Personnel .  Hearings,  96 th  Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n .  
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1980: 177-78. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i f  t h e  
"improved management" i n i t i a t i v e s  designed t o  r e s u l t  i n  a  g r e a t e r  p ropor t  i o n  
of t h e  IRR pool a c t u a l l y  be ing  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  m o b i l i z a t i o n  do n o t  work, t h e n  
e s t i m a t e s  based on tes t imony of t h e  Chief of Army Reserve imply t h a t  t h e  Army 
I R R  requirement  would be c l o s e r  t o  600,000 pe r sonne l .  This  tes t imony can be 
found i n  U.S. Congress. Senate .  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  Department 
of  Defense Au tho r i za t ion  f o r  Appropr i a t i ons  f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1981. P a r t  2. 
Hear ings ,  96th Congress, 2nd s e s s i o n .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  
1980: 680-81. This  assumes t h a t  70 pe rcen t  of  I R R  personnel  would be  
a c t u a l l y  u sab le  i n  t h e  event  of m o b i l i z a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  90-95 pe rcen t  
t h a t  "improved management" would lead  t o  i f  s u c c e s s f u l .  It i s  n o t  c l e a r  
how any such f i g u r e s  can be v e r i f i e d  s h o r t  of a c t u a l  test  m o b i l i z a t i o n s .  -
See U.S. Genera l  Accounting O f f i c e .  Can t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  Reserves  F i l l  
M o b i l i z a t i o n  Needs? GAO Report Nos. FPCD-79-3 and B-148167. Washington, 
June 28, 1979: 11-14. 
The a c t u a l  t r e n d s  i n  Army IRR s t r e n g t h  show a  d r a s t i c  d e c l i n e  a f t e r  
t h e  i n c e p t i o n  of t h e  AVF, fol lowed by a  s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  s i n c e  bottom was 
reached a t  t h e  end of FY 1978. Nonethe less ,  c u r r e n t   a arch 31, 1981) 
Army I R R  s t r e n g t h  remains 73 pe rcen t  below FY 1973; 48-65 pe rcen t  below 
t h e  v a r i o u s l y  e s t ima ted  m o b i l i z a t i o n  r equ i r emen t s ;  and 55 pe rcen t  below 
FY 1964 l e v e l s .  
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STRENGTHS, END FY 1964-PRESENT ( IN THOUSANDS) 
Marine A i r  
Army Navy Corps Force DoD 
FY 64 461 
FY 73 759 
FY 74 541 
FY 75 363 
FY 76 241 
FY TQ 2  28 
FY 77 160 
FY 78 17 7  
FY 79 206 
FY 80 21 2  
FY 81 ( 3 1  Mar 81) 208 
The c u r r e n t  requi rement  f o r  400,000-600,000 Army I R R  personnel  i s  
t h u s  200-300 pe rcen t  l a r g e r  t han  c u r r e n t  Army IRR s t r e n g t h s .  I f  Army I R R  
r equ i r emen t s  were r a i s e d  -- due t o  h i g h e r  e s t ima ted  c a s u a l t y  r a t e s  o r  a  
l a r g e r  a c t i v e  and S e l e c t e d  Reserve f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  needing  IRR personnel  
upon m o b i l i z a t i o n  -- t h e n  t h e  s h o r t f a l l  would be even g r e a t e r .  
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Requirements: S i t u a t i o n  and P rospec t s  
The above d a t a  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force a s  i t  now s t a n d s  
i s  meeting e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r e c r u i t i n g  g o a l s  and both  a c t i v e  
and Se l ec t ed  Reserve c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  au tho r i zed  manpower s t r e n g t h s .  
On c l o s e r  examinat ion ,  however, t h i s  appa ren t ly  o p t i m i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n  may 
be l e s s  meaningful  t h a n  i t  seems. Peacetime a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  
f o r c e s  have been s t e a d i l y  reduced s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  of t h e  AVF i n  FY 
1973, f o r  no c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  r ea sons ,  The inc reased  a c t i v e  f o r c e  r equ i r emen t s  
of t h e  Reagan Admin i s t r a t i on  beg t h e  q u e s t i o n  even f u r t h e r .  S e l e c t e d  Reserve 
wartime requi rements  a r e  s t i l l  conspicuous ly  l a r g e r  t han  S e l e c t e d  Reserve 
s t r e n g t h s ,  d e s p i t e  some improvement s i n c e  t h e  end of FY 1978. Overarching 
a l l  of t h e s e  f i g u r e s  i s  t h e  g r o s s  inadequacy of t h e  Army I n d i v i d u a l  Ready 
Reserve when compared t o  m o b i l i z a t i o n  requi rements  f o r  a  NATO/Warsaw 
Pact  war. 
Exhaus t ive  a n a l y s i s  i s  no t  needed t o  assume t h a t  a c t i v e  f o r c e  s t r e n g t h  
s h o r t f a l l s  of a  few percent  below c u r r e n t  congres s iona l ly -au tho r i zed  l e v e l s  
( o r  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  of seven yea r s  ago) could  probably  be made up through 
inc reased  management i n i t i a t i v e s  and more r e s o u r c e s  -- r e c r u i t i n g  and 
a d v e r t i s i n g ,  compensation and b e n e f i t s ,  e n l i s t m e n t  and t r a i n i n g  o p t i o n s ,  
and t h e  l i k e .  Current  AVF a c t i v e  f o r c e  l e v e l s  approximate c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  
a u t h o r i z e d  s t r e n g t h s  and a r e  only  marg ina l ly ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  g r o s s l y  under- 
s t r e n g t h  compared t o  FY 1973 au tho r i zed  l e v e l s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  would appear  t h a t  Se l ec t ed  Reserve f o r c e  l e v e l s  5 pe rcen t  
below FY 1973 could be brought  back t o  FY 1973 s t r e n g t h  i n  t h e  same f a s h i o n  -- 
an achievement which would reduce  t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve s h o r t f a l l  a g a i n s t  
wartime requi rements  from 17 pe rcen t  t o  a  more manageable 1 3  p e r c e n t .  
Ove ra l l  Se l ec t ed  Reserve s t r e n g t h  f i g u r e s  a r e  mi s l ead ing ,  however. A s  of 
March 31, 1981, t h e  t o t a l  numerical  s h o r t f a l l  of t h e  Navy, Marine Corps,  
and A i r  Force Reserve components combined was only  14 p e r c e n t ,  o r  44,000 
(280,000 a c t u a l  personnel  a s  opposed t o  FY 1982 requi rements  f o r  324,000). 
The two Army Reserve components had a  combined percentage  s h o r t f a l l  of 
19 p e r c e n t ,  and a  numer ica l  s h o r t f a l l  of 137,000. This  would appear  t o  
p r e s e n t  a  g r e a t e r  c h a l l e n g e ,  g iven  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  g r e a t e r  r e c r u i t i n g  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  Army when compared t o  t h e  more "glamorous" and /o r  
t e c h n i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d  Navy and A i r  Force ,  o r  more combat-oriented,  "macho" 
Marine Corps. Even h a l v i n g  t h e  s h o r t f a l l ,  however -- which would i n v o l v e  
marg ina l  s t r e n g t h  i n c r e a s e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  which do not  appear  u n a t t a i n a b l e  
f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  -- would r e s t o r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  gaps i n  Army Reserve 
Component s t r e n g t h .  
It i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, t o  s e e  how any amount of management a c t i o n  
o r  i n c e n t i v e s  can m a t e r i a l l y  d e c r e a s e  t h e  enormous Army I R R  s t r e n g t h  s h o r t -  
f a l l .  Claims by t h e  O f f i c e  of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense t h a t  v a r i o u s  I R R  
s t r e n g t h  i n c r e a s e  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  coupled w i th  management a c t i o n s  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  a c t u a l  y i e l d  of m o b i l i z a b l e  pe r sonne l  from t h e  I R R  poo l ,  w i l l  remove 
t h e  s h o r t f a l l  by t h e  end of FY 1985 appear  open t o  q u e s t i o n .  Tinese c l a i m s  
appear  t o  r e s t  on a  b e s t  c a s e  assumption -- ex t r eme ly  h igh  show r a t e s ,  low 
s k i l l  mismatch r a t e s ,  and no major upward r e v i s i o n s  i n  r equ i r emen t s  f o r  I R R  
f i l l e r s  and c a s u a l t y  rep lacements .  None of t h e s e  b e s t  c a s e s  i s  e i t h e r  
s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  r e a l i s t i c  e v a l u a t i o n ,  s h o r t  of t e s t  m o b i l i z a t i o n s ,  o r  l i k e l y  
t o  occu r  on t h e  b a s i s  of p a s t  h i s t o r y .  
Assuming c u r r e n t ,  more p e s s i m i s t i c  e s t i m a t e s  of  I R R  r equ i r emen t s  
and show r a t e s ,  t h e  I R R  w i l l  s t i l l  be s e v e r a l  hundred thousand pe r sonne l  
s h o r t  of r equ i r emen t s  by FY 1985. It would seem, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  
Army I R R  s t r e n g t h  i n c r e a s e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p r u d e n t l y  a n t i c i p a t e  wartime r e q u i r e -  
ments  i s  s o  g r e a t  t h a t  i n c e n t i v e s  and p o l i c i e s  adequate  t o  make up merely 
marg ina l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  would n o t  be s u f f i c i e n t .  S t r e n g t h  i n c r e a s e s  would 
have t o  be o rde rs  of magnitude g r e a t e r  than those  a t t a i n a b l e  wi th  c u r r e n t l y  
envisioned plans.  
To summarize, the  a c t i v e  fo rces  a r e  a t  congressionally-authorized 
s t r e n g t h ,  and t h e  Selected Reserve i s  not d r a s t i c a l l y  below DoD-stated 
mobi l iza t ion requirements. It the re fo re  seems reasonable t o  assume t h a t  
they could be maintained a t  these  l e v e l s  o r  s l i g h t l y  increased without a  
wholesale r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  incen t ives  and p o l i c i e s .  
The Army Ind iv idua l  Ready Reserve, however, would appear t o  be s o  quant i -  
t a t i v e l y  d e f i c i e n t  t h a t  i t  could t ake  considerably  more than " t i n k e r i n g  
a t  t h e  edges" t o  r econc i l e  I R R  s t r e n g t h  wi th  requirements. The a b i l i t y  
of t h e  All-Volunteer Force t o  meet increased manpower requirements would, 
on the  b a s i s  of pas t  experience a lone,  appear t o  be much more problemat ica l .  
The Gates Commission es t imated i n  1970 t h a t  the  pay inc reases  it recommended 
would r e c r u i t  and r e t a i n  enough male volunteers  t o  s u s t a i n  a  2.5 million-man 
fo rce ;  ins tead ,  a  f o r c e  of approximately 2.1 m i l l i o n ,  which i s  8.5 percent  
female, i s  being maintained wi th  some d i f f i c u l t y ,  a l b e i t  without the  f u l l  
pay comparabil i ty wi th  c i v i l i a n  wage l e v e l s  recommended by t h e  Gates 
Commission, and wi th  a  diminution of r e c r u i t i n g  resources.  
There i s  thus a  major pol icy  i s s u e  regarding the  q u a n t i t a t i v e  man- 
power requirements of t h e  Armed Forces which d id  not e x i s t  a  decade ago. 
I n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and e a r l y  1970s, the  t h r u s t  of most concerned a n a l y s t s  
and m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  l eaders  was t h a t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  manpower l e v e l s  
were adequate o r  even excessive.  I n  the  1980s, i f  t h e  assumptions noted 
above a r e  accepted,  t h e r e  i s  a  sense  t h a t  cu r ren t  manpower s t r e n g t h s  a r e  
e i t h e r  adequate o r  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  The Reagan Administrat ion i n  f a c t  
p lans  t o  expand manpower s t r eng ths .  There i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  ques t ion  
a s  t o  t h e  adequacy of s t a t e d  requirements themselves, even i f  f u l l y  met. 
A l o g i c a l  c o r o l l a r y  of t h i s  ques t ion i s  whether t h e  cur ren t  m i l i t a r y  
manpower system can supply increased numbers of m i l i t a r y  personnel 
of r e q u i s i t e  q u a l i t y  without r a d i c a l  change i f  more a r e  needed. 
111. QUALITATIVE ISSUES 
Background 
Rec ru i t  q u a l i t y  was no t  a major  i s s u e  du r ing  t h e  d r a f t  e r a ,  excep t  
f o r  p e r i o d i c  n a t i o n a l  concern about t h e  number of young men found p h y s i c a l l y ,  
m e n t a l l y ,  e d u c a t i o n a l l y ,  o r  mora l ly  u n f i t  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  This  concern ,  
however, was wi th  t h e  s o c i a l  and p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s t a t e  of t h e  n a t i o n  and t h e  
American people i n  g e n e r a l  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  Armed Forces  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r .  251 The s e r v i c e s ,  through t h e  d r a f t ,  were always a b l e  t o  a s s u r e  
themselves of adequate  r e c r u i t  q u a l i t y .  Then a s  now, though, t h e r e  was concern 
over  sho r t ages  of noncommissioned o f f i c e r s  and key t e c h n i c a l  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  t h e  
c a r e e r  f o r c e ,  due i n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  i t  was b e l i e v e d ,  t o  ex t remely  low c a r e e r  
pay s c a l e s .  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  q u a l i t y  of manpower i n  t h e  Al l -Volunteer  
Force,  a s  measured by t h e  conven t iona l  i n d i c e s  of e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t ,  
mental  ca t ego ry ,  l e v e l s  of c a r e e r  pe r sonne l ,  and m i l i t a r y  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y .  
It examines s o c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s  -- such a s  r a c e  and socioeconomic s t a t u s  -- 
a s  we l l .  Both s t a t i s t i c a l  and judgmental m a t e r i a l  i s  p r e sen ted .  
I n d i c e s  o f  Qua l i t y  
The Armed Forces measure personnel  q u a l i t y  i n  a  v a r i e t y  of ways. 
The two b e s t  known s t a n d a r d s  a r e  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h igh  
school  g radua te  s t a t u s )  and mental  ca t ego ry  ( b a s i c  i n t e l l i g e n c e  measured 
through a  s t anda rd  a p t i t u d e  t e s t ) .  M i l i t a r y  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y  and c a r e e r  
personnel  s t r e n g t h s  a r e  a l s o  i n d i c e s  of personnel  and f o r c e  q u a l i t y .  A 
2 5 1  See,  f o r  example, One-Third of a  Nation:  A Report on Young Men 
~ o u n d T n ~ u a l i f i e d  f o r  M i l i t a r y  Se rv i ce .  P r e s i d e n t  ' s  Task Force on Manpower 
Conserva t ion .  January 1, 1964. 
r e l a t e d  i s s u e  i n v o l v e s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  Armed Forces  a r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
of t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  l a r g e ,  i n  terms of r a c e  and/or  socioeconomic s t a t u s .  
The i n t e n s e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  on t h e  q u a l i t y  of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l ,  
and f i r s t - t e r m  r e c r u i t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  is  l a r g e l y  a  product  of t h e  A l l -  
Volunteer  Force e r a .  Proponents  of t h e  AVF have a t tempted  t o  defend 
i t  by c i t i n g  q u a l i t a t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  and opponents  have a t tempted  t o  
a t t a c k  i t  by c i t i n g  t h e  same o r  d i f f e r e n t  numbers a s  t h e  proponents .  
The marke tp l ace  environment  i n  which AVF r e c r u i t i n g  t a k e s  p l ace  encourages 
t h e  u se  of p r e c i s e  measures of pe r sonne l  q u a l i t y ,  s o  t h a t  p r o g r e s s  can be 
measured and p o l i c i e s  a d j u s t e d  t o  f i t  t h e  needs of t h e  r e c r u i t i n g  market.  
Educat ion  
The measurement of e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  i s  com- 
p l i c a t e d  by a  v a r i e t y  of methodologica l  problems and u t i l i z a t i o n  cont ro-  
v e r s i e s .  The most commonly-used e d u c a t i o n a l  i n d i c a t o r  -- h igh  schoo l  
g r a d u a t i o n  -- must be p r e c i s e l y  de f ined  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between h igh  
schoo l  g r a d u a t e  equ iva l ency  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t e s t i n g  ( m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  
who o b t a i n  such  an  equ iva l ency  r a t i n g  have t h e  same degree  of f i r s t - t e r m  
a t t r i t i o n  and d i s c i p l i n a r y  problems a s  non h igh  schoo l  g r a d u a t e s )  and 
a c t u a l  r e c e i p t  of a  h igh  schoo l  diploma. 
Much more impor tan t  t han  d e f i n i t i o n s  of what i s  be ing  measured a r e  
c o n t r o v e r s i e s  abou t  t h e  meaning and u t i l i t y  of e d u c a t i o n a l  i n d i c e s  i n  
making m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y .  One schoo l  of thought  ho lds  t h a t  educa- 
t i o n a l  l e v e l s  p e r  s e  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t ,  and can i n  f a c t  r e s u l t  i n  unnecessary  
s t i g m a t i z i n g  of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  no t  having  p a r t i c u l a r  diplomas o r  
deg rees .  What c o u n t s ,  s a y  proponents  of t h i s  view, i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  of a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  m i l i t a r y  member t o  perform h i s  o r  h e r  m i l i t a r y  job i n  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  environment .  261 Ana lys t s  who r e g a r d  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  
a s  v a l i d  i n d i c e s  w i th  which t o  e s t a b l i s h  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  do not  q u e s t i o n  
t h i s  premise a s  f a r  a s  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  concerned.  They simply n o t e  t h a t  
h igh  school  diploma g radua t ion  has  proven t o  be a  r e l i a b l e  index of m i l i t a r y  
performance i n  t h e  aggrega te .  The r a t e  of a t t r i t i o n  of f i r s t - t e r m  h igh  
school  diploma g radua te s  i s  lower t han  t h a t  of non-graduates  (80  p e r c e n t  
of h igh  school  diploma g radua te s  f i n i s h  t h r e e  y e a r s  of s e r v i c e ,  a s  opposed 
t o  only  60 percent  of non-high school  diploma g r a d u a t e s ) .  - 271 Fur thermore ,  
t h e  i nc idence  of d i s c i p l i n a r y  problems -- AWOL, d e s e r t i o n ,  n o n j u d i c i a l  
punishments -- i s  a l s o  lower among h igh  school  diploma g radua te s  when 
compared wi th  non-graduates .  Indeed,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  n o t e  t h a t  
h igh  school  g radua t ion  -- e s p e c i a l l y  i n  an e r a  of d e c l i n i n g  e d u c a t i o n a l  
s t a n d a r d s  -- does not  so  much mean t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  a t t a i n e d  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  l e v e l  of educa t ion  a s  i t  i n d i c a t e s  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e ,  pe r seve rance ,  
and a  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s t i c k  t o  a  cou r se  of a c t i o n  f o r  f u t u r e  g a i n .  - 281 
261 One of t h e  l e a d i n g  exponents  of t h i s  po in t  of view i s  C l i f f o r d  
~ l e x a a e r ,  S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  Army under t h e  C a r t e r  Admin i s t r a t i on .  See 
h i s  tes t imony b e f o r e  t h e  House Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee i n  U.S. Congress. 
House. Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  S t a t u s  of Army Manpower. Hear ings ,  
96 th  Congress, 2nd s e s s i o n .  June 11-12, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Off . ,  1981: 7-9, 1 4 ,  29, 32-33, 48-50. 
271 DoD Manpower Requirements Report f o r  FY 1982. February 1981 : V I I I - 1 .  -
281 See t h e  remarks of A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense (Manpower, Reserve 
~ f f a i G ,  and L o g i s t i c s )  Robert P i r i e  i n  U.S. Congress. House. Committee on 
Armed Se rv i ces .  Department o f  Defense Au tho r i za t ion  f o r  Appropr i a t i ons  f o r  
F i s c a l  Year 1981. P a r t  5 of 6  P a r t s ,  M i l i t a r y  Personnel .  Hear ings ,  96 th  
Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1980: 168;  and 
FY 1982 Manpower Requirements Report of t h e  Department of Defense. February 
1981: VIII-112. 
The fo l l owing  t a b l e s  summarize e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t  of m i l i t a r y  
pe r sonne l  i n  t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force :  29/ - 
TOTAL ACTIVE DUrY E1;ZISTED FORCE, KEN AND WOKEN, PERCEXT H I G H  SCHOOL 
GRADCATES ( inc ludes  sone h igh  school  equivalency through t e s t a ) ;  AND 
PERCENT hqTH SOHE COLLEGE ( i n  parentheses)  
H i g h S c h o o l  82  86  87 87 8 8  88 89 89* 88. 
Graduates 
Some College (20) (16) (16) (17) (18) (19) (17) (10)' (10). 
ACTIVE DUN N0:;PRIOR SERVICE EhZISRIESTS, KEN N;D WOYXN, PERCEhT HIGH 
SCHOOL DIPLO!"A CMDUATES AND PERCEhT WITH SO% COLLEGE ( i n  parentheses)  
H i g h S c h o o l  68  68 61  66 69 69 77 73 68  77 
Diploma 
Graduates 
SomeCol lege  NA (7) 5 Bh (6) (6) (7) 6 (5) RI 
TOTAL SELECTED RESERVE EhZISTED FORCE, tmi MD L'OEN, PERCEhT HIGH SCHOOL 
GWUAiES ( i n c l u d e s  sone high school  equivalency through t e s t s )  AND PEKCEhT 
hTTH AT LUST SO% COLLECE ( i n  parenthesea)  
High School 89* 87' 85' 82 8 1  79 79 78. 
Diploma 
Graduates 51 
Sone College (39)* ( 3 4 ) *  (30). (25) (17) (10) (10) (14). 
SELECTED RESERVE NOXPRIOR SERVICE MALE EhZISRTrhTS, PERCEPT HIGH SCHOOL 
DIPLOY! GRADUATES AXD PERCEhT WITH AT LEAST SOHE COLLEGE ( i n  parentheses)  
R i g h S c h o o l  94 68  46 5 1  55 45 39 39 42 39. 
Diplo!sa 
Graduates c /  
S o m e ~ o l l e ~ ~ ( 5 6 )  (25) (6) (6) (7) 6 (6) (4) (4) (4). 
ACTIVE DUTY NOIPRIOR SERVICE EhXISTHEATS, PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL DIPWHA 
GRADUATES, BY SEX 
&n 68* 66* 58  64 67 68 75 70 65 75  
Women NA 96* 89 92 9 1  90 9 1  91  86 89 
T o t a l  68 67 6 1  6h 69 69 77 73 68 77 
a /  Excludes c e r t a i n  Naval Reserve e o l i ~ t e e s ~  - 
bf F i r s t  F a r t e r  (October-December 1980) only. -
cf Excludes high school  sen iora  who e n l i l t  l o  t h e  Reserves befor* 
graduTtinp from high school ,  but who a r e  h igh  school  dropout.. 
29/ A l l  d a t a  were provided  by t h e  Access ion  P o l i c y  D i r e c t o r a t e ,  
o f f i c e o f  t h e  Deputy A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense ( M i l i t a r y  Pe r sonne l  
P o l i c y ) ,  November 14 ,  1980 and A p r i l  22, 1981, u n l e s s  o t h e r w i s e  i n d i c a t e d  
by an a s t e r i s k .  As t e r i sk -marked  d a t a  a r e  from a  v a r i e t y  of o t h e r  DoD 
s o u r c e s .  A s  i n  a l l  c a s e s  when d a t a  a r e  n o t  drawn from one sou rce ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of d i f f e r i n g  and m u t u a l l y  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  c r i t e r i a  must be no ted .  
S e v e r a l  s a l i e n t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  can be made from examining t h e s e  d a t a :  
-- They do not suppor t  t h e  n o t i o n  of a  d r a s t i c  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  minimum 
o r  average  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l  of m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  under  t h e  AVF. 
-- They do i n d i c a t e  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of 
m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  w i t h  more t han  a  h igh  schoo l  educa t ion .  
-- There has been a  g r e a t e r  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l s  
of t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve e n l i s t e d  f o r c e  s i n c e  t h e  AVF began, compared 
t o  t h a t  of t h e  a c t i v e  e n l i s t e d  f o r c e .  
Mental Category 
The measurement of i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l s  o r  i n n a t e  menta l  a b i l i t y  of 
m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l  i s  a  compl ica ted  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e .  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
t e s t i n g  has  been a t t a c k e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  a s  be ing  c u l t u r a l l y  b iased  
and r e f l e c t i v e  of socioeconomic s t a t u s  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  r a t h e r  t han  measuring 
t r u e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a b i l i t y .  
The Department of Defense u s e s  an  index  of mental  a b i l i t y  which 
d i v i d e s  pe r sonne l  i n t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  based on t e s t  r e s u l t s .  These 
c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  l a b e l e d  by roman numerals I through V, Pe r sonne l  i n  
Ca tego r i e s  I and 11 s c o r e  i n  t h e  s u p e r i o r  o r  above-average r anges ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  Category I11 per sonne l  a r e  r a t e d  i n  t h e  average  range 
( i . e . ,  from s l i g h t l y  above t o  s l i g h t l y  below t h e  median l e v e l ) ;  Category 
I V  pe r sonne l  a r e  below average ;  and Category V i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  a t  t h e  
lowes t  l e v e l s  of mental  a b i l i t y .  ( S i n c e  1948, Category V pe r sonne l  have 
been fo rb idden  by law t o  e n t e r  t h e  Armed Forces . )  
Category d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  a r e  based on t h e  s c o r e s  i n d i v i d u a l s  make 
on t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s  Voca t iona l  Ap t i t ude  B a t t e r y  (ASVAB). The ranges  
of i n t e l l i g e n c e  covered  by each  c a t e g o r y ,  however, a r e  o f t e n  misunder- 
s tood .  They a r e  no t  based on p a r t i c u l a r  pe rcen tages  of t h e  t o t a l  popu la t i on  
t e s t e d ,  o r  on pe rcen tages  of  t h e  American p o p u l a t i o n  a s  a  whole. Ra the r ,  
i n d i v i d u a l  t e s t  s c o r e s  a r e  ranked acco rd ing  t o  how they  would s t a n d  
among t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  on a c t i v e  duty  du r ing  World War 11. Since  
World War 11, t h e  t e s t s  used  by t h e  s e r v i c e s  t o  measure i n t e l l i g e n c e  
l e v e l s  have been reused  s e v e r a l  t imes .  I n  each  c a s e ,  t h e  t e s t s  have 
been des igned  s o  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  would be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  World War 
I1 t e s t  i n  te rms  of d i f f i c u l t y ,  t h u s  e n a b l i n g  t h e  s c o r e s  t o  be comparable 
ove r t ime . 
It appea r s  t h a t  f a u l t y  procedures  caused DoD t o  r a d i c a l l y  under- 
e s t i m a t e  t h e  number and p r o p o r t i o n  of pe r sonne l  e n l i s t e d  d u r i n g  FY 1976- 
1980 who were men ta l ly  below average .  I n  A p r i l  1980 t h e  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  
of  Defense (Manpower, Reserve A f f a i r s ,  and L o g i s t i c s )  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  
s e r i o u s  e r r o r s  had been made i n  c a l i b r a t i n g  t e s t  s c o r e s .  I n  J u l y  1980, 
DoD r e l e a s e d  a  r e p o r t  which s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o p o r t i o n  of Mental 
Category I V  r e c r u i t s  ( t h e  lowes t  ca t ego ry  c u r r e n t l y  a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  e n l i s t m e n t  
i n t o  t h e  Armed ~ o r c e s )  d u r i n g  FY 1979 was much h i g h e r  t han  p r e v i o u s l y  
s t a t e d  f i g u r e s ,  and t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  p ropor t i on  of Mental Category I11 
r e c r u i t s  ( ave rage  i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l )  was much lower.  The p r o p o r t i o n s  
of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental  Category I and I1 ( s u p e r i o r  and above average  
i n t e l l i g e n c e )  were a p p a r e n t l y  recorded  somewhat more a c c u r a t e l y  by t h e  
o r i g i n a l  t e s t s ;  DoD found l e s s  e r r o r  i n  t h e i r  ca se .  F u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  
r evea l ed  t h a t  r e c r u i t s  e n l i s t e d  from t h e  second h a l f  of FY 1976 (January-  
June 1976) through FY 1980 were t e s t e d  i n c o r r e c t l y ,  and t h a t  t h e  p ropor t i on  
of  r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I V  f o r  t h e s e  4  112 y e a r s  was r a d i c a l l y  
h i g h e r ,  and t h o s e  i n  C a t e g o r i e s  1-111 lower ,  p r ev ious ly  s t a t e d  by DoD 
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  Army. %/ 
Ana lys i s  of t r e n d s  i n  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l s  of m i l i t a r y  personnel  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  compl ica ted  by t h e  fo l lowing  f a c t o r s :  
-- Mental a b i l i t y  i s  no t  measured a g a i n s t  t h e  popu la t i on  a s  a  whole, 
bu t  a g a i n s t  a  35-year o l d  subsample -- World War I1 a c t i v e  du ty  m i l i t a r y  
members -- t h a t  was by no means r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  popu la t i on  then  
(due t o  t h e  deferment  of men f o r  age ,  medica l ,  o r  occupa t iona l  r e a s o n s ,  
and t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of women), l e t  a lone  now. 
-- Seve ra l  t e s t s  have been used by t h e  Armed Forces s i n c e  World 
War I1 t o  measure i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  caus ing  p o t e n t i a l  comparison problems 
each time t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  has  been made from one t e s t  t o  ano the r .  
301 The most comprehensive d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  mental  ca t ego ry  system, 
what it measures,  and t h e  r e c e n t  problems d iscovered  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
a r e  found i n  U.S. Congress. Senate.  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  Depart- 
ment o f  Defense Au tho r i za t ion  f o r  Appropr i a t i ons  f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1981. 
P a r t  3 ,  Manpower and Personnel .  Hearings,  96th Congress, 2nd s e s s i o n .  
Washington, U .  S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1980: 1285-1300, 1304-16, 1322-23, 
1332-45, 1359-60; H i s to ry  of t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s  Vocat iona l  Ap t i t ude  
B a t t e r y  (ASVAB). A Report t o  t h e  P r i n c i p a l  Deputy A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  
of Defense (Manpower, Reserve A f f a i r s ,  and L o g i s t i c s ) .  DoD ASVAB Working 
Group, March 1980; DoD Manpower Requirements Report f o r  1982. Feb rua ry  
1981: Chapter  V I I I ,  Rec ru i t  Qua l i t y .  
-- During FY 1976-1980, t h e  AFQT i n  u se  g r e a t l y  o v e r s t a t e d  t h e  
average  mental  a b i l i t y  of AVF r e c r u i t s ,  a l though t h e  new t e s t  i n t roduced  
a t  t h e  beginning  of FY 1981 c o r r e c t s  t h i s  e r r o r .  311 -
The s t a t i s t i c s  below r e f l e c t  t h e s e  r e c e n t  t e s t  problems: 321 -
31/ Due t o  Congress iona l  concern  over  t h e  q u a l i t y  of All-Volunteer  
~ o r c e r e c r u i t s ,  s e c t i o n  302 of t h e  FY 1981 DoD Appropr i a t i on  Au tho r i za t ion  
Act (P.L. 96-342), a s  amended by s e c t i o n  9 ,  P.L. 96-584, M i l i t a r y  Pay and 
Allowances B e n e f i t s  Act of 1980, p laced  s t a t u t o r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on e n l i s t -  
ment q u a l i t y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime s i n c e  FY 1974. These were a s  fo l l ows :  
-- No more t h a n  35% of Army male nonpr io r  s e r v i c e  e n l i s t e e s  
d u r i n g  FY 1981 can be non-high-school g radua te s .  
-- No more t h a n  25% o f  DoD e n l i s t e e s  du r ing  FY 1981 
and FY 1982 can  be i n  Mental Category I V .  
-- No more t h a n  20% o f  DoD e n l i s t e e s  d u r i n g  FY 1983 
can be i n  Mental Category I V .  
Also ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of Defense i s  r equ i r ed  t o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  Armed 
S e r v i c e s  Committees of t h e  House and Senate  a t  t h e  end of each  q u a r t e r  
of FY 1981 on whether  t h e  mental  ca t ego ry  l i m i t a t i o n s  have had a nega t ive  
impact on combat r e a d i n e s s .  
321 A l l  d a t a  were provided by t h e  Accession P o l i c y  D i r e c t o r a t e ,  
~ f f i c e o f  t h e  Deputy A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense ( M i l i t a r y  Personnel  
p o l i c y ) ,  November 14 ,  1980 and A p r i l  22,  1981,  u n l e s s  o the rwi se  i n d i c a t e d  
by an a s t e r i s k .  As ter i sk-marked  d a t a  a r e  from a v a r i e t y  of o t h e r  DoD 
sou rces .  A s  i n  a l l  c a s e s  when d a t a  a r e  not  drawn from one source ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of d i f f e r n g  and mutua l ly  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  c r i t e r i a  must be noted.  
ACTIVE DUTY NONPRIOR SERVICE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, PERCENT I N  MENTAL 
CATEGORIES I (SUPERIOR) ; II (ABOVE AVERAGE) ; 111 (AVERAGE) ; AND IV (BELOW AVERAGE) 
F i s c a l  Year 1964 1973 - 1974 1975 1976 b/ 1977 b/ 1978 b/ 1979 b/ 1980 b/ 1981 h /  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
I 6 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
I I 3 2 32 32 34 3 5 2 6 28 2 5 2 3 3 0 
I I I 4 7 5 5 5 5 5 6 51 4 0 4 3 42 42 45 
I V  15 10 10 6 10 3 0 2 5 30 3 3 2 2 
SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT I N  MENTAL CATEGORIES 
I (SUPERIOR) ; I1 (ABOVE AVERAGE) ; I11 (AVERAGE) ; AND I V  (BELOW AVERAGE) 
F i s c a l  Year 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 c /  1977 c /  1978 c /  1979 d/  1980 d /  1981 h /  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
I 17 10 5 3 3* 
ACTIVE DUTY NONPRIOR SERVICE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT I N  MENTAL CATEGORIES I - I V ,  BY SEX 
F i s c a l  Year 1964 1973 1974 1975 1976 f /  1977 g/ -- -
I - 
Men 7 5 4 3 3 NA 9 4 3 4 




Men 35 32 3 0 2 9 31 NA 2 5 2 7 24 2 2 
Women - - - 45 4 8 45 6 4 5 7 NA 3 8 35 28 23 
111 -
Men 5 1 42 53 5 8 59 N A 39 41 4 1 4 1 
Women 5 2 5 0 5 2 21 29 N A 5 2 54 5 4 46 
I v -
Men 8 21 14 11 7 NA 32 28 3 2 33 
Women e / 1 e l  - e / - - - e l  NA 6 7 15 28 --------------- 
a /  Pre-FY 1974 d a t a  i n c l u d e s  males on ly .  - 
b/  A l l  o r i g i n a l l y  r e p o r t e d  menta l  test s c o r e s  f o r  FY 1976-1980 were d i scovered  t o  be 
invalTd.  Recent a n a l y s i s  h a s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s c o r e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  u n d e r s t a t e d  
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I V  (below average)  and o v e r s t a t e d  t h e  pro- 
p o r t i o n  i n  Mental Category I11 ( a v e r a g e ) .  The p r o p o r t i o n s  of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental Category I 
( s u p e r i o r )  and Mental Category I1 (above average)  were a l s o  o v e r s t a t e d ,  but not  a s  g r e a t l y  
a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of Category 111 r e c r u i t s .  These pe rcen tages  r e p r e s e n t  r ecomputa t ions  of t h e  
o r i g i n a l  raw d a t a  t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  t h e  e r r o r s  d i scovered .  A new t e s t ,  des igned  t o  avoid t h e  
e r r o r s  of t h e  o l d ,  was in t roduced  a t  t h e  beginning of FY 1981. 
c /  Recomputations of t h e  mental  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  S e l e c t e d  Reserve r e c r u i t s  i n  FY 1976- 
1978-have n o t  y e t  been completed. See above, n o t e  b/ t o  t h i s  t a b l e .  
d /  Only p a r t i a l  r ecomputa t ions  of t h e  mental  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  S e l e c t e d  Reserve r e c r u i t s  
i% FY 1979-1980 have been completed,  showing o n l y  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  of r e c r u i t s  i n  Mental 
Category I V  (below average) .  The breakdown of Mental C a t e g o r i e s  1-111 i s  not  y e t  a v a i l a b l e .  
See above, n o t e  b/  t o  t h i s  t a b l e .  
e /  Less t h a n  one p e r c e n t .  - 
f /  Breakdown n o t  a v a i l a b l e  by s e x  f o r  FY 1976. 
/ See above, n o t e  b/ t o  t h i s  t a b l e .  
h /  1 s t  q u a r t e r  ( ~ c t z b e r - ~ e c e m b e r  1980) on lv .  
The b e l a t e d  d i scove ry  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of below-average mental  
c a t e g o r y  personnel  e n l i s t e d  i n  t h e  Armed Forces  du r ing  FY 1976-1980 was 
much h i g h e r  t han  h i t h e r t o  be l i eved  would appear  t o  conf i rm impression-  
i s t i c  r e p o r t s  by o f f i c e r s  and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s  -- u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  
o f f i c i a l l y  d i s coun ted  by DoD -- t h a t  r e c r u i t  q u a l i t y  d i d  d e c l i n e  -
d r a s t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s. 331 More d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  of mental -
ca t ego ry  d a t a  i s  hampered by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  recomputa t ion  of t h e  
e r roneous  FY 1976-1980 d a t a  i s  no t  y e t  complete. Furthermore,  t h e  
p r e s s  of c u r r e n t  bus ines s  and t h e  l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  and t ime a v a i l a b l e  
t o  DoD may prevent  a  f u l l  r e v i s i o n  of a l l  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  de r ived  from 
FY 1976-1980 menta l  t e s t  s c o r e  d a t a  from eve r  be ing  completed. 
Levels  o f  Ca ree r  Personnel  
The s e r v i c e s  r e q u i r e  s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  personnel  
t o  provide  l e a d e r s h i p  and t e c h n i c a l / a d m i n s t r a t i v e  e x p e r t i s e ,  " ca ree r "  
331 A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s e l e c t i o n  of such i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  d e t a i l ,  
t y p i c a l  of t h a t  found i n  numerous newspaper, magazine, and jou rna l  d i s -  
c u s s i o n s ,  i s  i n  U.S. Congress. Senate.  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  
S t a t u s  of t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Armed Force.  Hear ing ,  95th Congress ,  2nd 
s e s s i o n .  June 20, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1978. 
I m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  d a t a ,  of c o u r s e ,  h a s  i t s  own l i m i t a t i o n s .  These i n c l u d e  
s o c i a l  b i a s e s  and/or  u n r e a l i s t i c  n o s t a l g i a  on t h e  p a r t  of o l d e r  o f f i c e r s  
and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s  -- a  d e s i r e  t o  r e t u r n  t o  a  "Golden Age" which 
may i n  f a c t  be overdrawn. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  pub l i c  d i s c u s s i o n  and 
con t rove r sy  sur rounding  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force may have l ed  i t s  c r i t i c s  t o  
blame t h e  AVF f o r  r e c r u i t  q u a l i t y  problems which have a r i s e n  s imul taneous ly  
wi th  t h e  AVF, but  which may no t  i n  f a c t  be r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  AVF a t  a l l .  For  
v igo rous  de fenses  of AVF r e c r u i t  q u a l i t y ,  based i n  l a r g e  p a r t  on t h e  mental  
ca t ego ry  t e s t  s c o r e  d a t a  l a t e r  found t o  be i n  e r r o r ,  s e e  Richard V.  L. Cooper, 
M i l i t a r y  Manpower and t h e  All-Volunteer  Force.  Report no. R-1450-ARPA. 
Santa  Monica, C a l i f o r n i a ,  The Rand Corpora t ion ,  September 1977: 128-41; 
and America 's  Volunteers  : A Report on t h e  All-Volunteer  Armed Forces .  
O f f i c e  of t h e  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense (Manpower, Reserve A f f a i r s ,  
and ~ o ~ i s t i c s ) .  December 31, 1978: 24-35. 
being de f ined  a s  persons who have completed t h e i r  f i r s t  e n l i s t m e n t  term 
( o r  i n  some c a s e s  a s  t h o s e  wi th  more than  t h r e e  yea r s  of s e r v i c e ) .  
It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  gauge, however, what a c t u a l  requi rements  f o r  c a r e e r  
personnel  a r e .  The Navy, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  h a s  had a  p e r e n n i a l  sho r t age  of 
p e t t y  o f f i c e r s  compared t o  s t a t e d  requi rements  du r ing  t h e  e n t i r e  pos t -  
World War I1 e r a ;  t h i s  h a s  n o t ,  however, prevented t h e  Navy from s a t i s -  
f a c t o r i l y  performing i t s  a s s igned  mis s ions  du r ing  two wars and 36 y e a r s  
of s u s t a i n e d  ove r seas  peacet ime o p e r a t i o n s .  U n t i l  a c t u a l  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  
impeded by c a r e e r  f o r c e  s h o r t a g e s  -- a s  has  been t h e  ca se  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
when some Navy s h i p s  have had t o  g r e a t l y  reduce  t h e i r  tempo of o p e r a t i o n s  
due t o  l ack  of t r a i n e d  crews -- t hen  i t  i s  almost  imposs ib l e  t o  de te rmine  
how c r i t i c a l  c a r e e r  f o r c e  sho r t ages  r e a l l y  a r e .  
Reenlis tment  r a t e s  a r e  based on s t a t e d  requi rements .  Are s t a t e d  
r equ i r emen t s  based on what would be "nice" t o  have,  what would be "usefu l"  
t o  have ,  o r  what t h e  s e r v i c e s  must a b s o l u t e l y  have a t  a  minimum t o  conduct  
impor tan t  ass igned  t a s k s ?  Without t r a c k i n g  t h e  personnel  requi rements  
v a l i d a t i o n  process  s t e p  by s t e p ,  i t  i s  imposs ib le  t o  s a y .  
The fo l lowing  t a b l e  p rov ides  a summary of r e e n l i s t m e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  
s i n c e  FY 1955: 341 
341 Data from D i r e c t o r a t e  f o r  In fo rma t ion  Opera t ions  and Repor ts .  
washington Headquar te rs  Se rv i ce s .  Department of  Defense. S e l e c t e d  Manpower 
S t s t i s t i c s ,  FY 1980: 130-31, 134-35; Se l ec t ed  Manpoer S t a t i s t i c s ,  A p r i l  11, 
1966: 53; and DoD News Release  48-81. M i l i t a r y  Manpower S t r e n g t h  Assess-  
ment,  Rec ru i t i ng  and Reenl i s tment  R e s u l t s  f o r  October-December 1980 (Ac t ive  
Force) .  February 11, 1981. F igu re s  do no t  i n c l u d e  d r a f t e e s ,  bu t  pre-1976 
f i g u r e s  i nc lude  d r a f  t-induced v o l u n t a r y  e n l i s t e e s .  The "unadjusted" r e e n l i s t -  
ment r a t e  i s  de f ined  a s  " the  r a t i o  of t o t a l  r e e n l i s t m e n t s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  a  g iven  
pe r iod  t o  t o t a l  s e p a r a t i o n s  of personnel  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e e n l i s t  i n  t h e  same 
pe r iod ,  expressed  a s  a  percentage ."  
UNADJUSTED REENLISTMENT RATES 
F i s c a l  Year 1955 1960 1965 1973 b/ 1974 ----- -
First-Term 16 21 24 24 30 
Personnel  
Career  74 85 87 83 81 
(2nd and L a t e r  
Term Personnel  ) 
FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL a /  - 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 c /  -------- 
37 30 35 37 37 39 45 
a /  S t a t i s t i c s  h e r e  do not  i nc lude  d r a f t e e s ,  bu t  pre-FY 1976 f i g u r e s  
i n c l u d e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p ropor t i on  of v o l u n t a r y  e n l i s t e e s  whose o r i g i n a l  
e n l i s t m e n t  was undoubtedly d ra f t - i nduced .  The "unadjusted" r e e n l i s t m e n t  
r a t e  i s  de f ined  a s  " the  r a t i o  of t o t a l  r e e n l i s t m e n t s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  a  g iven  
pe r iod  t o  t o t a l  s e p a r a t i o n s  of personnel  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e e n l i s t  i n  t h e  same 
pe r iod ,  expressed  a s  a  percentage . ' '  
b /  F i r s t  AVF f i s c a l  y e a r .  - 
c /  F i r s t  Hal f .  - 
(These o v e r a l l  DoD f i g u r e s ,  i t  should be no ted ,  mask much more d r a s t i c  
dec reases  i n  Navy and Marine Corps c a r e e r  r e e n l i s t m e n t s  s i n c e  FY 1973.) 
D e t a i l e d  examinat ion  of c a r e e r  r e e n l i s t m e n t  r a t e s  du r ing  t h e  FY 1955-1975 
per iod  shows an average  i n  t h e  85-90 pe rcen t  range f o r  each y e a r ;  t h e  
drop  below 75 pe rcen t  a f t e r  FY 1975-1976 t h e r e f o r e  appears  t o  be a  r a d i c a l  
d e p a r t u r e  from post-World War I1 norms. The f i r s t - t e r m  r e e n l i s t m e n t  r a t e s  
d u r i n g  FY 1955-1975 g e n e r a l l y  s t ayed  i n  t h e  25-30 percent  r ange ;  h e r e ,  t h e  
improvement t o  t h e  h igh  30s/ low 40s range i s  a l s o  a  new phenomenon. 
These r e e n l i s t m e n t  r a t e s  ( p l u s  o t h e r  f a c t o r s )  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
be ing  s h o r t  104,000 personnel  i n  grades  E-4 through E-9 a s  of January  
1980, most such s l o t s  be ing  f i l l e d  by j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  pe r sonne l .  - 351 
While t h e  s h o r t a g e  was only  about  6  pe rcen t  of t h e  t o t a l  e n l i s t e d  f o r c e ,  
s t a t i s t i c s  on s h o r t a g e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s k i l l s  l e ave  l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  
r e t e n t i o n  i s  c r i t i c a l  i n  a  v a r i e t y  of a r e a s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t hose  which 
351 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropr i a t i ons .  Department 
of  ~ e z n s e  Appropr i a t i on  B i l l ,  1981; r e p o r t  t o  accompany H.R. 8105. 
September 11, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1980 (96 th  
Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n .  House. Report no. 96-131 7) : 23-24. 
involve combat and/or arduous duty in peace or war (ground combat skills, 
Navy engineering ratings, and the like) or which require technical training 
and education which is in high demand in the private sector (electronics 
in particular) . 
What is not clear is the extent to which retention problems result 
from the transition from a conscription-based force to an All-Volunteer 
Force. An examination of the historical record suggests that while first- 
term recruit quality may indeed have dropped under the AVF when compared 
to the draft era, career enlisted retention has been a pervasive military 
personnel policy problem since the end of World War 11. A host of reports, 
studies, and analyses since the late 1940s -- notably proposals for 
major increases in career compensation levels -- have stated that career 
enlisted retention rates are inadequate. Virtually all of these 
discussions have identified pay levels as the primary reason for 
retention problems. 361 In the early 1970s -- during the first few -
years of the AVF -- military compensation was actually roughly comparable 
with private sector compensation for the first time since 1945, 
361 See Career Compensation for the Uniformed Forces. A Report and 
~ecomyndation for the Secretary of Defense by the Advisory Commission on 
Service Pay [the "Hook Commission"], and Appendix. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., December 1948; A Modern Concept of Manpower Management and 
Compensation for Personnel of the Uniformed Services. Volume. I: Military 
Personnel. A Report and Recommendation for the Secretary of Defense by 
the Defense Advisory Committee on Professi.ona1 and Technical Compensation 
[the "Cordiner Committee" Report]. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
May 1957; Department of Defense. Modernizing Military Pay. Report of 
the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation. Volume I: Active 
Duty Compensation. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., November 1, 1967. 
Any interested analyst who believes that career retention is a problem 
unique to the All-Volunteer Force need only survey these three pre-AVF 
studies to dispel such notions. 
according to several compensation analyses. By 1975-1976 military 
compensation had started to lag behind civilian compensation, and 
continued to decrease until late 1980. 37/ Major increases in military -
compensation enacted in 1980 halted the erosion relative to civilian 
pay, although it did not restore the purchasing power of military 
personnel to the relative high reached in 1972-1973. 38/ -
Most of the 1980 military compensation initiatives were explicitly 
directed at retention rather than first-term recruiting, and did not 
directly address the major overall gap between military and civilian 
compensation which developed during the 1970s. The actual effects of 
these compensation increases, anticipation of their enactment, and 
the indication that they provide tangible public and congressional 
support for career personnel all had positive effects on career retention. 
DoD career enlisted retention was up in FY 1980 compared to FY 1979, and 
37/ A variety of analyses have confirmed that the purchasing power 
of mixtary compensation peaked in 1972-1973 and has eroded steadily 
since then, at an accelerating rate after 1975-1976. See Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy). Report 
of the Pay Adequacy Study. October 1979; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee 
on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 1980. Part 4, Manpower and Personnel. Hearings, 96th 
Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979: 1970-75; 
Richard L. Eisenman, with Paul Zinsmeister and Robert L. Goldich. What's 
Happened to Military Pay and Benefits through the Past Decade? Report 
78-9F. Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
December 30, 1977; Melvin R. Laird. People, Not Hardware: The Highest 
Defense Priority. Special Analysis 80-1. Washington, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. 
38/ The Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments of 1980 
(P.L.T~-343, September 8, 1980; 94 Stat. 1123); several provisions of the 
FY 1981 DoD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342, September 8, 1980; 
94 Stat. 1077); and the Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 
(P.L. 96-579, December 23, 1980; 94 Stat. 3359) were the principal statutes 
involved. 
even h i g h e r  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  of FY 1981 than  i n  FY 1980. Navy c a r e e r  
e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  has  recovered from a  low of 62% i n  FY 1979 t o  73% 
dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of FY 1981; Marine Corps c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  
rebounded from 52% i n  FY 1979 and 50% i n  FY 1980 t o  74% i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
of FY 1981. Army c a r e e r  e n l i s t e d  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e s  have a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  
from FY 1979 lows. 
M i l i t a r y  S k i l l  P r o f i c i e n c y  
A t  f i r s t  g lance  i t  would appear  t h a t  measuring t h e  a b i l i t y  of i n d i v i -  
dua l  m i l i t a r y  members t o  perform t h e i r  jobs would be one of t h e  b e s t  
i n d i c a t i o n s  of q u a l i t y ,  a s  i t  would measure d i r e c t  competence i n  m i l i t a r y  
t a s k s  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n d i r e c t  i n d i c a t o r s  of t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  perform t h o s e  
t a s k s ,  such a s  educa t ion  o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  However, whi le  m i l i t a r y  s k i l l  
p r o f i c i e n c y  t e s t s  may measure t h e  a b i l i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  perform s p e c i f i c  
a c t i o n s  -- f i r e  a  r i f l e  a c c u r a t e l y ,  o p e r a t e  a  computer p r o p e r l y ,  o r  d i agnose  
an e l e c t r o n i c  ma l func t ion  and r e p a i r  i t  -- t h e y  do not  measure t h e  a b i l i t y  
of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  perform a s  a  member of a  team, on a  coope ra t ive  b a s i s ,  
f r e q u e n t l y  under s t r e s s .  They do no t  t ake  account  of d i s c i p l i n a r y  problems. 
They do no t  measure t h e  a b i l i t y  of a  person t o  perfrom c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  a s  
opposed t o  a  one-time t e s t  s i t u a t i o n .  Furthermore,  l i k e  a l l  t e s t s ,  t h e y  
a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  man ipu la t i on  and coaching ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  a  s t r u c t u r e d  
m i l i t a r y  environment ,  
Much con t rove r sy  has  a r i s e n  about  h igh  f a i l u r e  r a t e s  of Army personnel  
t ak ing  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y  t e s t s  -- S k i l l  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  T e s t s  
(SQT), f i r s t  i n t roduced  i n  1977. 391 There i s  no way t o  de t e rmine ,  however, -
--------------- 
391 J u r i  Toomepuu, Ready, Wi l l i ng ,  Able t o  F i g h t .  Army, January  1980: 
6-7; J a c k  Tay lo r ,  M i l i t a r y  S u f f e r s  Manpower C r i s i s ,  The Sunday Oklahoman, 
September 14 ,  1980: 1. 
whether t h i s  problem i s  due t o  low q u a l i t y  r e c r u i t s ,  u n r e a l i s t i c  
o r  i n a c c u r a t e  t e s t i n g ,  o r  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of apply ing  w r i t t e n  t e s t s  i n  
a  non-academic environment .  Furthermore,  t h e r e  a r e  no time s e r i e s  a v a i l -  
a b l e  w i th  which t o  measure t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y  ove r  
t h e  yea r s .  What would SQT pas s ing  r a t e s  have been i n  1965 o r  1955, had 
such t e s t s  been used t h e n ?  What p ropor t i on  of World War I1 s o l d i e r s  
would have passed World War I1 SQTs? It may be t h a t  d e t a i l e d  numer ica l ly-  
scored  t e s t s  a r e  s imply i n v a l i d  t o o l s  with which t o  measure m i l i t a r y  
s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y  i f  e v a l u a t e d  i n  i s o l a t i o n  from a  working environment ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  of combat o r  o t h e r  occupa t iona l  s p e c i a l t i e s  performed 
i n  t h e  f i e l d .  401 -
The Navy and A i r  Force have used w r i t t e n  s k i l l  t e s t s  -- n o t  i n  i s o l a t i o n  
from t h e  o t h e r  t o o l s  of personnel  e v a l u a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  commanders, bu t  
a s  one of s e v e r a l  such t o o l s  -- f o r  many y e a r s ,  wi th  cons ide rab l e  succes s .  
It may be t h a t  t h e  Army's problems wi th  such t e s t s  s imply invo lve  "growing 
p a i n s , "  due t o  t h e  Army's l e s s e r  expe r i ence  wi th  them. It i s  impor t an t ,  
however, no t  t o  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  o r  e x c l u s i v e l y  blame t e s t s  f o r  bad r e s u l t s ;  
t h i s  i s  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  e q u i v a l e n t  of " k i l l i n g  t h e  messenger t h a t  b r i n g s  
t h e  bad news . I '  
Race and Socioeconomic S t a t u s  
The e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  All-Volunteer  Force i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  
American s o c i e t y  a s  a  whole has  been debated a t  g r e a t  l eng th .  Some f e e l  
401 General  Donn A. S t a r r y ,  U.S. Army. Values,  Not Scores ,  t h e  Best  
~ e a s u G  of S o l d i e r  Qua l i t y .  Army, October 1980: 38-43. 
t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s  i s  i r r e l e v a n t ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  i s  has  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  combat c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  s e r v i c e s  a s  w e l l  
a s  s o c i a l  e q u a l i t y .  Perhaps t h e  most s a l i e n t  p o i n t  about  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s  
i s  t h a t  i t  must be measured i n  comparison t o  some o t h e r  group,  and t h a t  group 
must be s e l e c t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of  judgment and i n t u i t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  h a r d  
and f a s t  l o g i c .  Should t h e  i s s u e  of r a c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
be d i s cus sed  i n  terms of  t h e  t o t a l  b l ack  p o p u l a t i o n  of t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  
t h e  b l ack  popu la t i on  i n  t h e  18-34 age  group (which c o n t a i n s  most a c t i v e  
duty  e n l i s t e d  p e r s o n n e l ) ,  o r  t h e  b l ack  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  18-30 age  group 
not  e n r o l l e d  i n  c o l l e g e  o r  w i th  h i g h e r  educa t ion  (which approximate  t h e  
e n l i s t e d  f o r c e  even more c l o s e l y ) ?  A l i t e r a l  comparison f o r  purposes  of 
r a c i a l  o r  socioeconomic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  may very  w e l l  i g n o r e  t h e  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  of l e s s  p r e c i s e ,  bu t  more v i s i b l e  and unde r s t andab le ,  
comparisons. 
Measurement and judgment problems become even more a c u t e  when a p p l i e d  
t o  s t a n d a r d s  such a s  income l e v e l ,  which can be measured only  through 
sample surveys .  When d e a l i n g  wi th  such vague terms a s  "socioeconomic 
s t a t u s , "  q u a n t i t a t i v e  measurement b reaks  down comple te ly .  What i s  t h e  
"socioeconomic s t a t u s "  of a  wh i t e  male g radua te  of a  h igh  schoo l  i n  a  
g e n e r a l l y  a f f l u e n t  a r e a  who does no t  go on t o  c o l l e g e  and comes from one 
of t h e  few poor households i n  h i s  a r e a ?  S p e c i f i c  i n d i c a t o r s  f o r  such an 
i n d i v i d u a l  would be h i g h l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  Under such c i r cums tances ,  i t  
i s  o f t e n  mi s l ead ing  and even r i s k y  t o  u s e  q u a n t i f i e d  d a t a .  
The fo l lowing  s t a t i s t i c s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of b l a c k s  i n  t h e  
Armed Forces  has  r i s e n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  under  t h e  AVF. ( O v e r a l l  f i g u r e s  f o r  
DoD mask s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n s  of b l a c k s  i n  t h e  Army and among 
Army e n l i s t m e n t s  -- approximate ly  a  t h i r d  i n  both  c a s e s ) :  411 - 
BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE AND SELECTED 
RESERVE ENLISTED FORCE, MEN AND WOMEN 
64 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 8 1 a /  F i s c a l  Year - - - - - - - - - - - 
Act ive  Force  10  14* 16 16 17 18 19 21 22 NA 
S e l e c t e d  NA 4 6  8  11 14 15 16 16 16 
Reserve 
BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE AND SELECTED RESERVE 
NONPRIOR SERVICE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN 
6 4 b /  73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 8 1 a /  F i s c a l  Year - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A c t i v e F o r c e  9  18  21 18  17 20 23 26 22 20 
Se l ec t ed  NA 11 26 27 29 28 28 26 22 19* 
Reserve 
a /  F i r s t  h a l f .  - 
b/ Males on ly ;  i n c l u d e s  some Army non-whites. - 
These f i g u r e s  can be c o n t r a s t e d  wi th  U.S. Census d a t a  t h a t  show t h a t  
du r ing  1950-1979, b l a c k s  a s  a  percentage  of t h e  t o t a l  U.S. popu la t i on  
i n c r e a s e d  from approximate ly  10  t o  almost  12  pe rcen t  and b l ack  males 
i n c r e a s e d  from over  11 t o  almost  13  pe rcen t  of a l l  U.S. males ages 18-24; 
411 A l l  d a t a  were provided by t h e  Accession P o l i c y  D i r e c t o r a t e ,  
o f f i c e £  t h e  Deputy A s s i s t a n t  S e c r t a r y  of  Defense ( M i l i t a r y  Personnel  
p o l i c y ) ,  November 14,  1980 and A p r i l  22, 1981, u n l e s s  o the rwi se  i n d i -  
c a t e d  by an a s t e r i s k ,  As ter i sk-marked  d a t a  a r e  from a v a r i e t y  of o t h e r  
DoD sou rces .  A s  i n  a l l  c a s e s  when d a t a  a r e  not  drawn from one sou rce ,  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of d i f f e r i n g  and mutua l ly  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  c r i t e r i a  must 
be noted.  
b lacks  a s  a  percentage  of t h e  exper ienced  c i v i l i a n  l a b o r  f o r c e  remained 
a t  about  10 p e r c e n t ;  and b l a c k s  a s  a  percentage  of t h e  non-profess iona l  
c i v i l i a n  l abo r  fo rce  remained about midway between 11 and 12  p e r c e n t .  - 421 
In s h o r t ,  by any conce ivab le  g e n e r a l  measure b l a c k s  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
ove r r ep re sen ted  i n  t h e  e n l i s t e d  r anks  of t h e  All-Volunteer  Force.  
It i s  conce ivable  t h a t  much more s p e c i f i c  comparisons -- t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  
of b l a c k s ,  s ay ,  among a l l  18-24 year  o l d  males wi th  a  h igh  school  e d u c a t i o n  
o r  l e s s  working i n  b l u e - c o l l a r  o r  low-level wh i t e  c o l l a r  p o s i t i o n s  -- 
would show a  sma l l e r  d i s p a r i t y .  431 Nonethe less ,  such a  s p e c i f i c  comparison 
assumes t h e  i s s u e  of r a c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  Armed Forces  i s  r e l a t e d  
on ly  t o  s p e c i f i c  occupa t iona l  s t r u c t u r e  r a t h e r  t han  t o  b roade r  s o c i a l  and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i s s u e s  of e q u i t y  and burden-sharing;  and t h a t  unde r s t andab le  
r ea sons  f o r  o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  remove i t  a s  a  s o c i a l  i s s u e ,  441 -
There a r e  two sou rces  of socioeconomic d a t a  on r e c r u i t s  ( s e e  t a b l e  on 
p. 44) .  One invo lves  a  computer matching of t h e  r e s i d e n c e  a r e a  of e n l i s t e e s  
w i th  U.S. Census d a t a  on fami ly  income by r e s i d e n c e  a r e a ,  u s ing  z i p  code 
421 Data from U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of t h e  Census. 
c u r r e n t  Popu la t i on  Reports .  Popu la t i on  Es t ima te s  and P r o j e c t i o n s .  S e r i e s  
P-25. #/870. Es t ima te s  of t h e  Popu la t i on  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  by Age, 
Race, and Sex, 1976 t o  1979. January  1980: 7 ,  25; 1960 Census o f  Popula t ion .  
Volume I:  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  Popula t ion .  P a r t  1: United S t a t e s  Summary. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1964: 1-1481152; 1960 Census o f  Popula- 
t i o n .  Subjec t  Reports .  Occupat ional  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Washington, U.S. 
Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1963: 21-30; 1970 Census o f  Popula t ion .  Sub jec t  Repor ts .  
Occupat iona l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  June  1973: 
12-27. 
431 Richard V.L. Cooper. M i l i t a r y  Manpower P o l i c y  and t h e  Al l -Volunteer  -
Force. Rand Report  R-1450-ARPA. Santa  Monica, C a l i f o r n i a ,  The Rand Corpora- 
t i o n ,  September 1977: 205. 
44/ For an example of t h i s  po in t  of view, s e e  Cooper, M i l i t a r y  Manpower 
p o l i c y a n d  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force :  209-21. 
CALENDAR YEAR 1969 FAMILY INCOME DATA COMPARED WITH CALENDAR YEAR 1969 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDIAN INCOMES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974, 1975, 1976, TRANSITION 
QUARTER, 1977, 1978, AND 1979 ENLISTEE'S RESIDENCE 45/ -
[ I n  Pe rcen t ]  
Calendar  Year D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Calendar  Year 1969 Median Incomes 
U.S. Family of  DOD E n l i s t e e s '  Residences ( f i s c a l  y e a r s )  
Income 
Income D i s t r i b u t i o n  a /  1975 1975 1976 TQ 1977 1978 1979 
Under $6,000 2 6 7 6 5 6 6 6 7 
$6,000 t o  $7,999 14  25 24 2 2 22 23 24 2 5 
$8,000 t o  $9,999 14  32 32 3 3 3 2 32 3 2 3 2 
$10,000 t o  $11,999 13  2 4 2 5 26 2 6 2 6 25 24 
$12,000 t o  $14,999 14 10 11 12 12 11 11 10 
$15,000 t o  $24,999 15 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
Over $25,000 
T o t a l  
a /  Bureau of t h e  Census, s e r i e s  P-60, No. 70, Consumer Income-1969. - 
b/  Less t han  0.5 p e r c e n t .  - 
Note: Median f ami ly  income i n  ca l enda r  yea r  1978 was $17,640 o r  87 pe rcen t  
h i g h e r  t han  i n  1969. 
REPORTED FAMILY INCOME BY SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 1979 MALE ACCESSIONS COMPARED TO 
U.S. POPULATION DATA 43/ 
[Pe rcen t  ~ i s t r i b u t i o n r  
Popu la t i on  Data,  
Fami l i e s  wi th  
Heads 35-54 Total  Marine A i r  
y r  o l d  c /  DO D Amy Navy Corps Force 
To ta l  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Under $10,000 
$10,000 t o  $14,999 
$15,000 t o  $19,999 
$20,000 t o  $25,999 
$26,000 and above 
Median Income 
Percent  t o t a l  w i th  
un repor t ed  income 
c /  1978 f ami ly  income f a m i l i e s  wi th  heads 35 t o  54 y r .  o ld .  Taken from Census 
~ u r e a u  p u b l i c a t i o n  P-60, No. 118 i s s u e d  i n  1980. 
Source:  AFEES (Armed Forces  Ent rance  and Examination S t a t i o n )  survey .  -------------- 
45/ U.S. Congress. Senate .  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  M i l i t a r y  Compensa- -
t i o n .  Hear ing ,  96th Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n .  June 2, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Off . ,  1980: 26-27. 
a r e a s  a s  t h e  geog raph ica l  u n i t  of measurement. The o t h e r  i n v o l v e s  su rveys  
of r e c r u i t s  which r e q u e s t  i n fo rma t ion  on t h e i r  f ami ly  income ( t h i s  l a t t e r  
i n v a r i a b l y  r e v e a l s  a  g r e a t  l a c k  of knowledge of f ami ly  incomes on t h e  
p a r t  of young pe r sons ,  and must t h e r e f o r e  be t r e a t e d  w i th  some c a u t i o n ) .  
These two sou rce s  of d a t a  i n d i c a t e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of t h e  a f f l u e n t  among AVF r e c r u i t s .  It should be no ted  t h a t  t h i s  h a s  been 
t r u e  of v o l u n t a r i l y  r e c r u i t e d  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  th roughout  h i s t o r y .  */ There  
i s  a  c o r o l l a r y  i n d i c a t i o n  of o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of persons  w e l l  below t h e  
median income, a l though t h e  z i p  code-based d a t a  appear  t o  show t h a t  t h e  ve ry  
poor -- t h o s e  a t  t h e  a b s o l u t e  bot tom of t h e  socioeconomic s c a l e  -- a r e  a s  
unde r r ep re sen t ed  a s  t h e  a f f l u e n t .  
Qua l i t y :  A Summing Up 
It i s  ve ry  easy  t o  g e t  bogged 3 o w  i n  a  p l e t h o r a  of d a t a  when a t t e m p t i n g  
t o  ana lyze  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force.  This  r e p o r t  h a s  t r i e d  t o  
avoid  do ing  s o ,  so  a s  t o  e x t r a c t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  which do no t  demand t h a t  t h e  
r e a d e r  fo l l ow  t o r t u o u s  r ea son ing .  C e r t a i n  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  however, can be drawn: 
461 For  examples, s e e  New Cambridge Modern H i s t o r y ,  Volume I V .  The 
~ e c l i G  of Spain and t h e  T h i r t y  Years War, 1609-48/59. Chapter  V I :  M i l i t a r y  
Forces  and Warfare ,  1610-48. Cambridge, Grea t  B r i t a i n ,  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1970: 209-10; New Cambridge Modern H i s t o r y ,  Volume V I .  The Rise  of  
Great  B r i t a i n  and Russ i a ,  1688-1725. Chapter  X X I I :  Armies and Navies. 
P a r t  2: S o l d i e r s  and C i v i l i a n s .  Cambridge, Great  B r i t a i n ,  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1970: 763-77; John Ch i ld s .  The Army of Cha r l e s  11. Toronto,  U n i v e r s i t y  
of Toronto  P r e s s ,  1976: 21-24; F r a n c i s  Paul  Prucha. The Sword of t h e  Repub l i c :  
The United S t a t e s  Army on t h e  F r o n t i e r ,  1783-1846. Bloomington, I n d i a n a ,  I n d i a n a  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1977: 320-30; Robert M. Ut ley .  F r o n t i e r  Regu la r s :  The United 
S t a t e s  Army and t h e  I n d i a n ,  1866-1890. New York, Macmillan Co., 1973: 22-24; 
Alan Ramsay S k e l l e y .  The V i c t o r i a n  Army a t  Home: The Recrui tment  and Cond i t i ons  
of t h e  B r i t i s h  Regular ,  1859-1899. Mont rea l ,  McGill-Queen's U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1977: 281-300; John M. C o l l i n s .  Depress ion  Army. Army, January  1972: 12-13. 
-- The percentage  of above average  and average  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  
t h e  e n l i s t e d  r anks  -- measured by e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a inmen t  o r  mental  t e s t  
s c o r e  -- h a s  dec l ined  s i n c e  t h e  AVF began. This  c o r r o b a t e s  nea r -  
unanimous i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  r e p o r t s  by o f f i c e r s  and N C O s  t h a t  such persons  
a r e  found much l e s s  o f t e n  i n  t h e  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  r anks  -- e s p e c i a l l y  above 
average  i n d i v i d u a l s .  The absence of t h e  l a t t e r ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  removes 
an impor tan t  " informal  l e a d e r s h i p  cadre ' '  from t h e  j un io r  e n l i s t e d  r a n k s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  a  group which i s  a b l e  t o  mas t e r  t e c h n i c a l  d e t a i l  and procedures  
much more q u i c k l y  t han  less -educa ted ,  l e s s - i n t e l  l i g e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s .  It 
may a l s o  augur ill f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  of f u t u r e  NCOs, a s  t h e s e  must come 
from t o d a y ' s  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  personnel .  
-- The p r o p o r t i o n  of below average  personnel  has  r i s e n  subs tan-  
t i a l l y  s i n c e  t h e  mid-1970s, a  b e l i e f  he ld  by many c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  
pe r sonne l  which was r e i n f o r c e d  by r e c e n t  r e v e l a t i o n s  of mental  
t e s t  i n a c c u r a c i e s  d u r i n g  FY 1976-1980. These tend t o  suppor t  t h e  r e p e a t e d  
i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  e v a l u a t i o n s  from o f f i c e r s  and NCOs t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
d i s t u r b i n g  and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  number of AVF r e c r u i t s  who, even i f  
t h e i r  q u a n t i f i a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  cons idered  "adequate,"  a r e  
compara t ive ly  d e f i c i e n t  i n  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  of " cha rac t e r "  which a r e  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  s u c c e s s  i n  bo th  m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  l i f e .  47/ 
47/ One of t h e  shor thand exp res s ions  f o r  t h i s  impress ion  i s  t h e  
a s s e r x o n  t h a t  r e g a r d l e s s  of t e s t  s c o r e s  and/or  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l s ,  
o r  even s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y ,  a  l a r g e  number of " l o s e r s "  a r e  e n t e r i n g  
t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force  -- i n d i v i d u a l s  whose a c t u a l  l e v e l s  of s o c i a l i -  
z a t i o n  and commitment a r e  .low, r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e i r  q u a n t i f i a b l e  
c a p a c i t i e s .  See Cha r l e s  C. Moskos, Jr. "The E n l i s t e d  Ranks i n  t h e  
Al l -Volunter  Army," i n  John B ,  Keeley, E d i t o r .  The All-Volunteer  
Force and American Socie ty .  C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e ,  V i r g i n i a ,  U n i v e r s i t y  
P re s s  of V i r g i n i a ,  1978: 61-76; Cap ta in  Stephen D ,  Wesbrook, U,S, 
Army. S o c i o p o l i t i c a l  A l i e n a t i o n  and M i l i t a r y  E f f i c i e n c y .  Armed 
Forces and S o c i e t y ,  Winter 1980: 170-89; Capta in  Stephen D. Wesbrook, 
U.S. Army. The Al i ena t ed  S o l d i e r :  Legacy of our  Soc i e ty .  Army, 
December 1979: 18-23. 
-- High schoo l  diploma g radua t e  p r o p o r t i o n s  among new r e c r u i t s  were 
g e n e r a l l y  no t  much d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s from t h o s e  of t h e  e a r l y  
1970s. I n  t h e  l a t e  1970s,  however, t h e  s e r v i c e s  -- t h e  Army, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  -- 
were r e c r u i t i n g  an i n c r e a s i n g  number of persons  who were both non-high 
school  g r adua t e s  and below average  i n  mental  t e s t  s co re s .  Thus, t h e  
average  i n t r i n s i c  menta l  c a p a b i l i t y  -- a s  measured by t h e  DOD t e s t s  -- 
of non-high s choo l  g r adua t e s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  and mid 1970s was much h i g h e r  
t h a n  t h a t  of t h e  non-high s choo l  g r adua t e s  of t h e  l a t e  1970s. 
-- Even i f  some prev ious  s t a t i s t i c a l  i n d i c a t o r s  d i d  n o t  suppor t  
c l a i m s  of s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  and i n t e l l i g e n c e  
l e v e l s  of m i l i t a r y  personnel  e n t e r i n g  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force ,  t h i s  
d i d  n o t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  such changes had no t  t aken  p l ace .  Ra the r ,  i t  
r e f l e c t e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  and/or  accuracy  of e x i s t i n g  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  d a t a  i n  measuring such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
s t a t i s t i c s  on e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t  and i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l s  d i d  n o t  
f u l l y  measure t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  and m o t i v a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  u se  
and apply  t h o s e  a t t r i b u t e s  i n  r e a l - l i f e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t o  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  
i n  a  group environment under  s t r e s s ,  and t o  obey o r d e r s  and i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
-- The d e c l i n e  i n  average  e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t ,  mental  c a t e g o r y ,  
o r  o t h e r ,  l e s s  q u a n t i f i a b l e  i n d i c e s  may have had an  impact on m i l i t a r y  
s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y .  How much i s  almost  imposs ib l e  t o  de t e rmine ,  due t o  
t h e  l a c k  of meaningful  compara t ive  d a t a .  One way i n  which lower b a s i c  
a b i l i t i e s  o r  m o t i v a t i o n  of r e c r u i t s  h a s  a f f e c t e d  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y ,  
however, i s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  amount of t r a i n i n g  t ime r e q u i r e d  t o  mas t e r  
s p e c i f i c  t a s k s ,  and t h e  amount of d r i l l  and r e p e t i t i o n  r e q u i r e d  t o  main- 
t a i n  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y .  
-- The b r i e f  h i s t o r y  of manpower q u a l i t y  e v a l u a t i o n  i n  t h e  A l l -  
Vo lun t ee r  Force  s u g g e s t s  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of r e l y i n g  t o o  h e a v i l y  on 
s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  informed judgment, i n  de t e rmin ing  o v e r a l l  
p o l i c y .  A r e a d i n g  of t h e  voluminous l i t e r a t u r e  on AVF manpower q u a l i t y  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t ,  i n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  de f ende r s  of t h e  All-Volunteer  Force have  
used s t a t i s t i c s  t o  a s s e r t  i t s  " succes s , "  and c r i t i c s  have used t h e  same 
raw d a t a ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t o  i n d i c a t e  " f a i l u r e . "  It would appear  
t o  be more u s e f u l  t o  u s e  g e n e r a l  i n d i c a t o r s  and impress ions  of u n i t  r e a d i -  -
n e s s  and p r o f i c i e n c y ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  of i n d i v i d u a l  s k i l l  competence. 
A f t e r  a l l ,  i t  i s  t h e  u n i t s  t h a t  dep loy  t o  f i g h t ,  no t  a  mass of unorganized  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  u n i t  r e a d i n e s s  measurement i s  -- o r  can  
be -- more comprehensive and based on informed judgment i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  d a t a .  - 48/  
-- The AVF j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  r anks  do not  appear  t o  be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
of t h e  n a t i o n  a s  a  whole i n  te rms  of r a c e .  The complex and profound 
n a t u r e  of t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between b l ack  and wh i t e  Americans, and t h e  
cause s  and consequences of r a c i s m  i n  American l i f e ,  make e v a l u a t i n g  
t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  o v e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  on m i l i t a r y  performance very  
d i f f i c u l t .  
-- It i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  c a r e e r  r e t e n t i o n  problems r e s u l t  p r i m a r i l y  
from t h e  advent  of t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force.  The ev idence  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
c a r e e r  r e t e n t i o n  problems preceded t h e  AVF by many yea r s .  It may be 
48/ For  a  c o n c i s e  d i s c u s s i o n  of u n i t  r e a d i n e s s  measurement c r i t e r i a ,  
s e e  ~ a v i n  R. La i rd  w i t h  Lawrence J .  Korb. The Problem of M i l i t a r y  Readiness .  
A E I  S p e c i a l  A n a l y s i s  80-3. Washington, American E n t e r p r i s e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
P u b l i c  P o l i c y  Research ,  1980: 17-26. 
that intangible or secondary effects of the transition to an AVF exacerbate 
career retention problems, but if past laments of retention study groups 
in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s are any indication, the major reason 
for inadequate career retention was and remains inadequate career force 
compensation. 
I V .  ANALYTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
Nature o f  Suppor t ing  Analyses 
One of t h e  c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e s  of manpower p o l i c y  management i n  t h e  A l l -  
Volunteer  Force i s  t h e  dominance of economic c r i t e r i a ,  market-place ana l -  
o g i e s ,  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  ana lyses .  Much of t h i s  has  come about  because i n  
t h e  A'VF environment  t h e  Armed Forces must compete i n  t h e  l abo r  market 
f o r  personnel .  It i s  no t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  some of t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h e  Armed Forces  adopt  t o  induce  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  e n t e r  an3 remain i n  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  w i l l  b e a r  a  c l o s e  resemblance t o  t hose  used by c i v i l i a n  
b u s i n e s s  and commercial e n t e r p r i s e s .  
The t r a n s i t i o n  t o  an All-Volunteer  Force ,  however, merely r e i n f o r c e d  
a  b roade r  t r e n d  toward approaching  m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y  from a c i v i l i a n -  
o r i e n t e d  manage r i a l ,  i n d u s t r i a l ,  and u t i l i t a r i a n  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
a  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  m i l i t a r y ,  g e o p o l i t i c a l ,  and s t r a t e g i c  one.  - 491 Th i s  
has  r e s u l t e d  from a  combina t ion  of t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l ,  s t r a t e g i c ,  and 
s o c i a l  c i r cums tances  and a  v a r i e t y  of post-World War I1 developments t h a t  
r e i n f o r c e d  t h e s e  t r a d i t i o n s .  In  b l end ing  t h e i r  Eng l i sh  h e r i t a g e  w i th  North 
American c i r cums tances ,  Americans opted f o r  a  m i l i t a r y  manpower system -- 
and a  system of  t h i n k i n g  about  m i l i t a r y  manpower -- which s a c r i f i c e d  wartime 
491 A v a r i e t y  of works examine t h i s  tendency,  bu t  i t  has  never  r e a l l y  
been a d d r e s s e d  from a  broad p e r s p e c t i v e .  See  Gregory Palmer. The McNamara 
S t r a t e g y  and t h e  Vietnam War: Program Budgeting i n  t h e  Pentagon,  1960-1968. 
Westport ,  Connect icu t :  Greenwood P r e s s ,  1978: e s p e c i a l l y  pp. 9-18; 
R. James Woolsey. M i l i t a r y  Opt ions :  Backward March. Washington P o s t ,  
February  26, 1978: A-19; J e f f r e y  Record. The For tunes  of War. H a r p e r ' s ,  
A p r i l  1980. 
e f f i c i e n c y  f o r  what t h e y  pe rce ived  a s  g e n e r a l  l i b e r t y  and freedom from 
unnecessary  m i l i t a r y  c o e r c i o n  and m i l i t a r y  presence .  501 These a t t i t u d e s  
were c a r r i e d  over  i n t o  what t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  a s  t h e  " r a i s i n g  and 
m a i n t a i n i n g  of armies" due t o  t h e  l a c k  of c o n s t a n t  s e t  of s t r a t e g i c  problems 
throughout  American h i s t o r y ;  t h e  l a c k  of a  s u s t a i n e d  major  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  
t o  t h e  homeland; t h e  absence  of enemies w i th  e q u i v a l e n t  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  
and p o p u l a t i o n ;  and t h e  p r e sence  of a l a r g e ,  wel l -educa ted ,  h i g h l y - s k i l l e d ,  
and e a s i l y  t r a i n a b l e  p o p u l a t i o n  i d e a l  f o r  s o l d i e r i n g  i f  persuaded of t h e  
need t o  do so.  To t h e s e  s t r a t e g i c  and demographic f a c t o r s  must be added 
t h e  Eng l i sh  a n t i - m i l i t a r y  t r a d i t i o n  brought  ove r  a s  p a r t  of t h e  Americans '  
p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  baggage,  z/ and t h e  American f a i t h  i n  " e f f i c i e n c y "  
and "o rgan i za t i on"  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  massive i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  
second h a l f  of t h e  19 th  c e n t u r y .  
A v a r i e t y  of post-1945 developments  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e s e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
American ways of looking  a t  m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y .  The i n c r e a s e d  
g e n e r a l  r o l e  of s c i e n c e  and technology  i n  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  (and  s p e c i -  
f i c a l l y  i n  t h e  development and use  of n u c l e a r  weapons) l e d  t o  an i n c r e a s e d  
50/ Robert L. Goldich.  H i s t o r i c a l  C o n t i n u i t y  i n  t h e  U.S. M i l i t a r y  
~ e s e r z  System. Armed Fo rces  and S o c i e t y ,  VII ( F a l l  1980) ;  Samuel P. 
Huntington.  The S o l d i e r  and t h e  S t a t e :  The Theory and P o l i t i c s  of C i v i l  
M i l i t a r y  R e l a t i o n s .  Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap P r e s s  of  Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1957;  Cha r l e s  Roys te r .  A Revolu t ionary  People a t  War: 
The C o n t i n e n t a l  Army and t h e  American Cha rac t e r ,  1775-1783. Chapel H i l l ,  
North C a r o l i n a ,  The U n i v e r s i t y  of North C a r o l i n a  P r e s s ,  1979, a l l  d i s c u s s  
t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  background of t h i s  a t t i t u d e .  
51/ For a  d e t a i l e d  d i s s e c t i o n  of t h e  o r i g i n s  of E n g l i s h  a n t i m i l i t a r y  
i deo logy ,  s e e  Lo i s  G. Schwoerer. "No S t and ing  Armies! " The Antiarmy 
Ideology i n  Seventeenth  Century England. Bal t imore ,  Johns Hopkins Univer- 
s i t y  P r e s s ,  1974. 
use  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h e  fo rmula t ion  of a l l  a r e a s  of m i l i t a r y  
p o l i c y  and a co r r e spond ing  deemphasis of more t r a d i t i o n a l  g e o p o l i t i c a l  
i d e a s .  A t  t h e  same t ime t h e r e  grew i n c r e a s e d  r e l i a n c e  on q u a n t i t a t i v e  
measurements of  human behav io r  u s ing  t echn iques  de r ived  from t h e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e s ,  g e n e r a l l y  economics,  psychology,  soc io logy ,  and p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e .  
Among both  t h e  consequences and causes  of t h i s  u se  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  neasure-  
ments were b e l i e f s  i n  t h e  r a t i o n a l l y  p r e d i c t a b l e  n a t u r e  of human behav io r  
g e n e r a l l y  and i n  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  measurable r a t i o n a l  
approaches t o  more t r a d i t i o n a l  concep t s  i n  n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g i c  formula- 
t i o n  and m i l i t a r y  decisionmaking.  - 521 Given t h e  comparat ive e a s e  w i th  
which economic a c t i v i t i e s  could  be measured compared t o  o t h e r  a r e a s  of  
521 The l i t e r a t u r e  on q u a n t i t a t i v e  and economic-based p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  
i s  v o ~ m i n o u s .  An o v e r a l l  su rvey  i s  U.S. Congress. Senate.  Committee on 
Government Ope ra t ions .  Planning-Programming-Budgeting. Inqu i ry  of t h e  
Subcommittee on Na t iona l  S e c u r i t y  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Opera t ions .  Committee 
P r i n t .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1970: passim, esp.  121-36, 
639-58. The major  works by t h e  p ionee r s  i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e  and economic 
de fense  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  i n c l u d e  A l a i n  C .  Enthoven. Economic Ana lys i s  
i n  t h e  Department o f  Defense. American Economic Review, L I I I ,  May 1963, 
413-23; A la in  C .  Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. How Much i s  Enough? New 
York, Harper and Row, 1971; Cha r l e s  J. Hitch.  Decision-Making f o r  Defense. 
Berke ley ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  U n i v e r s i t y  of C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  1965; Cha r l e s  J .  
Hi tch  and Roland N. McKean. The Economics of  Defense i n  t h e  Nuclear  
Age. Cambridge, Massachuse t t s ,  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1960. S k e p t i c a l  
o r  c r i t i c a l  works i n c l u d e  Robert Conquest. The Role of t h e  I n t e l l e c t u a l .  
Encounter ,  August 1978, 29-42; Xichard A. Gabr i e l .  What t h e  Army Learned 
from Business .  New York Times, A p r i l  15 ,  1979, s e c .  3 ,  p. 4 ;  Richard A. 
Gabr i e l  and Paul  Savage. C r i s i s  i n  Command:   is management i n  t h e  
Army. New York, H i l l  and Wang, 1978; Theodore L e v i t t .  A H e r e t i c a l  View 
of  Management "Science." Fo r tune ,  December 18,  1978, 50-52; Palmer, 
The McNamara S t r a t e g y ;  and Aaron Wildavsky. The P o l i t i c s  of t h e  Budgetary 
Process .  3 rd  ed . ,  Boston,  L i t t l e ,  Brown, and Co., 1979, and Speaking 
Truth  t o  Power: The A r t  and C r a f t  o f  P o l i c y  Analys is .  Boston,  L i t t l e ,  
Brown, and Co., 1979. 
l i f e ,  economic c r i t e r i a  r a p i d l y  assumed a more and more impor tan t  r o l e  
i n  m i l i t a r y  policymaking g e n e r a l l y  and manpower policymaking s p e c i f i c a l l y .  g/ 
Economic a n a l y s e s  and a s s o c i a t e d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  methodology use  long-range 
s t e a d y  s t a t e  p r o j e c t i o n s  t o  provide  a r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  comparing e x i s t i n g  
p o l i c i e s  and programs wi th  t h o s e  be ing  proposed. De ta i l ed  s t a t i s t i c a l  
models of f u t u r e  m i l i t a r y  manpower r equ i r emen t s ,  manpower supp ly ,  and 
gene ra l  economic t r e n d s  a r e  developed. Such models a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  s o  
a s  t o  provide  a s e t  of common assumptions wi th  which t o  compare t h e  c o s t s  
and e f f e c t s  of proposed p o l i c i e s .  
These p r e d i c t i o n s  and t h e  a n a l y s e s  based on them a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  ove r t aken  
by even t s  o r  changes i n  fundamental assumptions.  The Gates Commission, 
f o r  example, p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  f i r s  t-term e n l i s t e d  a t t r i t i o n  would t a k e  p l a c e  
a t  l e v e l s  t h r e e  q u a r t e r s  below t h a t  subsequent ly  exper ienced .  541 S i m i l a r 1  y, -
t h e  Gates Commission and o t h e r  ana lyses  of t h e  AVF made i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s 
and e a r l y  1970s d id  n o t  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  e s t i m a t e s  of pay and b e n e f i t s  needed 
53/ Palmer, The McNamara S t r a t e g y .  19-77; Cooper, M i l i t a r y  Man- 
p o w e r ~ o l i c y  and t h e  All-Volunteer  Fo rce ,  36-39 ; and S teven  E. Rhoads, 
Economists and P o l i c y  Analys ts .  Pub l i c  Admin i s t r a t i on  Review. March-April 
1978: 112-20. 
541 The Gates Commission e s t ima ted  t h a t  f i r s t - t e r m  e n l i s t e d  a t t r i t i o n  
w o u l d b e  approximate ly  5 pe rcen t  du r ing  t h e  f i r s t  two y e a r s  of s e r v i c e ;  
i n s t e a d ,  i t  has  averaged over  30 pe rcen t  du r ing  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  yea r s  of 
s e r v i c e .  The Gates Commission e s t ima ted  t h a t  a 2.0 m i l l i o n  person f o r c e  
would r e q u i r e  259,000 acces s ions  annua l ly  t o  s u s t a i n  i t ;  i n s t e a d ,  i t  h a s  
r equ i r ed  between 340,000 and 410,000. Gate Commission Repor t :  40-43; 
S t u d i e s  Prepared f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on an All-Volunteer  Armed 
Force.  Volume I. Study 1: Manpower and Budgetary I m p l i c a t i o n s  of  Ending 
Consc r ip t ion .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off. ,  November 1970: I-1-1/90; 
U.S. Congress. Senate .  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  Department o f  Defense 
A u t h o r i z a t i o n  f o r  Appropr i a t i ons  f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1981. P a r t  3 ,  Manpower and 
Personnel .  Hear ings ,  96th Congress ,  2nd s e s s i o n ,  Washington, U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Off . ,  1980: 1336; Annual Defense Department Report ,  FY 1981: 267. 
t o  a t t r a c t  v o l u n t e e r s  t h e  presence  of a  panoply of c i v i l i a n  Fede ra l  
programs f o r  persons  of m i l i t a r y  age such a s  Bas ic  Educa t iona l  Oppor tuni ty  
Grants  (BEOG) and jobs under t h e  Comprehensive Employment and T r a i n i n g  
Act (CETA). 551 They could  n o t ,  because t h e  programs d id  not  e x i s t  -
a t  t h e  t ime t h e  a n a l y s e s  were made. 
These l a t t e r  two examples a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e  ano the r  problem i n  making 
long-range s t e a d y  s t a t e  p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  purposes of fo rmula t ing  AVF 
r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  po l i cy .  A l l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  procurement ,  t r a i n i n g  
u t i l i z a t i o n ,  and management of m i l i t a r y  personnel  a r e  h i g h l y  i n t e rdependen t .  
There a r e  many v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  manpower process .  Changing one 
can d r i v e  changes i n  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  system; o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of t h e  system 
c o n s t r a i n  changes i n  any one o t h e r  a s p e c t .  A primary example of t h i s  
i n t e rdependence  i n v o l v e s  t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  AVF on t h e  I n d i v i d u a l  
Ready Reserve.  There i s  no i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  d r a s t i c  d e c l i n e  i n  I R R  
s t r e n g t h  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from t h e  a b o l i t i o n  of t h e  d r a f t  was r ecogn ized ,  
l e t  a l o n e  debated  du r ing  t h e  l eng thy  d i s c u s s i o n s  of 1969-1973. No documents 
ana lyz ing  t h e  p r o s p e c t s ,  s u c c e s s e s ,  and problems of t h e  AVF -- i n  and ou t  
of Government. -- addressed  t h e  i s s u e  u n t i l  l a t e  1975, when DoD t e n t a t i v e l y  
r a i s e d  t h e  problem of i n d i v i d u a l  r e s e r v e  manpower. Thus, due t o  unforeseen  
consequences of p o l i c y  changes which r e v e r b e r a t e d  throughout  t h e  e n t i r e  
m i l i t a r y  manpower system, an u n a n t i c i p a t e d  problem became -- and remains 
-- one c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  whole m i l i t a r y  manpower s t r u c t u r e .  
551 It i s  conce ivab le  t h a t  cu tbacks  i n  t h o s e  programs proposed by 
t h e  ~ z ~ a n  Admins t ra t ion  w i l l  have a  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  on r e c r u i t i n g .  
Using d e t a i l e d  p r o j e c t i o n s  and f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  
of m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y  appea r s  t o  c r e a t e  numerous a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
and p o l i c y  problems. The p r o j e c t i o n s  made i n  numerous AVF r e c r u i t i n g  
and r e t e n t i o n  s t u d i e s  may, indeed ,  be t h e  b e s t  p o s s i b l e  -- i f  no t  t h e  
on ly  p o s s i b l e  -- p r o j e c t i o n s ,  Developers  and u s e r s  of such p r o j e c t i o n s  
and f o r e c a s t s  may n o t e  t h a t  no a l t e r n a t i v e  ha s  been dev i sed  t o  p rov ide  
any kind of meaningful  method of e v a l u a t i n g  proposed changes i n  p o l i c y .  
During t h e  AVF e r a ,  p r e s s u r e s  t o  u se  such p r e d i c t i v e  t e chn iques  have 
been exace rba t ed  by i n c r e a s e d  m i l i t a r y  manpower c o s t s  due t o  t h e  need 
t o  compete w i th  t h e  c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r ,  coupled w i th  f i s c a l l y - c o n s t r a i n e d  
de fense  budgets .  These r e s o u r c e  l i m i t a t i o n s  have spu r r ed  a t t e m p t s  
t o  p rocu re  and u se  m i l i t a r y  manpower i n  t h e  most economica l ly  e f f i c i e n t  
ways, f o r  t h e  unde r s t andab l e  r ea sons  of minimizing c o s t s  and maximizing 
t h e  manpower t h a t  can be o b t a i n e d  from a v a i l a b l e  funds.  The u se  of 
long-range f o r e c a s t i n g  and p lanning  i s  an unde r s t andab l e  a t  tempt t o  
cope wi th  r e a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  This  does  n o t ,  however, mean t h a t  such 
a t t e m p t s  t o  cope do no t  b r i n g  t h e i r  own s e r i o u s  problems. 
Another heavi ly-deba ted  e f f e c t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e s e  a n a l y t i c a l  
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  t r e n d s  on m i l i t a r y  manpower p o l i c y  under  t h e  A l l -  
Volunteer  Force h a s  been t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  h a s  
been,  o r  i s  be ing ,  r e d e f i n e d  away from an " i n s t i t u t i o n "  o r  " c a l l i n g , "  
w i t h  s p e c i a l  r equ i r emen t s  of d i s c i p l i n e ,  s e r v i c e ,  l o y a l t y ,  and commitment, 
toward an occupa t ion  o r  job,  no d i f f e r e n t  from c i v i l i a n  employment. 561 
The e x t e n t  t o  which i n d i v i d u a l  m i l i t a r y  members may have " i n s t i t u t i o n a l "  
o r  t 'occupat iona l"  v a l u e s  o r  b e l i e f s  h a s  been t h e  s u b j e c t  of s o c i o l o g i c a l  
s t udy  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  most have some of both. 571 However, t h e  very -
f a c t s  of vo lun ta r i sm r a t h e r  t h a n  compulsion,  and of competing a s  an 
equa l  i n  t h e  l a b o r  market  r a t h e r  t han  having a  p r i o r i t y  c a l l  on t h e  
n a t i o n ' s  manpower, a r e  bound t o  i n d i c a t e  such an equa t ion  between t h e  
AVF a s  an i n s t i t u t i o n  and c i v i l i a n  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  and between m i l i t a r y  
s e r v i c e  and c i v i l i a n  employment. 
One of t h e  g e n e r a l  e f f e c t s  of t h e s e  t r e n d s  i s  an emphasis on 
peacet ime e f f i c i e n c y ,  i n  te rms  of economy of motion,  smoothness of e f f o r t ,  
and c o n s e r v a t i o n  of r e sou rces .  P r i o r i t y  i s  g iven  t o  t h e  economical ly 
and b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y  e f f i c i e n t  management of a  peacet ime armed f o r c e  
561 The most prominent r e c e n t  exponent of t h e  movement of t h e  U.S 
~rmed-orces from an " i n s t i t u t i o n a l "  t o  an "occupat iona l"  model i s  P r o f e s s o r  
Char les  C .  Moskos, Jr . ,  of Northwestern Un ive r s i t y .  His works i nc lude  From 
I n s t i t u t i o n  t o  Occupation:  Trends i n  M i l i t a r y  Organiza t ion .  Armed Forces  
and S o c i e t y ,  I V ,  F a l l  1977, pp. 41-50; The E n l i s t e d  Ranks i n  t h e  A l l -  
Volunteer  Army, i n  John B. Keeley, Ed. The All-Volunteer  Force and American 
Soc ie ty .  Cha r lo t  t e s v i l l e ,  V i r g i n i a ,  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  of V i r g i n i a ,  1978: 
39-80; (w i th  Morr i s  J anowi t z )  F i v e  Years of t h e  All-Volunteer  Force : 
1973-1978. Armed Forces  and S o c i e t y ,  V ,  Winter 1979: 171-218; and h i s  
tes t imony i n  U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  Cont inuing  
Review of t h e  Al l -Volunteer  Force.  Hearing,  95 th  Congress ,  2d s e s s i o n .  
J u l y  11, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off. ,  1978; and U.S. Congress .  
Senate .  Committee on Armed Se rv i ces .  S t a t u s  of t h e  All-Volunteer  Armed 
Force.  Hear ing ,  95 th  Congress ,  2d s e s s i o n ,  June 20, 1978. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  1978. See a l s o  John E. Greenbacker. The P e r i l s  
o f  Pay Comparabi l i ty .  U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e  Proceedings ,  J u l y  1978,  31-37. 
571 David R. Sega l ,  John D. B l a i r ,  Joseph  Lengermann, and Richard 
~ h o m ~ z n .  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  and Occupat iona l  Values i n  t h e  U.  S. M i l i t a r y ,  i n  
James Brown, Michael J. C o l l i n s ,  and F r a n k l i n  D. Marg io t t a ,  Eds. Changing 
M i l i t a r y  Manpower R e a l i t i e s .  Boulder ,  Colorado,  Westview P r e s s ,  for thcoming;  
and Michael J. S t a h l ,  Cha r l e s  W. McNichols, and T.  Roger Manley. An Empir ica l  
Examination of t h e  Moskos In s t i t u t i on -Occupa t ion  Model. Armed Forces  and 
S o c i e t y ,  V I ,  Winter  1980, 257-69. 
o p e r a t i n g  on a  s t e a d y - s t a t e  b a s i s ,  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
of t h a t  peacet ime f o r c e  upon m o b i l i z a t i o n  f o r  war. One s u s p e c t s  t h a t  a  
major m a n i f e s t a t i o n  of t h i s  emphasis on peacet ime e f f i c i e n c y  i s  t h e  
l i n e  of thought  which argues  t h a t  s m a l l ,  w e l l - t r a i n e d ,  t e chno logy- in t ens ive  
armed f o r c e s ,  manned by q u a l i t a t i v e l y  s u p e r i o r  long-serv ice  v o l u n t e e r s  
and wi th  a  h igh  p r o p o r t i o n  of c a r e e r  pe r sonne l ,  a r e  s u p e r i o r  t o  l a r g e ,  
l e s s  i n d i v i d u a l l y - p r o f i c i e n t ,  manpower-intensive f o r c e s  manned by 
s h o r t - s e r v i c e  c o n s c r i p t s  and a  s m a l l e r  p r o p o r t i o n  of c a r e e r  pe r sonne l .  
There can be l i t t l e  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  former type  of f o r c e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  c a r e f u l l y  s t r u c t u r e d  i n  accordance wi th  s t a t e d  m i l i t a r y  and f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i s  more economica l ly  e f f i c i e n t ,  and e a s i e r  t o  manage, 
t han  t h e  l a t t e r  kind of fo rce .  In t h e  p a s t ,  however, v o l u n t e e r  f o r c e s  
of t h i s  n a t u r e  have proven t o  be much l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  p rov id ing  
a  m o b i l i z a t i o n  base  f o r  i n t e n s e  and perhaps  p r o t r a c t e d  war fa re  t han  
a  f o r c e  wi th  more s u r p l u s  manpower and r e s o u r c e s  l e s s  t i e d  t o  one 
p a r t i c u l a r  s t r a t e g i c  and g e o p o l i t i c a l  v i s i o n .  58/ I f  s t r a t e g y  -
58/ The c l a s s i c  such example i s  t h e  sma l l ,  a l l - v o l u n t e e r  B r i t i s h  
Army of 1914, a t  t h e  outbreak  of World War I. The B r i t i s h  Army had a  
much h i g h e r  l e v e l  of bo th  i n d i v i d u a l  s k i l l  p r o f i c i e n c y  and u n i t  t r a i n i n g  
than  t h e  c o n s c r i p t  f o r c e s  of C o n t i n e n t a l  Europe, but  i t  soon "melted" due 
t o  heavy c a s u a l t i e s .  The l a c k  of mass ive ,  consc r ip t i on -c rea t ed  r e s e r v e s ,  
p lu s  t h e  l a c k  of s u r p l u s  c a p a c i t y  i n  t h e  a c t i v e  f o r c e ,  d r a s t i c a l l y  i n h i b i t e d  
t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  B r i t i s h  Army t o  mob i l i ze  f o r  a  long war a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  
few months of combat. See C o r v e l l i  B a r n e t t ,  B r i t a i n  and Her Army, 1509-1970: 
A M i l i t a r y ,  P o l i t i c a l ,  and S o c i a l  Survey. Burgay, S u f f o l k ,  United Kingdom, 
Penguin Books, 1974: 377-80, 389, 397, 403-04, 410-12, 492-94. Also,  t h e  
comment i n  C y r i l  F a l l s .  The Grea t  War, 1914-1918. New York, Capr icorn  Books, 
1959: 35: "The B r i t i s h  would have been t h e  b e s t  of t h e  l o t  on t h e  En ten t e  
s i d e  i f  t h e r e  had been enough of them. M i l i t a r y  c r i t i c s  t a l k  only  of t h e  
s u p e r i o r i t y  of smal l  p r o f e s s i o n a l  armees d ' e l i t e  over  'armed c o n s c r i p t  ho rdes . '  
Very good, bu t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e  main enemy had a  magn i f i cen t  army, and 
i n  t h e  second,  smal l  a rmies  f e e l  l o s s e s  more s h a r p l y  t han  b ig .  Armees d ' e l i t e  
would be i n v i n c i b l e  i f  wars were fought  wi thout  c a s u a l t i e s .  Things being 
what t hey  a r e ,  armees d ' e l i t e  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  remain so  long." 
and commitments, o r  t h e  n a t u r e  and i n t e n s i t y  of war, change, t h e r e  i s  no 
s l a c k  wi th  which t o  change d i r e c t i o n ;  - 591 when m o b i l i z a t i o n  comes, t h e r e  
i s  no s u r p l u s  of manpower t o  s imu l t aneous ly  s u s t a i n  t h e  shock of i n i t i a l  
combat l o s s e s  and suppor t  f o r c e  expans ion  wi thou t  t h r e a t e n i n g  i n i t i a l  
combat c a p a b i l i t y .  Yet t h e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  appea l  of such a  
f o r c e  i n  peacet ime i s  undeniable .  
The All-Volunteer  Force Environment 
There has  been much con t rove r sy  about  whether o r  not  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
of t h e  AVF h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  " c i v i l i a n i z a t i o n "  of t h e  Armed Forces i n  te rms  
of a t t i t u d e s  and d i s c i p l i n e .  There i s  l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s  an i n s t i t u t i o n  e x e r t s  c o n t r o l  over  i t s  members f a r  beyond 
t h a t  of c i v i l i a n  e n t e r p r i s e s  has  diminished s u b s t a n t i a l l y  over  t h e  p a s t  two 
decades.  Formerly,  t h i s  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c o n t r o l  was cons idered  t o  be a  mains tay  
of m i l i t a r y  d i s c i p l i n e .  It bo th  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e  n e c e s s a r i l y  a u t o c r a t i c  n a t u r e  
of t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  wartime and provided p o s i t i v e  suppor t  f o r  m i l i t a r y  personnel  
and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  i n  time of s t r e s s ,  bo th  i n  peace and war. Almost u n i v e r s a l l y ,  
however, t h e  r e c r u i t ' s  encoun te r  wi th  t h i s  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  e a r l y  months and 
y e a r s  of s e r v i c e  was n o t a b l y  u n p l e a s a n t ;  c e r t a i n l y  i t  went a g a i n s t  t h e  s o c i a l  
c u r r e n t s  of t h e  1960s and 1970s. Much of t h i s  c o n t r o l  i s  gone. 
C e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  of t h e  AVF appear  t o  have c o n t r i b u t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  
t h i s  e r o s i o n  of c o n t r o l .  The dramat ic  r i s e  i n  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  pay, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  h a s  g iven  s i n g l e  e n l i s t e d  personnel  much more d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
income wi th  which t o  purchase  l u x u r i e s  and r e c r e a t i o n  h i t h e r t o  unava i l -  
a b l e  t o  low-paid r e c r u i t s  -- c a r s  and f r equen t  of f -base  excu r s ions  a r e  
two of t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  examples. The same r i s e  i n  pay, coupled 
wi th  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  Armed Forces  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  d e s i r e s  of t h e i r  
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e n l i s t e d  pe r sonne l  f o r  pe r sona l  p r i v a c y ,  h a s  l e d  t o  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  number 
of s i n g l e  e n l i s t e d  pe r sonne l  l i v i n g  o f f  ba se ,  and t h e r e f o r e  l i t t l e  
d i f f e r e n t  from c i v i l i a n  commuters go ing  t o  and from work each  day. The 
g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  p r o p o r t i o n  of marr ied  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  pe r sonne l  ( f o r  
whatever r e a s o n )  h a s  s i m i l a r l y  d imin ished  t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  Armed 
Forces  ove r  more of i t s  members, f o r  DoD does no t  p rovide  f ami ly  hous ing  
f o r  j u n i o r  e n l i s t e d  personnel .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s t e e p  r i s e  i n  f i r s t - t e r m  
e n l i s t e d  a t t r i t i o n  unques t i onab ly  r e s u l t s  from a  t a c i t  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n  by 
DoD t h a t  i n  a  v o l u n t e e r  f o r c e ,  i t  i s  more a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  d i s c h a r g e  a  
r e c a l c i t r a n t  o r  u n s u i t a b l e  m i l i t a r y  member t han  u se  t r a d i t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  
d i s c i p l i n e  t o  mo t iva t e  him t o  f i n i s h  h i s  term s u c c e s s f u l l y  -- " i f  h e  
d o e s n ' t  want t o  be h e r e ,  we d o n ' t  want him." Put  i n  a n o t h e r  way, " t h e  
a l l - v o l u n t e e r  m i l i t a r y ,  l i k e  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i s  w i t n e s s i n g  
t h e  common occu r r ence  of i t s  members ' q u i t t i n g '  o r  be ing  ' f i r e d . " '  601 -
Other  a s p e c t s  of " c i v i l i a n i z a t i o n , "  whi le  t h e y  may have been a c c e l -  
e r a t e d  by t h e  advent  of t h e  All-Volunteer  Force ,  c l e a r l y  preceded i t s  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  The e x t e n t  t o  which m i l i t a r y  j u s t i c e  and d i s c i p l i n e  h a s  
been c l o s e l y  a l i g n e d  w i th  c i v i l i a n  j u s t i c e ,  i n  terms of p rocedu ra l  s a f e -  
guards ,  narrowing of m i l i t a r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  and c o n t r a c t  law, began i n  
t h e  1960s,  we l l  b e f o r e  t h e  AVF began i n  1973. It would seem l o g i c a l  t o  
assume, however, t h a t  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of t h e  AVF would r e i n f o r c e  t h e  t r e n d  
of removing t h e  p r ev ious  pr imary goa l  of m i l i t a r y  j u s t i c e  -- t h e  main- 
tenance  of m i l i t a r y  d i s c i p l i n e  -- and r e p l a c i n g  i t  wi th  t h e  g e n e r a l  
c i v i l i a n  j u d i c i a l  o b j e c t i v e  of s a f egua rd ing  t h e  r i g h t s  of t h e  accused.  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  changing r o l e  of women i n  American s o c i e t y  h a s  r e s u l t e d  
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i n  an e r o s i o n  of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  concept  of t h e  " m i l i t a r y  wife ,"  i n  
te rms  of h e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  move f r e q u e n t l y ,  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  v o l u n t a r y  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  suppor t  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  community, and eschew work and 
c a r e e r  ambi t ions  of h e r  own i n  f avo r  of a  primary r o l e  of wi fe  and 
homemaker. It seems u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  AVF has  much t o  do wi th  t h i s  
t r e n d  a t  a l l ,  a l though o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  AVF would c e r t a i n l y  
r e i n f o r c e  any moves toward pe r sona l  autonomy r a t h e r  t h a n  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  
t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  g o a l s .  
Other  examples of s o c i a l  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  AVF, o r  r e i n f o r c e d  by t h e  
AVF, could  be c i t e d .  But i t  i s  impera t ive  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  changes 
appear  t o  be i n  l a r g e  measure t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  a b s o l u t e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  compete i n  t h e  marke tp lace  f o r  r e c r u i t s .  To 
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  " m i l i t a r y "  a s p e c t s  of t h e  Armed Forces  
a r e  deemed u n d e s i r a b l e  by t h e  t a r g e t  r e c r u i t i n g  popu la t i on ,  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
would appea r  t o  have l i t t l e  cho ice  b u t  t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  s e v e r i t y  of t h e  
m i l i t a r y  environment s imply  t o  r e c r u i t  enough personnel .  C r i t i c i s m  of  
All-Volunteer  Force  pol icymakers  f o r  t ak ing  a c t  i ons  which lead  t o  t h i s  
a l l e g e d  " c i v i l i a n i z a t i o n "  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  environment would t h e r e f o r e  
appear  t o  be mi sp l aced ,  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  c r e a t e  and s u s t a i n  an  AVF 
appears  t o  make such a  " c i v i l i a n i z a t i o n "  very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  avoid .  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Problems : Complexity and "Ta i lo r ing"  of  I n c e n t i v e s  
The m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  c u r r e n t l y  provide  an e l a b o r a t e  mix of 
r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  f i r s t - t e r m  and c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  
pe r sonne l .  P r o s p e c t i v e  f i r s t - t e r m  r e c r u i t s  a r e  faced  w i th  a  bewi lde r ing  
a r r a y  of cho i ce s .  There a r e  f o u r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  choose from, each 
w i th  d i s t i n c t i v e  advantages  and d i s advan t ages ,  r e a l  and pe rce ived .  
There a r e  e n l i s t m e n t  terms of two t o  s i x  y e a r s ,  o f t e n  l i nked  w i t h  s p e c i a l  
pays ,  bonuses,  and e d u c a t i o n a l  b e n e f i t s ;  and p a r t i c u l a r  s k i l l s ,  m i l i t a r y  
u n i t s ,  geog raph ica l  a r e a s ,  and d a t e  of beg inning  a c t i v e  du ty  commencement. 
The p r o s p e c t i v e  e n l i s t e e  i n  t h e  S e l e c t e d  Reserve i s  f aced  wi th  rough ly  t h e  
same number and type  of cho i ce s ,  a l though t h e  R e s e r v i s t  w i l l  have many 
of h i s  cho i ce s  made f o r  him i n  accordance  wi th  t h e  type  of S e l e c t e d  
Reserve u n i t s  i n  h i s  home a r e a .  611 Overarch ing  a l l  of t h e s e  c h o i c e s  i s  -
t h e  i n h e r e n t  complexi ty  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  compensat ion and b e n e f i t s  system 
i t s e l f ,  w i th  i t s  components of b a s i c  pay, a l l owances ,  t a x  advan t ages ,  
and non-monetary b e n e f i t s  such a s  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  i n su rance ,  d i s coun t -  
purchas ing  f a c i l i t i e s  and o t h e r  mora le ,  w e l f a r e ,  and r e c r e a t i o n  
a c t i v i t i e s  and Veterans  Admin i s t r a t i on  b e n e f i t s  a v a i l a b l e  a f t e r  l e a v i n g  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  - 621 
While t h e  c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  member i s  p robably  more f a m i l i a r  w i th  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  compensation and b e n e f i t s  system, h e  a l s o  ha s  a  wide 
611 For a  comprehensive l i s t i n g  of r ec ru i tmen t  o p t i o n s  s e e  O f f i c e  of 
t h e   gista ant S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense (Manpower, Reserve A f f a i r s ,  and L o g i s t i c s ) .  
Educa t i ona l  I n c e n t i v e s  Study.  Washington, February 9 ,  1980: 1-2/14; and 
Pathways t o  M i l i t a r y  S e r v i c e  f o r  Men and Women. October  1978. 
621 For  e x p l a n a t i o n s  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  compensat ion sys tem,  s e e  U.S. 
cong re s s .  House. Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s .  Pay and Allowances 
of t h e  Uniformed S e r v i c e s  ... a s  amended through December 31, 1978. 
Committee P r i n t .  H.A.S.C. No. 4. 96 th  Congress .  Washington, U.S. Govt. 
P r i n t .  Off . ,  1979: passim,  e s p e c i a l l y  81-118. 
v a r i e t y  of r e e n l i s t m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  r e c e i v e  and o p t i o n s  t o  e x e r c i s e ,  
depending on h i s  s k i l l ,  d e s i r e d  u n i t  o r  l o c a t i o n ,  grade ,  and s e r v i c e ,  
and he t o o  must f a c t o r  i n t o  h i s  cho ice  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of v e t e r a n s  
b e n e f i t s  a f t e r  l e a v i n g  a c t i v e  duty .  
By c r e a t i n g  such a  wide v a r i e t y  of pay, t r a i n i n g ,  and s e r v i c e  
o p t i o n s ,  t h e  Armed Forces  p rov ide  e x p l i c i t  gua ran t ees  t o  most e n l i s t e e s  
a s  t o  e x a c t l y  what t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  s k i l l  t r a i n i n g  and/or  duty  w i l l  i nvo lve  
and where i t  w i l l  t a k e  p l a c e .  The needs of t h e  s e r v i c e s  can t h u s  
be matched t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  g o a l s  of i n d i v i d u a l  r e c r u i t s .  There can 
be l i t t l e  doubt  t h a t  t h i s  " t a i l o r i n g "  of r e c r u i t i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l  r e c r u i t  d e s i r e s  -- a ided  by e l a b o r a t e  automated in fo rma t ion  
systems i n d i c a t i n g  t o  r e c r u i t e r s  what s k i l l s ,  du ty  s t a t i o n s ,  formal  
m i l i t a r y  s c h o o l s ,  and geograph ica l  a r e a s  have openings f o r  r e c r u i t s  
a t  any t ime -- h a s  g r e a t l y  a ided  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force  i n  r e c r u i t i n g .  
The r e c r u i t e r  can  no t  on ly  " s e l l "  t h e  r e c r u i t  on m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  
g e n e r a l l y ,  bu t  " s e l l "  him on a  s p e c i f i c  job,  u n i t ,  o r  l o c a t i o n ,  o f t e n  i n  
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  s p e c i f i c  monetary o r  non-monetary i n c e n t i v e s .  Indeed ,  
g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  r e c r u i t  i s  look ing  a t  c i v i l i a n  employment 
and checking  t h e  same o p t i o n s  a s  provided by c i v i l i a n  employers ,  such a  
t a i l o r i n g  of m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  o p t i o n s  and compensation would appear  t o  be 
i m p e r a t i v e  t o  e n a b l e  AVF r e c r u i t e r s  t o  compete e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  t h e  l a b o r  
market .  g/ To a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  t h e  same i s  t r u e  -- h a s  always been 
t r u e  -- of t h e  r e t e n t i o n  of c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l .  
It does appear ,  however, t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  have pa id  a  p r i c e  
f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  such a  complex network of i n c e n t i v e s  and o p t i o n s .  There 
a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  o p t i o n s  have m u l t i p l i e d  so  much t h a t  t h e y  have 
reached t h e  p o i n t  of n e a r  i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y  t o  bo th  p o t e n t i a l  r e c r u i t s  
and r e c r u i t e r s  -- t h a t  t h e  number of f a c t o r s  t o  be weighed i s  so  g r e a t  t h a t  
i t  t a x e s  t h e  a b i l i t y  of bo th  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  e v a l u a t e  t h e i r  worth.  The 
s p e c i f i c i t y  of an i n d i v i d u a l  r e c r u i t ' s  compensat ion,  t r a i n i n g  and s e r v i c e  
g u a r a n t e e s  -- embodied i n  h i s  e n l i s t m e n t  c o n t r a c t  -- a l s o  c r e a t e s  expec ta -  
t i o n s ,  no t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h a t  t h o s e  gua ran t ee s  w i l l  be p r e c i s e l y  f u l f i l l e d  
d u r i n g  h i s  s e r v i c e .  I f  t h e  e x i g e n c i e s  of m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  demand t h a t  
any of t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  be changed, t hen  t h e  r e c r u i t  f e e l s  shor tchanged  
o r  chea t ed .  This  may be c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  t h e  d r a f t  e r a ,  d u r i n g  which a  
r e c r u i t  expected few i f  any i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  t o  be  g r an t ed  and 
consequen t ly  s u f f e r e d  l i t t l e  i f  any d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  a f t e r w a r d s  i f  h e  
found h imse l f  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  h e  would n o t  have chosen f o r  h i m s e l f .  A 
byproduct  of t h e s e  p r e c i s e  e n l i s t m e n t  o p t i o n s  i s  t h e  growing a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
of c o n t r a c t  law t o  e n l i s t m e n t  c o n t r a c t s  and compensat ion,  t r a i n i n g ,  and 
s e r v i c e  gua ran t ee s .  
631 The u t i l i t y  of such f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  managing r e c r u i t i n g  o p t i o n s  
and i n c e n t i v e s  i s  de sc r ibed  i n  U.S. General  Accounting O f f i c e .  F l e x i b l e  
Management: A Must f o r  E f f e c t i v e  Armed S e r v i c e s  R e c r u i t i n g .  Report t o  
t h e  Congress by t h e  Comptro l le r  General  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  GAO 
Report Nos. FPCD-80-64 and B-199870. Washington, September 18,  1980. 
The complexi ty of r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  has  c r e a t e d  
problems of a n a l y s i s  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s  we l l .  It has  become d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  manpower pol icymakers  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n d i v i d u a l  changes 
i n  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  -- more o r  l e s s  money f o r  bonuses 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s k i l l s ,  adding o r  d e l e t i n g  c e r t a i n  s k i l l s  from bonus e l i g i -  
b i l i t y ,  i n c r e a s i n g  o r  dec reas ing  e n l i s t m e n t  terms i n  accordance wi th  
s p e c i a l  b e n e f i t s  -- due t o  t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of i n t e rdependen t  f a c t o r s  
involved .  More and more expe r imen ta l  and/or  l i m i t e d  programs a r e  be ing  
added t o  t h e  a r r a y  of i n c e n t i v e s  a l r e a d y  a v a i l a b l e ,  each wi th  i t s  own 
s e t  of c r i t e r i a  r ega rd ing  compensat ion,  s k i l l  t r a i n i n g ,  geograph ica l  
a r e a  i n  which a p p l i c a b l e ,  l e n g t h  of s e r v i c e ,  and s i m i l a r  i t ems .  It i s  
t h e r e f o r e  almost  imposs ib l e  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of changing any one 
of t h e s e  i t ems  on r e c r u i t i n g  o r  r e t e n t i o n ,  even wi th  t h e  u se  of s t a n d a r d  
s t a t i s t i c a l  t e chn iques  f o r  doing so .  
The problem i s  compounded by t h e  l a c k  of s t r i n g e n t ,  j u d i c i o u s ,  and 
r i g o r o u s  e v a l u a t i o n  of expe r imen ta l  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s .  641 
Accura te  e v a l u a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of one 
p a r t i c u l a r  v a r i a b l e .  Changing o n l y  one v a r i a b l e  i n  a r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n -  
t i o n  exper iment ,  however, c o n f l i c t s  w i th  t h e  need of t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  
t o  be a s  f l e x i b l e  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  vary ing  all of t h e i r  op t ions  i n  o r d e r  
t o  a t t r a c t  and r e t a i n  a s  many personnel  a s  p o s s i b l e .  There i s  t h u s  a  
c o n f l i c t  between ( 1 )  t h e  o v e r a l l  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  s e r v i c e s  need i n  
64/ See Gus W.  Haggstrom. The Var i ab l e  Tour Experiment i n  t h e  Army 
~ e s e r z  Components, Report no. R-1568-ARPA. Santa  Monica, Ca., The 
Rand Corpora t ion ,  May 1975: v i a  65-74; and The P i t f a l l s  of Manpower 
Exper imenta t ion .  Report no. P-5449. San ta  Monica, Ca., The Rand Corpora- 
t i o n ,  A p r i l  1975. 
o r d e r  t o  a t t r a c t  and r e t a i n  pe r sonne l  and (2) t h e  i n c e n t i v e  p o l i c y  b e s t  
s u i t e d  t o  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  succes s  of s p e c i f i c  i n c e n t i v e s .  
"Ta i lo r ing"  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  c r e a t e s  a  r e l a t e d  
type  of t e n s i o n  between t h e  need t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  i n c e n t i v e  programs do n o t  
o u t l i v e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n s  they  were des igned  t o  d e a l  w i t h  and t h e  need t o  
avoid t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  c o n s t a n t  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  i n c e n t i v e s  
t h a t  such f l e x i b i l i t y  g e n e r a t e s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  s e r v i c e s  have op t ed  f o r  
manager ia l  f l e x i b i l i t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  s t a b i l i t y  i n  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  
i n c e n t i v e s .  This  ha s  prevented  unnecessary  o r  even c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  -- such a s  r e e n l i s t m e n t  bonuses f o r  s k i l l s  i n  which t h e  
s e r v i c e s  a r e  a c t u a l l y  o v e r s t r e n g t h ,  which t h e  d r a f t - e r a  r e e n l i s t m e n t  
bonus program al lowed.  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i t  may have c o s t  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
much i n  terms of t h e i r  members' hav ing  a  s ense  of permanence i n  t h e i r  
compensat ion and b e n e f i t  e n t i t l e m e n t s .  
Some a n a l y s t s  have argued t h a t  pe r ce ived  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  such e n t i t l e -  
ments can have a s  n e g a t i v e  an  impact on morale  -- and presumably r e c r u i t i n g  
and r e t e n t i o n  -- a s  do a c t u a l  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  b e n e f i t s .  g/ Constan t  m o d i f i c a t i o n  
of i n c e n t i v e s  t o  meet shor t - te rm r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  needs ,  even i f  
such m o d i f i c a t i o n s  evened o u t  over  t h e  long te rm,  could  have a s  d e t r i m e n t a l  
an e f f e c t  on r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  a s  any s p e c i f i c  l a c k  of " t a i l o r i n g "  
of i n c e n t i v e s  t o  meet ing  shor t - te rm needs.  This  would appear  t o  be p a r t i c -  
u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  c a s e  of s k i l l e d  t e c h n i c a l  pe r sonne l ,  such a s  Navy nuc l ea r -  
power pe r sonne l  and h e a l t h  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  who a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  under  
p r e s s u r e  -- a c t u a l  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  -- t o  l e a v e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  f o r  more 
65/ For a  c o n c i s e  summary of t h i s  p o i n t  of view, s e e  t h e  remarks of 
~ i e u t e n a n t  Genera l  Benjamin 0. Davis ,  Jr., USAF ( R e t i r e d ) ,  i n  Report  of 
t h e  p r e s i d e n t ' s  Commission on M i l i t a r y  Compensation. Washington, U.S. 
Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  A p r i l  1978: 186-87. 
l u c r a t i v e  c i v i l i a n  employment. I f  a s su red  a  c e r t a i n  l e v e l  of com- 
p e n s a t i o n  and b e n e f i t s ,  such i n d i v i d u a l s  might be more persuaded t o  
forego  t h e  monetary advantages  of c i v i l i a n  l i f e .  However, t h e  
c o n s t a n t  shor t - te rm f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  execu t ive  branch suppor t  and l e g i -  
s l a t i v e  r e a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  f o r  r e t e n t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  do l i t t l e  t o  a s s u r e  a  
s t a b l e  l e v e l  of remunera t ion  ove r  an e n t i r e  c a r e e r ,  and hence t o  r e a s s u r e  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  involved .  
A f i n a l  i s s u e  i nvo lves  what appears  t o  be a  fundamental d i f f e r e n c e  
between r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  problems and t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  d i r e c t e d  towards 
each.  The average  h y p o t h e t i c a l  f i r s t - t e r m  e n l i s t e e  i n  t h e  All-Volunteer  
Force i s  no t  ye t  s o c i a l i z e d  i n t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  environment. He t h e r e f o r e  
w i l l  t end  t o  e v a l u a t e  job cho ices  accord ing  t o  c i v i l i a n  c r i t e r i a ,  which a r e  
t h e  on ly  ones  he  h a s  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l .  These i n c l u d e  job s a t i s f a c t i o n  -- i n  
terms of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t a s k s  t o  be performed and t h e  working environment -- 
and compensat ion and b e n e f i t s .  It i s  not  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  All-Volunteer  
Force r e c r u i t e r s  a t t empt  t o  formula te  t h e i r  r e c r u i t i n g  appea ls  i n  c i v i l i a n  
terms -- what o t h e r  terms w i l l  a  t a r g e t  popu la t i on  of t h e  s i z e  they a r e  
d e a l i n g  wi th  unders tand?  While a  c e r t a i n  p ropor t i on  of t h e  c i v i l i a n  
popu la t i on  can  always be a t t r a c t e d  by more s p e c i f i c a l l y  " m i l i t a r y "  appea l s  
t o  p a t r i o t i s m  and adventure ,  hero ism and g l o r y ,  h i s t o r y  sugges t s  t h a t  t h a t  
p r o p o r t i o n  i s  r a r e l y  l a r g e  enough t o  man any All-Volunteer  Force of 
a p p r e c i a b l e  s i z e .  - 661 
------------- 
66/ See Alan Ramsay Ske l l ey .  The V i c t o r i a n  Army a t  Home: The Rec ru i t -  
ment a n d  Terms and Cond i t i ons  of t h e  B r i t i s h  Regular ,  1859-1899. Montrea l ,  
~ c G i l l - Q u e e n ' s  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1977: 247-49; F rede r i ck  S. Harrod. Manning 
t h e  New Navy: The Development of a  Modern Naval E n l i s t e d  Fo rce ,  1899-1940, 
Westpor t ,  Connect icu t ,  Greenwood P r e s s ,  1978: 46-48, 67-73; and Major Robert K. 
G r i f f i t h ,  Jr.,  U.S. Army. Q u a l i t y  n o t  Quan t i t y :  The Volunteer  Army During t h e  
Depression.  M i l i t a r y  A f f a i r s ,  December 1979: 171-77. 
For r e c r u i t e r s  t o  emphasize educa t i on  and t r a i n i n g ,  t r a v e l ,  and pay, r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  " m i l i t a r y  v i r t u e s , "  i s  t h e r e f o r e  l o g i c a l  i f  r e c r u i t s  
a r e  t o  be secured .  The v a l u e s  of t h e  " m i l i t a r y  v i r t u e s , "  and t h e i r  appea l  
a s  an i n c e n t i v e ,  t end  t o  come a f t e r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  been exposed t o  
them, which i s  by d e f i n i t i o n  n o t  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  f i r s t - t e r m  
e n l i s t e e .  
For c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l ,  however, t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t .  The c a r e e r  member h a s  accep t ed  t h e  un ique ly  d i f f e r e n t  and 
r i g o r o u s  n a t u r e  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s  an i n s t i t u t i o n  by t h e  ve ry  f a c t  of 
h i s  r e e n l i s t m e n t .  It can t h e r e f o r e  be reasoned  t h a t  t h e  c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  
member f i n d s  t h e  m i l i t a r y  environment congen ia l  and d e s i r a b l e ,  and chooses  
a  m i l i t a r y  c a r e e r  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  because of t h e  m i l i t a r y  environment .  Two 
consequences flow from t h i s .  F i r s t ,  i f  compensat ion and o t h e r  t a n g i b l e  
b e n e f i t s  a r e  main ta ined  a t  "adequate1'  -- i . e . ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  h i g h l y  
r emune ra t i ve ,  bu t  comfor tab le  -- l e v e l s ,  t h e  c a r e e r  m i l i t a r y  member 
i s  t h e r e a f t e r  concerned with maintenance of t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  environment  
i n  which h e  h a s  e l e c t e d  t o  work and l i v e .  Second, r e t e n t i o n  -- a s  opposed 
t o  f i r s t - t e r m  r e c r u i t i n g  -- p o l i c i e s  can and a rguab ly  should be much 
more concerned w i th  maintenance of t h o s e  a s p e c t s  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s  
an i n s t i t u t i o n  which d i f f e r e n t i a t e  i t  from c i v i l i a n  s o c i e t y .  This  might 
i nvo lve  such fundamental i s s u e s  a s  s t a n d a r d s  of m i l i t a r y  j u s t i c e  and 
d i s c i p l i n e  and r i g o r  and i n t e n s i t y  of t r a i n i n g ,  down t o  such seemingly-  
p r o s a i c  t h i n g s  a s  uniform and grooming s t a n d a r d s .  
The maintenance of the distinctly different aspects of military 
life to improve career retention, it can be seen, thus conflicts with 
attempts to emphasize those aspects of military life which are the same 
as civilian society to improve first-term recruiting. The demands of 
voluntary recruiting in the civilian labor market thus create another 
set of theoretical contradictions for the Armed Forces. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Preliminary research for this study began on the assumption that one 
of its purposes was to identify new concepts and/or unconventional, hitherto 
unexplored options for improving All-Volunteer Force recruiting, retention, 
and quality. A survey of the numerous studies, analyses, and reports on 
both specific programs and the general status of the AVF resulted in conclu- 
sions that such an attempt was unlikely to prove fruitful. A great deal 
of analytic talent has been brought to bear on making the All-Volunteer 
Force work over the past decade, and there are few if any radically 
new, specific ideas that have not been considered previously. 
Some generalizations can be made from this survey: 
-- Since the transition to an AVF began in 1969-1970, the services have 
emphasized the recruiting of nonprior service males, with or without a high 
school diploma, but probably not college bound in either case. Maintenance 
of an adequate career enlisted force has stressed the reenlistment of per- 
sonnel rather than recruitment of skilled older individuals from civilian 
life. This marks a continuation of draft era policies. 
-- The legislative or administrative initiatives designed to accomplish 
the above ends have varied little from those recommended by the Gates Com- 
mission in 1970 or those which form part of the 1980 legislation designed to 
improve retention and bolster recruit quality. These initiatives include increased 
compensation and benefits, larger recruiting and advertising budgets and man- 
power strengths, broader military assignment and training options, and "quality 
of life" improvements in living and working conditions. Suggestions for 
improving AVF r e c r u i t i n g ,  r e t e n t i o n ,  and q u a l i t y  a long  t h e s e  l i n e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
i nvo lve  no innova t ions  i n  p o l i c y ;  r a t h e r ,  t hey  invo lve  i n c r e a s e d  r e s o u r c e s  
and b e t t e r  management of t h o s e  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e .  
-- The s e r v i c e s  have p l aced  compara t ive ly  less emphasis on broadening  
t h e  manpower pool  from which new r e c r u i t s  (and,  i n  some c a s e s ,  exper ienced  
NCOs) a r e  ob t a ined .  A conspicuous  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  i s  t h e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  female m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l ,  who have g e n e r a l l y  been 
of h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n a l  and i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l s  and have proved i n v a l u a b l e  i n  
s u s t a i n i n g  t h e  AVF, bu t  whose use  i n  l a r g e r ~ n u m b e r s  has  c r e a t e d  problems 
which have been add res sed  by t h e  s e r v i c e s  t a n g e n t i a l l y ,  a t  b e s t .  
The unde r ly ing  assumption behind t h e  s e r v i c e s '  appa ren t  unwi l l i ngness  
t o  move f u r t h e r  i n  t h e  a r e a  of t app ing  new sou rces  of u n t r a i n e d  manpower 
appea r s  t o  be t h a t  t h e  conven t iona l  one -- nonpr io r  s e r v i c e  young males -- 
i s  t h e  only  one r e a l l y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  Other  groups 
of p o t e n t i a l  r e c r u i t s  a r e  regarded  a s  be ing  "low q u a l i t y "  ( t o o  o l d ,  
t o o  young, t o o  p h y s i c a l l y  u n f i t ,  t o o  uneducated,  t o o  u n i n t e l l i g e n t ) ;  
" o v e r q u a l i f i e d "  ( t o o  wel l -educa ted ,  t o o  i n t e l l i g e n t ,  t o o  highly-graded 
i n  t h e  c a s e  of persons  w i th  p r i o r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e ) ;  o r  i ncapab le  
of be ing  e f f e c t i v e l y  s o c i a l i z e d  i n t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  environment ( o l d e r  
pe r sonne l  who a r e  p o t e n t i a l  NCOs). There appea r s  t o  be a  t a c i t  assumption 
t h a t  enough manpower e x i s t s  t o  be h i g h l y  s e l e c t i v e  -- t h a t  demands a r e  
not  s o  g r e a t ,  o r  supply  s o  l i m i t e d ,  a s  t o  r e q u i r e  l e s s  s e l e c t i v i t y .  The 
d r a f t  combined w i t h  t h e  l a r g e  s i z e  of t h e  American popu la t i on  fo rmer ly  
gua ran t eed  t h i s  s e l e c t i v i t y .  
A r e l a t e d  assumpt ion  appea r s  t o  be t h a t  an  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  e i t h e r  
" q u a l i f i e d w  o r  " u n q u a l i f i e d "  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e ,  r a t h e r  t han  be ing  
r i s k s  t o  l i f e ,  t h e i r s  
such r i s k  a s  i n e v i t a b  
a t t i t u d e  would appear  
t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
and o t h e r s  -- r a t h e r  
l e  i n  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t  
t o  c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e  
more o r  l e s s  u s e f u l ,  depending on t o t a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of manpower and 
t h e  t r a d e o f f s  between h i s  l i a b i l i t i e s  on t h e  one hand and t h e  drawback 
of having  an u n f i l l e d  m i l i t a r y  space  on t h e  o t h e r .  I n  l a r g e  p a r t ,  t h i s  
d i s t i n c t  i o n  r e f l e c t s  a  l e s s  r i g o r o u s  a t t i t u d e  toward m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  
-- t h e  unwi l l i ngnes s  t o  employ l e s s  q u a l i f i e d  persons  who might cause  
t h a n  be ing  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c u r  
ions .  ( P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  
s t a t emen t  of many AVF s u p p o r t e r s  
of t h e  m i l i t a r y  h a s  made 
s t a n d a r d s  of performance under a c u t e  s t r e s s  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t . )  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  may r e s u l t  
i n  an i n d i v i d u a l  be ing  "ove rqua l i f i ed"  f o r  e n l i s t e d  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  
may a l s o  r e s u l t  from an o r i e n t a t i o n  which s t r i c t l y  e q u a t e s  m i l i t a r y  
s e r v i c e  w i th  b l u e - c o l l a r  c i v i l i a n  work, c aus ing  a  l a c k  of a t t e n t i o n  
toward r e c r u i t i n g  i n  c o l l e g e  envi ronments .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h e  American m i l i t a r y  toward cha rges  of "mi l i t a r i sm"  
h a s  r e s t r a i n e d  t h e  development of m i l i t a r y  o r i e n t a t i o n  programs such 
a s  t h e  C i t i z e n s '  M i l i t a r y  T r a i n i n g  Camps of t h e  pre-World War I1 e r a  
and J u n i o r  ROTC, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  of t h e  Vietnam War. 
It can be argued t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  have t h u s  f a r  no t  a d j u s t e d  
r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  p h i l o s o p h i e s  i n  accordance  wi th  changing s t r a t e g i c ,  
demographic, and m i l i t a r y  c i r cums tances  and requi rements .  Manpower 
"requirements"  a s  p u b l i c l y  s t a t e d  have n o t  i n c r e a s e d  s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  of 
t h e  AVF and i n  f a c t  a  d e c l i n e  i n  manpower s t r e n g t h  ha s  been accep t ed .  The 
c r e s t  of t h e  demographic wave of baby boom persons  h a s  o n l y  j u s t  pa s sed ,  i n  
1980. The s t r a t e g i c  environment h a s  been r e l a t i v e l y  benevolen t  when compared 
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t o  t h a t  p r o j e c t e d  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .  It appears ,  though, t h a t  some o r  
a l l  of t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  change du r ing  t h e  1980s. Nobody 
seems t o  be p r e d i c t i n g  a  benign i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
t h e  1980s. Manpower r equ i r emen t s  w i l l  p robably  i n c r e a s e ,  whi le  t h e  
number of persons  of m i l i t a r y  age w i l l  d ec rease  due t o  d e c l i n i n g  b i r t h  
r a t e s  t h a t  began i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s. 
Given t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of t h e s e  changing c i rcumstances ,  a t  l e a s t  a  
p a r t i a l  r e a l l o c a t i o n  of r e s o u r c e s  and e f f o r t  -- both  budgetary and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  -- may be cons ide red .  More comparat ive emphasis could be 
placed on expans ion  of t h e  manpower pool ,  and perhaps l e s s  on r e c r u i t i n g  
from t h e  c u r r e n t ,  op t imal  (nonpr io r  s e r v i c e  male, non-college l e v e l )  man- 
power pool .  Persons  from t h i s  l a t t e r  group w i l l ,  of cou r se ,  probably 
c o n t i n u e  t o  form t h e  backbone of t h e  e n l i s t e d  ranks.  But a  c a s e  can be 
made t h a t  a  g r e a t e r  mix from o t h e r  c o h o r t s  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  u n f i l l e d  s l o t s  
and q u a l i t a t i v e  s h o r t f a l l s .  
An expans ion  of t h e  manpower pool  deemed e l i g i b l e  f o r  m i l i t a r y  
s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  AVF w i l l  p robably  be s u i t e d  t o  making up s h o r t f a l l s  i n  
q u a l i t y  only .  Measures such a s  reducing  p h y s i c a l ,  men ta l ,  e d u c a t i o n a l ,  
and age s t a n d a r d s ;  r e c r u i t i n g  more c o l l e g e  s t u d e n t s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  j u n i o r  
c o l l e g e  s t u d e n t s  and g r a d u a t e s ) ;  and inducing  a  more f avo rab le  a t t i t u d e  
toward m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  through t r a i n i n g  programs such a s  J u n i o r  ROTC 
might a s s i s t  i n  making up q u a l i t a t i v e  s h o r t f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  
2.1 m i l l i o n  pe r son  AVF. A p p l i c a t i o n  of s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more money and 
manpower t o  t h e  u s u a l  p l e t h o r a  of compensat ion-related i n c e n t i v e s  could 
a s s i s t  a s  w e l l  -- i n  f a c t ,  t h e s e  methods have worked w e l l  i n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
improving S e l e c t e d  Reserve r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  s i n c e  FY 1978. 
Such an "expansion of t h e  manpower pool" may a l s o  r e s u l t  from cu tbacks  
i n  a  v a r i e t y  of e d u c a t i o n a l  and employment a s s i s t a n c e  programs o f f e r e d  
by t h e  Fede ra l  Government which have no s e r v i c e  r equ i r emen t s .  Major 
r e d u c t i o n s  i n  t h e  number of persons r e c e i v i n g  t h i s  t ype  of Government 
a s s i s t a n c e  could t u r n  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  number of young people -- i n c l u d i n g  
many wi th  h igh  e d u c a t i o n a l  a t t a i n m e n t  and mental  a b i l i t y  -- toward t h e  
m i l i t a r y .  Such a  t u r n  could be enhanced by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of more 
l i b e r a l  m i l i t a r y  and v e t e r a n s  e d u c a t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t han  t h a t  c u r r e n t l y  
o f f e r e d .  
I f  major  problems of q u a n t i t y  a r e  assumed, however, they  appear  much 
l e s s  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  s o l u t i o n  through t h e  t a r g e t i n g  of i n c r e a s e d  r e s o u r c e s  
on p r e c i s e  problem a r e a s  o r  through t h e  p r e c i s e  ad jus tment  of e n l i s t m e n t  
e l i g i b i l i t y  s t anda rds .  Grea t ly  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  q u a n t i t y  of m i l i t a r y  personnel  
would a p p a r e n t l y  r e q u i r e  d r a s t i c  r i s e s  i n  budgetary  r e s o u r c e s  -- f o r  
r e c r u i t i n g  i n c e n t i v e s  f a r  and beyond c u r r e n t  pay s c a l e s ,  i f  c u r r e n t  
r e c r u i t i n g  problems a r e  any gu ide ,  o r  h i g h e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s  r e s u l t i n g  
from a  r e t u r n  t o  c o n s c r i p t i o n .  It h a s  been s a i d  t h a t  " q u a n t i t y  h a s  
a  q u a l i t y  a l l  i t s  own." I f  t h i s  " q u a l i t y "  i s  sought ,  s e c u r i n g  i t  may 
be t h e  most i n t r a c t a b l e  problem of t h e  All-Volunteer  Force ,  long a f t e r  
j u d i c i o u s  monetary and p o l i c y  i n c e n t i v e s  have e l i m i n a t e d  t h e  c a r e e r  
r e t e n t i o n  and mental  ca t ego ry / educa t iona l  l e v e l  problems t h a t  seem t o  
be so  c r i t i c a l  i n  t h e  AVF i n  1980. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  All-Volunteer  Force has  gene ra t ed  a n a l y t i c a l ,  admini- 
s t r a t i v e ,  and p h i l o s o p h i c a l  problems t h a t  do no t  seem t o  have  much t o  
do wi th  s p e c i f i c  r e c r u i t i n g  and r e t e n t i o n  p o l i c i e s  o r  q u a l i t y  l e v e l s .  
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Ra the r ,  t h e y  r e s u l t  i n  l a r g e  p a r t  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Armed Fo rces ,  
t o  o b t a i n  r e c r u i t s ,  must assume many of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of a  c i v i l i a n  
b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  o r d e r  t o  compete i n  t h e  l a b o r  market e f f e c t i v e l y .  
This  i n c l u d e s  a d a p t i n g  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e s i r e s  of m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  emphasizing more t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  m i l i t a r y  
d i s c i p l i n e ;  r e l y i n g  more on q u a n t i t a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s  of pe r sonne l  q u a l i t y  
and r e a d i n e s s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  judgment of o f f i c e r s  and NCOs; 
and c a r e f u l l y  t a i l o r i n g  r e s o u r c e s  t o  o b j e c t i v e s ,  even i f  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  
no t  r e a d i l y  p r e d i c t a b l e .  The cumula t ive  e f f e c t  of many of t h e s e  changes 
i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y ' s  way of "doing bus ines s "  and d e c i d i n g  what i t s  b u s i n e s s  
i s  may, i n  t h e  long run ,  be c r e a t i n g  a s  many problems f o r  t h e  All-Volunteer  
Force a s  t h e  more obvious  and t a n g i b l e  ones of r e c r u i t i n g ,  r e t e n t i o n ,  
and q u a l i t y ,  and may l i n g e r  long a f t e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  wi th  t h e  l a t t e r  
seem t o  have been so lved .  
